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themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of dances; for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured speech. In these things the sense is better judge than the art;
"Cœnæ fercula nostræ Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis."
continued impresses and emblems. And as for gestures, they are as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written, in that they abide not; but they have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with the things signified: as Periander, being consulted with how to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he saw him do; and went into his garden and topped all And of the servile expressing antiquity in an the highest flowers: signifying, that it consisted unlike and an unfit subject, it is well said, in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobilityQuod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruiand grandees. "Ad placitum," are the charac- tate est maxime novum. ters real before mentioned, and words: although For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or some have been willing by curious inquiry, or alphabets, but may be in words. The kinds of rather by apt feigning, to have derived imposition | ciphers, besides the suple ciphers, with changes, of names from reason and intendment; a specula- | and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants, tion elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into are many, according to the nature or rule of the antiquity, reverent; but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This portion of knowledge, touching the notes of things, and cogitations in general, I find not inquired, but deficient. And although it may seem of no great use, considering that words and writings by letters do far excel all the other ways; yet because this part concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge, (for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver,) I thought|phering, by supposition unprofitable, but, as good to propound it to better inquiry.
Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them hath produced the science of Grammar: for man still striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived; and as he hath striven against the first general curse by the invention of all other arts, so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse, which was the confusion of tongues, by the art of grammar: whereof the use in a mother tongue is small, in a foreign tongue more; but most in such foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures; the one popular, which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well for intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors; the other philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they are the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words and reason is handled "sparsim," brokenly, though not entirely; and therefore I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself.
Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of the accidents of words; which are measure, sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and harshness of them; whence hath issued some curious observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the verse, and not of the argument: wherein though men in learned tongues do tie
infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, &c. But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be impossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that they be without suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write "omnia per omnia;" which is undoubtedly possible, with a proportion quintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of ciphering, hath for relative an art of deci
things are, of great use. For suppose that ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them which exclude the decipherer. But in regard of the rawness and unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass, the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers.
In the enumeration of these private and retired arts, it may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them for show and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those which are skilful in them judge whether I bring them in only for appearance, or whether in that which I speak of them, though in few marks, there be not some seed of proficience. And this must be remembered, that as there be many of great account in their countries and provinces, which, when they come up to the seat of the estate, are but of mean rank and scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here placed with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things; yet to such as have chosen them to spend their labours and studies in them, they seem great matters.
For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved a controversy in our time. But as in civil business, if there be a meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and no proceeding at all; so in learning, where there is much controversy, there is many times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall report it deficient.
Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, [matical and disclosed. The pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharp
in logic, as a part of judgment: for as the doc-
The latter whereof seemeth to be "via deserta et interclusa.” For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of error between the deliverer and the receiver: for he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as may be best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to doubt, than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength.
Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is great, is the delivery of knowledge. in aphorisms, or in methods; wherein we may observe, that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few axioms or observations upon any subject, to make a solemn and formal art, filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a sensible method: but the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, where to the writing in method doth not approach.
For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; discourse of connection and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation: and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in methods,
"Tantum series juncturaque pollet, Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris ;"
as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy; but particulars, being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire farther; whereas methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at farthest.
But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method wherein it was invented; and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet nevertheless, "secundum majus et minus," a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots; but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of knowledges, as it is now used, is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the roots: of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematics, in that sub-things will come in of themselves: indeed a man ject, hath some shadow; but generally I see it neither put in ure nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.
Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight, is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by questions and their determinations; the latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning, as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller
would not leave some important piece with an enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not to minister and excite disputations and doubts.
