CHAPTER IX.

(1810 to 1814.)

Plans of the British General-His exertions-Ill health-Spanish guerillas -Movements of the British army-Difficulties to contend with-Excellent measures for defence or attack-He annoys and delays the enemy-Proceedings of the opposition-Conduct of the government-Napoleon— Opinion of Lord Wellington-Buonaparte's system-His opinion of the British General-Operations of General Hill-Strange conspiracy-The French army-Progress of Massena-Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo-Measures of precaution-Portuguese authorities-Preparations for retreat.

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THE series of disastrous events which ushered in the opening of the year 1810, and appeared to close every avenue of hope for the re-establishment of national independence throughout the Peninsula, did not, at the same time, take the British commander by surprise, or find him unprepared how to act. His mind had been long engaged in preparing plans for the future, and preparing even for the worst; while his arrangements were so admirably made with reference to the power of the enemy, that he could take advantage of events, and succour or act with our allies, whenever a fair occasion and reasonable prospects success should render it prudent. Surrounded by difficulties and trammelled with responsibility as he was, he permitted nothing to interfere with the persevering ardour with which he embraced every subject, entered into its least details, availed himself of every resource, and became master of every kind of information which could tend to the success of the war. Neither his own ill health,--for he had now some time been suffering from a slow or remittent fever,—nor his disappointments and losses incurred by the faults of others, could induce him to

relax in his exertions; and, having matured his plans relating to more immediate and pressing occurrences of the war, he was anxious to connect them with a system of defence, still more extended and deep grounded, which had recently occupied much of his time and thoughts. To develope and mature it, ere the anticipated ruin of the Spanish armies should bring down the combined strength of the French upon himself, he set out on the 8th of October to visit Lisbon and the vicinity, where he continued for a period of nearly three weeks. He took a particular survey of the adjacent country; and, after personal examinations and practical observations with regard to all its capabilities for natural and artificial fortification, he fixed his eyes on the formidable heights of Torres Vedras. He already meditated the grand project of those impregnable lines, and was eager to apply it with his previous reasonings to the existing localities, and to the capabilities of the ground.

In less than three weeks he had completed all his calculations, and all the practical details of the subject, besides despatching a mass of other business,-maintaining an active correspondence, laying down plans, (even time, place, and circumstances,)—with reference to magazines and supplies, and pointing out to his general officers the movements and line of action they would have to adopt on the invasion of the enemy, whose motions and designs he penetrated, and was even enabled to direct them in their duties,-giving each the line he was to follow in his approaching famous retreat.

Before the end of October he was again with his army, better in health, full of animation and activity, and in communication on every side with the different corps and divisions, both of British and Portuguese, which were to make corresponding movements when the different armies of Napoleon, - now strongly reinforced and flushed with recent victories,—should bear down upon the frontiers.

With astonishing celerity, his comprehensive mind embraced every object connected with his future plans while it went through the minutest details; and, on the 1st of November, he

again left his army at Badajos and repaired to Seville. He thence accompanied Lord Wellesley to Cadiz, on occasion of the departure of that nobleman for England, and the appointment of his brother, the Hon. Henry Wellesley, as ambassador to Spain. He had thus an opportunity of inspecting the works at Cadiz and on the isle of Leon, defended by the English and Portuguese under Sir William Stewart, and, subsequently, by General Graham. At the same time, he entered into arrangements equally necessary for the interests of Spain and Portugal, and for their common defence in conjunction with his own plans; and, about the middle of the month, again rejoined his army on the Guadiana.

The French army still continuing to receive reinforcements, the attention of Lord Wellington now became painfully directed to the immediate results of the contest. When called upon by the supreme junta and the different Spanish generals to resume the offensive, and unite with one or other of their armies in protecting the weaker and stemming the tide of French successes, he uniformly replied by showing that his interference, under the circumstances of the war, would not only prove actually injuri ous with regard to the purposes they proposed, but must assuredly bring destruction upon the British army, upon Portugal; and upon the last hopes of the common cause. At the same time, so anxious was he to support and protract the war in Spain, that, from the period of retiring from Talavera, he had his eye upon every movement of the campaign; he anticipated the objects of the enemy, he forewarned, he advised the Spanish generals how to foil or defeat the objects of that enemy, not by open battles, but by covering with their armies the operations of the guerilla warfare throughout the country, holding their large forces aloof in strong impregnable positions, like their ancestors in their first conquests of the Moors,-always on the alert to follow up, by striking decisive blows, the earliest successes of the guerillas.

