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gave the first occasion. So as it should seem, | upon those sons of Jesse which were brought that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild before him, and failed of David, which was in goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or the field. And this form, to say truth, is so to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the pot gross, as it had not been possible for wits so lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to subtile as have managed these things to have chance, or any thing else, than to logic, for the offered it to the world, but that they hasted to invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperiform of invention which Virgil describeth much ous and scornful toward particulars; which their other: manner was to use but as "lictores and viatores," for sergeants and whifflers, ad summovendam turbam," to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth: for as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child; so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions whereof we speak, as if it were a second infancy or childhood.
Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism, that is, by touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea and divinity, (because it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capacity of the simplest,) that form may have use; and in natural philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, "Quæ assensum parit, operis effœta est:" but the subtilty of nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds: for arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of words; and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things: which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not the Secondly, the induction which the logicians laborious examination either of consequences of speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can (whereby the principles of sciences may be pre-ever correct that error, being, as the physicians tended to be invented, and so the middle propo- speak, in the first digestion: and therefore it was sitions by derivation from the principles ;) their not without cause, that so many excellent philoform of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and in- sophers became sceptics and academics, and decompetent: wherein their error is the fouler, nied any certainty of knowledge or comprehenbecause it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt sion; and held opinion, that the knowledge of nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, man extendeth only to appearances and probabiliabused, and traduced nature. For he that shall ties. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed attentively observe how the mind doth gather this to be but a form of irony, "Scientiam dissimuexcellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which | lando simulavit:" for he used to disable his the poet speaketh of, "Aërei mellis cœlestia knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge; dona,” distilling and contriving it out of particu- like the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, lars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the that would reign, but would not acknowledge so field and garden, shall find that the mind of her- much: and in the later Academy, which Cicero emself by nature doth manage and act an induction | braced, this opinion also of "acatalepsia," I doubt, much better than they describe it. For to con- was not held sincerely: for that all those which clude upon an enumeration of particulars, without excelled in "copia" of speech seem to have instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to give conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects glory to their eloquence and variable discourses; upon those particulars which appear of a side, being rather like progresses of pleasure, than that there are not other on the contrary side which journeys to an end. But assuredly many scatappear not? As i Samuel should have rested tered in both Academies did hold it in subtilty
"Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes
For if you observe the words well, it is no other nethod than that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in use; which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being: for so Cicero saith very truly, "Usus uni rei deditus, et naturam et artem sæpe vincit." And therefore if it be said of men,
"Labor omnia vincit Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas ;"
it is likewise said of beasts, "Quis psittaco docuit suum xaîps?" Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where she espied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, and to find the way from a field in flower, a great way off, to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow? Add then the word "extundere," which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word "paulatim," which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, even amongst the Ægyptians' gods; there being little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty of art, for matter of invention.
and integrity: but here was their chief error; | like a good householder, that bringeth forth both they charged the deceit upon the senses; which new and old store; and we see the ancient in my judgment, notwithstanding all their cavilla- writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, that tions, are very sufficient to certify and report pleaders should have the places, whereof they truth, though not always immediately, yet by have most continual use, ready handled in all the comparison, by help of instrument, and by pro- | variety that may be; as that, to speak for the ducing and urging such things as are too subtile literal interpretation of the law against equity, for the sense to some effect comprehensible by and contrary; and to speak for presumptions and the sense, and other like assistance. But they inferences against testimony, and contrary. And ought to have charged the deceit upon the weak- Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great ness of the intellectual powers, and upon the man- experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever ner of collecting and concluding upon the reports a man shall have occasion to speak of, if he will of the senses. This I speak, not to disable the take the pains, he may have it in effect premedimind of man, but to stir it up to seek help for no tate and handled "in thesi;" so that when he man, be he never so cunning or practised, can cometh to a particular, he shall have nothing to do, make a straight line or perfect circle by steadi-but to add names, and times, and places, and such
ness of hand, which may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass.
This part of the invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I purpose, if God give me leave, hereafter to propound, having digested it into two parts; whereof the one I term "Experientia Literata," and the other "Interpretatio Naturæ:" the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise.
other circumstances of individuals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations and speeches. All which authorities and precedents may overweigh Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears.
The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention: for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know: and the use of this invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration. So So as, to speak truly, it is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an application; which is the cause why the schools do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase, as well of deer in an enclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention: so as it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.
To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, Preparation and Suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near his time, saying, "they did as if one that professed the art of shoemaking should not teach how to make a shoe, but only exhibit, in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes." But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, that the kingdom of heaven is VOL. I.-27
But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the farther handling of it to rhetoric.
The other part of invention, which I term suggestion, doth assign and direct us to certain marks or places, which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use thereof. Neither is this use, truly taken, only to furnish argument to dispute probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may these places serve only to prompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, "Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion; else how shall he know it when he hath found it?" | And therefore the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve: so as I cannot report that this part of invention, which is that which the schools call topics, is deficient.
Nevertheless topics are of two sorts, general and special. The general we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned too much
in the schools, which is, to be vainly subtle in a few things which are within their command, and to reject the rest; I do receive particular topics, (that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge,) as things of great use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences; for in these it holdeth, "Ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis;" for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed; but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth: so every degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth; which light if we strengthen, by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry,we do greatly advance our pursuit.
Now we pass unto the arts of Judgment, which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations; which as to induction hath a coincidence with invention; for in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all one as in the sense; but otherwise it is in proof by syllogism; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequence is another; the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of "Interpretation of nature."
