government and the duplicity of the authorities, who had resisted all his efforts to divide the city into districts and establish an active police, the British general adopted prompt and effici→ ent measures to check so serious an evil, and he pressed them with the utmost vigour. He at once informed the authorities that he should hold them responsible for the tranquillity of the town, and that, if the civil power were not sufficient to restrain the factious and disaffected from instigating the mob to plunder and slaughter, and directing their worst passions against the more respectable and virtuous classes and their own allies, who were there to defend them, martial law should be proclaimed. Language like this from a man like Lord Wellington was effectual; they knew that he never threatened what he did not perform; the rising murmurs and turbulence of the multitude became still, the progress of the evil was arrested, and the conspirators slunk back into their secret conclave, where the evil genius of a Bishop of Oporto and the intrigues of De Souza presided. But this was not the only unpleasant feature which presented itself, now the tide of success appeared to be turning so rapidly in favour of the French. The commander-in-chief and the officers of the French army in general, altered their system of rigour towards the inhabitants, particularly in the south of Spain, for one of a milder description, which had the effect of reconciling many to the existing government. The loss of Ciudad Rodrigo was felt as a great misfortune by the people of Castile; and they were aggrieved, not only with Lord Wellington but the whole British people, that some effort had not been made to relieve the place. One of the consequences was, that all correspondence with the allied army ceased; persons refused to give any intelligence, and even to forward the communications of those employed to acquire it. Nor was this the only disadvantage felt by such unexpected re-action in the public mind; it gave greater weight and importance to the movements of Massena, and, both at home and abroad, added to the evil prognostics respecting the failure of Lord Wellington's plans. This great commander felt all the difficulties, added to the immense responsibility which he had to encounter; the utmost degree of caution, combined with rare skill and boldness, were required to enable him to retreat and concentrate his army without loss, A single error might destroy all his projects; and compromise the safety of Portugal and of the British army. On one hand it was important that he should not allow the enemy to attempt the siege of Almeida without keeping their army collected; at the same time that he must not allow them to push him too hard in his retreat. In the present positions of the allied army, he could place the whole between Celorico and Pinhanços the first march, at the same time that he could collect the whole to bear on any one position in a few hours. At this time he received intelligence from General Cox, the governor of Almeida, that there was no force of any importance before the place, and he instantly determined to make a movement to the rear with the infantry, with the exception of the 4th division to be left in observation at Guarda, and which, in retiring, was directed to move upon Linhares. General Craufurd was ordered to be at Celorico, and the whole cavalry under Sir Stapleton Cotton in front, to observe the different roads and points of the enemy's march. Having thus adapted his movements to the dispositions of the enemy, Lord Wellington stood prepared for every contingency,—either to act on the offensive or to retreat. “Whatever may be the enemy's intentions," he says, "(which I think are to dash at us as soon as they shall be prepared, and make our retreat as difficult as possible), we shall be in such a situation as to be able to effect it without being much pressed, or to move forward again if a blow can be struck with advantage.”* The enemy now advanced as he anticipated, with the intention of throwing their whole force upon both flanks of the army, and thus to bring on a general engagement in a situation advantageous to them, but they found the British withdrawn into * Alverca, 27th July, 1810. the valley of Mondego, behind Celorico,-the 4th division, under General Cole, upon Guarda, the whole of the cavalry in front,— calmly observing their movements upon the Coa. The corps under General Hill made a corresponding movement, and passed the Elja, near Salvaterra; while the partisan chief, Colonel Le Cor, with his division, was at Fundao, in communication with the troops at Guarda. The invasion having commenced, Lord Wellington issued his famous proclamation enjoining the inhabitants on the whole line of his retreat to forsake their houses, to remove their goods and cattle, and destroy all stores and provisions for which they had no conveyance. The magistrates and authorities were also informed that if, after receiving the order from the military officers, they remained to receive the invaders, they should be considered traitors to their country, and suffer the severest penalty of the law. CHAPTER X. (1810 to 1814.) Profound views-Depth of character-Fall of Almeida-Promotion in the army-Opinions of Lord Wellington-Correspondence-Sufferings of the Portuguese-Able remarks-Strictures of Lord Wellington on the regency Advice to the government-Comprehensive mind-Knowledge of details-On the Spanish system of carrying on the war-Impartial examination of his own opinions-Self-distrust and control-Wonderful harmony of great qualities-Famous retreat-Masterly movement of General Hill-Battle of Busaco-Victory of the British-Massena attempts to turn their position-Retreat of Lord Wellington on Torres Vedras-The famous lines-Strong positions-Winter campaign. It was a just observation of the distinguished subject of these memoirs, as regarded the events of war, that as the Almighty does not give "the race to the swift, or the battle to the strong," so he had himself fought battles enough to know that, even under the best arrangements, the result of any one is not certain; an opinion wholly in accordance with that trust in Providence, (the Fortune of the ancients) moderation of views and freedom from vain boasting, in other words, too great reliance on human wisdom and daring, which he invariably manifested. At no time had he observed this great truth more remarkably illustrated than by the sudden and unexpected fall of Almeida. The place itself was immensely strong the works were regularly constructed; it had a garrison upwards of 4000 men, commanded by an experienced English officer, and it was fully expected that it would stand a protracted siege. Commensurate with its strength, and the supposed duration of its defence, was the large store of provisions and munitions of every kind; and it was the only grand fortress which arrested the progress of the enemy. Should the siege be protracted until the autumnal rains, it must render the object of the French commander-even if enabled to proceed with his plans-exceedingly difficult. After having been regularly invested for a period of ten days, the batteries, consisting of sixty-five pieces of cannon, poured in a tremendous fire during the greater part of the 26th, and on the same night (Sunday) the great magazine in the centre of the town blew up with a fearful explosion. It shook the city like an earthquake; the houses and public buildings were unroofed-numbers of people were killed, and so wide and appalling was the destruction-the sound of which was heard to an immense distance—that it left that noble fortress, like a vast heap of ruins, defenceless before the enemy. Even the batteries—and the ponderous engines on which the garrison relied for their defence, were blown from the walls into the ditches below. But scarcely had the stunning effect of the first shock subsided, when the rappel of the governor was heard beating to arms; the few gunners who were left alive hurried to the ramparts, and opened a fire with such pieces as they found still mounted. A general assault was every moment expected; but the besiegers, almost as much taken by surprise as the garrison, failed, in the confusion of the night, to take advantage of the circumstance. Next morning, when the extent of the evil became manifest, Massena demanded an instant surrender, and, after some preliminary arrangements, the necessity became so obvious, that General Cox no longer hesitated. "The loss of Almeida," writes Lord Wellington,* "is a great misfortune; but I do not lose all hopes yet. Since I wrote yesterday to government I have heard that Regnier's corps has been brought to Sabugal, where it arrived yesterday; so that I have now got the three corps upon my hands. Since yesterday they have made no movement." And again, in reference to this painful subject, he observes:+ "The Arganil *To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley, Celorico, 30th of August. |