Another diversity of method there is, which bath some affinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain Another diversity of method is, according to the persons, who have made it as a false light for | subject or matter which is handled; for there is a their counterfeit merchandises; and that is, enig- great difference in delivery of the mathematics,
which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and | &c. than he did in introducing the canker of epipolicy which is the most immersed; and howso- tomes; and yet (as it is the condition of human ever contention hath been moved, touching a things that, according to the ancient fables, “The uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, most precious things have the most pernicious yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness keepers ;") it was so, that the attempt of the one of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as made him fall upon the other. For he had need that which taketh the way to reduce learning to be well conducted that should design to make certain empty and barren generalities; being but axioms convertible, if he make them not withal the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel circular, and "non promovent," or incurring into being forced out and expulsed with the torture and themselves but yet the intention was excellent. The other considerations of method, concerning press of the method: and therefore, as I did allow well of particular topics for invention, so I do propositions, are chiefly touching the utmost proallow likewise of particular methods of tradition. positions, which limit the dimensions of sciences; Another diversity of judgment in the delivery for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the and teaching of knowledge is, according unto the profundity, (which is the truth and substance of light and presuppositions of that which is deliver- | it, that makes it solid,) to have a longitude and a ed; for that knowledge which is new, and foreign | latitude; accounting the latitude towards other from opinions received, is to be delivered in sciences, and the longitude towards action; that another form than that that is agreeable and fa- is, from the greatest generality to the most parmiliar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks ticular precept: the one giveth rule how far one to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, knowledge ought to intermeddle within the prowhere he saith, "If we shall indeed dispute, and vince of another, which is the rule they call Kafavrò; not follow after similitudes," &c. For those the other giveth rule unto what degree of particuwhose conceits are seated in popular opinions, | larity a knowledge should descend: which latter need only but to prove or dispute; but those I find passed over in silence, being in my judgwhose conceits are beyond popular opinions have ment the more material; for certainly there must a double labour; the one to make themselves be somewhat left to practice; but how much is conceived, and the other to prove and demon-worthy the inquiry. We see remote and superstrate: so that it is of necessity with them to have ficial generalities do but offer knowledge to scorn recourse to similitudes and translations to express of practical men; and are no more aiding to practhemselves. And therefore in the infancy of tice, than an Ortelius's universal map is to direct learning, and in rude times, when those conceits the way between London and York. The better which are now trivial were then new, the world sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to was full of parables and similitudes; for else glasses of steel unpolished, where you may see would men either have passed over without mark, the images of things, but first they must be filed ; or else rejected for paradoxes that which was so the rules will help, if they be laboured and offered before they had understood or judged. So polished by practice. But how crystalline they in divine learning, we see how frequent parables may be made at the first, and how far forth they and tropes are; for it is a rule, "That whatsoever may be polished aforehand, is the question; the science is not consonant to presuppositions, must inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient. pray in aid of similitudes."
There be also other diversities of methods, vulgar and received : as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of concealment or cryptic, &c., which I do allow well of, though I have stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I have remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one general inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touching the wisdom of tradition.
There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method, which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture; which is, to deliver knowledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make a show of learning who have it not: such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius, in making that art which bears his name; not unlike to some books of typocosmy, which have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words of all arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the art; which collections are much like a fripper's or broker's shop, that hath ends of every thing, but nothing of worth.
But unto this part of knowledge, concerning methods, doth farther belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work, but also the severals beams and columns thereof; not as to Now we descend to that part which concerneth their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure : and therefore method considereth not only the the illustration of tradition, comprehended in that disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise science which we call Rhetoric, or art of elothe propositions; not as to their truth or matter, but quence; a science excellent, and excellently well as to their limitation and manner. For herein Ra- laboured. For although in true value it is inferior mus merited better a great deal in reviving the to wisdom, (as it is said by God to Moses, when good rules of propositions, Kaðóλov πρ☎тоν катà пavтós, | he disabled himself for want of this faculty, Aron
shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as [that she cannot be showed to the sense by corpoGod:) yet with the people it is the more mighty; ral shape, the next degree is to show her to the for so Solomon saith, “Sapiens corde appellabitur imagination in lively representation: for to show prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora• reperiet ;" her to reason only in subtilty of argument, was signifying, that profoundness of wisdom will help a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of a man to a name or admiration, but that it is elo- the Stoics; who thought to thrust virtue upon quence that prevaileth in an active life. And as men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle have no sympathy with the will of man. with the rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of rhetoric exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art; and therefore the deficiencies which I shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.
Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true, there should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; but in regard to the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections,
"Video meliora, proboque; Deteriora sequor :"
reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the imagination from the affections part, and conthe roots of this science, as we have done of the tract a confederacy between the reason and imarest; the duty and office of Rhetoric is, to apply gination against the affections; for the affections reason to imagination for the better moving of the themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reawill. For we see reason is disturbed in the ad- son doth. The difference is, that the affection ministration thereof by three means; by illaquea- beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth tion or sophism, which pertains to logic; by ima- the future and sum of time. And therefore the gination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; present filling the imagination more, reason is and by passion or affection, which pertains to commonly vanquished; but after that force of morality. And as in negotiation with others, men eloquence and persuasion hath made things future are wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by and remote appear as present, then upon the revehemency; so in this negotiation within our-volt of the imagination reason prevaileth. selves, men are undermined by consequences, We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be solicited and importuned by impressions or observations, and transported by passions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it: for the end of logic is, to teach a form of argument | to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of morality is to procure the affections to obey reason, and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is, to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it: for these abuses of arts come in but "ex obliquo," for caution.
the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors:
no more charged with the colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with vice. For we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close the other at large; but much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, both: for the proofs and demonstrations of logic though springing out of a just hatred of the rhe-are toward all men indifferent and the same; but toricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome "Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion :" by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. which application, in perfection of idea, ought to For we see that speech is much more conversant extend so far, that if a man should speak of the in adorning that which is good, than in colouring same thing to several persons, he should speak to that which is evil; for there is no man but them all respectively in several ways: though speaketh more honestly than he can do or think; this politic part of eloquence in private speech it and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in is easy for the greatest orators to want; whilst, Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad by the observing their well-graced forms of speech, side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever they lose the volubility of application: and thercinveighing against eloquence and good speech; fore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to knowing that no man can speak fair of courses better inquiry, not being curious whether we place sordid and base. And therefore as Plato said it here, or in that part which concerneth policy. elegantly, "That Virtue, if she could be seen, Now, therefore, will I descend to the deficiencies, ---ould move great love and affection;" so seeing|which, as I said, are but attendances: and first, I
do not find the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric, as I touched before. For example:
'Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum."
"Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.
A CONCLUSION IN A DELIBERATIVE.
"So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences future."
There remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical. For all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained by men's proper endeavours and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth
Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor: sed cum reces- reading of books; whereunto appertain incidently serit, tum gloriabitur."
The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three: one, that there be but a few of many; another, that their elenches are not annexed: and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them: for their use is not only in probation, but much more in impression. For many forms are equal in signification which are differing in impression; as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same: for there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said, "Your enemies will be glad of this:"
"Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ :"
than by hearing it said only, "This is evil for you."
Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching provision or preparatory store, for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts; the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made up; both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request: the former of these I will call antitheta, and the latter formulæ.
Antitheta are theses argued "pro et contra;" wherein men may be more large and laborious: but, in such as are able to do it, to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skains or bottoms of thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used; applying authorities and examples by reference.
PRO VERBIS LEG
"Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, quæ recedit, a literâ : Cum receditur a literâ, judex transit in legislatorem."
PRO SENTENTIA LEGIS.
these considerations. The first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice. For these critics have often presumed, that that which they understand not is false set down: as the priest that, where he found it was written of St. Paul, "Demissus est per sportam, mended his book, and made it "Demissus est per portam;" because sporta was a hard word, and out of his reading: and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, are yet of the same kind. And therefore, as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct.
The second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors, which resteth in annota
tions and commentaries: wherein it is over usual
to blanch the obscure places, and discourse upon the plain.
The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give great light to true interpretations.
The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors; that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what
books to read.
And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies; that men may know in what order or pursuit to read.
For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference of tradition which is proper for youth; whereunto appertain divers considerations of great
As first, the timing and seasoning of knowledge; as with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refrain them.
Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses to press the more diffi"Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus, qui interpretatur cult, and then to turn them to the more easy; for singula." it is one method to practise swimming with bladFormulæ are but decent and apt passages orders, and another to practise dancing with heavy conveyances of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing subjects; as of preface, conclusion, digression, transition, excusation, &c. För as in buildings, there is great pleasure and use in the well-casting of the staircases, entries, doors, windows, and the like; so in speech, the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect. VOL. I.-28
A third is, the application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual, but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies: as for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if tne T