For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently and excellently laboured; for the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed and immovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished: so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within, to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of falling; therefore men did hasten to set down some principles about which the variety of their disputations might turn.
But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution; the former frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflections from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged; toward the composition and structure of which form, it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple words: and this is that part of logic which is comprehended in the analytics.
So then this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions to principles in a middle term: the principles to be agreed by all and exempted from argument; the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man's invention; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted; the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a probation ostensive; the other, when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, which is that which they call "per incommodum," or pressing an absurdity; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle.
The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and assurance sake; discovering the more subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is termed Elenches. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca maketh the comparison well, as in juggling feats, which though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be; yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a man beside his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment.
This part concerning Elenches is excellently handled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example, not only in the persons of the sophists, but even in Socrates himself; who professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallacy, and redargution. And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advantage: though the difference be good which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature.
But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more ample latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge; whereof some are laboured and others omitted. For first, I conceive, though it may seem at first somewhat strange, that that part which is variably referred sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysics, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an elench; for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase, (especially of such words as are most general, and intervene, in every inquiry,) it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use, leaving vain subtilties and speculations, of the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities of speech. So again the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments
are but cautions against the confusion of defini- | to be of human shape. And therefore Velleius tions and divisions. the Epicurean needed not to have asked, why God should have adorned the heavens with stars as if he had been an Ædilis, one that should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays. For if that great Work-master had been of a human disposition, he would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders, like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number; so differing a harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of nature.
Let us consider, again, the false ppearances imposed upon us by every man's wn individual nature and custom, in that feigned supposition that Plato maketh of the cave: for certainly if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth, until maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he would have strange and absurd imaginations. So in like manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions, if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof we have given many examples in one of the errors or peccant humours, which we ran briefly over in our first book.
Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the impression, and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation; not so much perplexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric.
But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind, beholding them in an example or two; as first, in that instance which is the root of all superstition, namely, That to the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or active to affect more than the negative or privative: so that a few times hitting or presence countervails ofttimes failing or absence; as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed him in Neptune's temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, “ Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest:"| "Yea, but," saith Diagoras, "where are they painted that are drowned?" Let us behold it in another instance, namely, That the spirit of man, being of an equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth. Hence it cometh, that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves, except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh, that whereas there are many things in nature, as it were "monodica, sui juris;" yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an element of fire, to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like: nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fancies the similitude of human actions and arts, together with the making of man "communis mensura," have brought into Natural Philosophy; not much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the gods
And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort; and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well, "Loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes;" yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment; so as it is almost necessary, in all controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether For it cometh to they concur with us or no. pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and differences about words. To conclude, therefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are inseparable from our nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless the caution of them, (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions,) doth extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or cautions against these three false appearances, I find altcgether deficient.
There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient; which s the application of the differing
xinds of proofs to the differing kinds of subjects; "copia," and such as by device and practice may for there being but four kinds of demonstrations, be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder,) than I that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or do of the tricks of tumblers, funambulos, baladines; sense, by induction, by sophism, and by congru- the one being the same in the mind that the other ity, (which is that which Aristotle calleth de- is in the body, matters of strangeness without monstration in orb or circle, and not "a noti- worthiness. oribus ;") every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences, in which respectively they have chiefest use; and certain others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded: and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hinderance to knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations, according to the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient.
This art of memory is but built upon two intentions; the one prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth us to seek in a narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory. Emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike the memory more; out of which axioms, may be drawn much better practice than that in use; and besides which axioms there are divers more touching help of memory, not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only ill managed.
For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which is Memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of. An art there is extant of it: but it seemeth to me that there are better precepts than that art, and better practices of that art than those received. It is certain the art, as it is, may be raised to points of ostentation prodigious; but in use, as it is now managed, it is barren, (not burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren,) that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and occasions. And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or rhymes extempore, or the making of a satirical simile of every thing, or the turning of every thing to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of every thing by cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great
The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in Writing or Memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character, and the order of There remaineth the fourth kind of rational the entry; for the art of characters, or other visible knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjuga-expressing or transferring our knowledge to tion with grammar; and therefore I refer it to others; which I will term by the general name the due place for the disposition and collocation of tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, parts; the first concerning the organ of tradition; it consisteth in a good digest of commonplaces; the second concerning the method of tradition; wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed and the third concerning the illustration of trato the use of commonplace books, as causing a dition. retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of commonplaces, to be a matter of great use and essence in studying, as that which assureth "copia" of invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the methods of commonplaces that I have seen there is none of any sufficient worth; all of them carrying merely the face of a school, and not of a world; and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions, without all life, or respect to action.
For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing for Aristotle saith well," Words are the images of cogitations, and letters are the images of words;" but yet it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by the medium of words. For whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to express cogitations. And therefore we see in the commerce of barbarous people, that understand not one another's language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men's minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we understand further, that it is the use of China, and the kingdoms of the high Levant, to write in characters real, which express neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions; insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand not one another's language, can nevertheless read one another's writings, because the characters are accepted more generally than the languages do extend; and therefore they have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as radical words.
These notes of cogitations are of two sorts; the one when the note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the other "ad placitum," having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, things of ancient use, and embraced chiefly by the Ægyptians, one of the most ancient nations, they are but as