But, although his admirable directions were thrown away upon the weak ambition of the junta, and the sanguine tempera

ment of the chiefs and soldiers of the Spanish armies, he had the satisfaction, as he well knew must be the result, of beholding them, at length, driven by necessity to adopt the very measures he had so strenuously urged, while their armies remained yet entire, and occupied the attention of the French armies,-and there were other causes for this.

The effect of being frequently brought into contact with death, at once wearies and appals the mind of the stoutest soldier. It is a fact, well noted by ancient no less than modern commanders, that, after long and arduous service, the veteran shrinks with disgust from the repetition of the sanguinary work, as if cloyed with destruction,-whereas the soldiers, younger in point of service, rush readily and even gaily into the battle.* If we add to the almost continual contact with death, the disheartening influence of almost certain defeat, with all its terrors of shame, flight, and slaughter, we may form some idea of the feelings with which Spanish soldiers met the armed and disciplined legions of Napoleon in the open plains, and of the causes of those sudden panics which led to the very consequences they were intended to avoid. Bitter experience with continual defeats, sufferings, and disasters, at last drove the main bodies themselves, scattered and confused, into their native hills, where, joining the small parties already put in motion, or forming separate bands, the guerilla system daily assumed a more formidable attitude. Thus, after having routed the Spaniards at all points in the open field, the enemy found there were still armies of the mountains more difficult to reach, and, when found, to be fought under every disadvantage to the

* We well remember hearing a brave officer of a very distinguished British regiment observe, upon an occasion when the corps had behaved nobly and as usual sustained a heavy loss, "it is almost time that our old hands should be sent home; they have had too much of this; they were as steady as usual but not in such good humour as the men who last came out,-a few more such victories would sicken them.”—Sherer's Military Memoirs. There is an observation, also, of a similar purport in the excellent work of the historian Napier, who, in speaking of the French under Soult, and their weariness and discontent, says, that "the mind shrinks from perpetual contact with death."

invaders. That this was the species of force calculated for the defence of the country, we learn from the description of what the Spaniards termed armies,* by one of their commandersthe Duke of Albuquerque when accompanying the army of Cuesta in its early campaigns. "On our marches,” it is observed, "we stop to repose like a flock of sheep, without taking up any position, and again we march as if we were on a pilgrimage, without any regard to distance, order, or method." On the contrary, the guerillas could collect under chosen leaders, acquainted with all the advantages of the ground on which they were to act in small bands, so disposed as to act separately or in concert with others,-to surprise the unfortunate straggler, a few scattered troops,—a convoy,— and even to hover round and alarm the French camps,— sometimes the head quarters and the garrison of the capital themselves.

This was, indeed, a formidable system; and, supported by the good will, the enthusiasm of the people, or, at least, the great majority in all parts,-while the British army on the frontiers continued unbroken and prepared when the moment came to resume active operations,-kept the French in continual alarm, and disturbed all the plans and calculations of Napoleon himself. The war became more sanguinary in detail than when conducted on a general scale; the French, in ostensible possession of the country, with no armies to oppose them, found themselves opposed to individuals,-to a whole nation sup ported by innumerable bands of mountaineers, led by the most brave and skilful, elected in every village and community, as ready to surprise and fall upon them in their guarded as in their unguarded moments. In the camp, in the market place, or on the march, and in every transaction of ordinary life, they stood among those who had marked them out for a bloody prey. The peasant, whom they saw peaceably employed in the field, bad his gun and his knife secretly prepared to bring down his

* Words made use of by Sir John Moore.