of no allusion in the Bible, which can lead to a supposition that snakes are wise or subtil; but lest the reader should be alarmed, we make haste to quote what Christ said at a certain time to his disciples, on the subject of serpents, and to explain it. He said, "be ye wise as serpents but harmless as doves." Does not this, says one, not only hint, but plainly make out, that serpents are indeed wise and cunning, and were so considered by Jesus Christ? we think not; and the following is our reason. A man, or a human being, is certainly far more wise and subtil than a snake. If so, then the Saviour could never have chosen this contemptible reptile as a figure of emulation for his disciples. Did he, indeed, wish them to be as wise as common snakes? This would be to suppose them at least, somewhat below serpents in ability, a very strange predicament for human beings, who had the use of their reason. The supposition is altogether ridiculous. What then did he mean? He meant, no doubt, that they should be as wise as devils-or evil spirits, of whose wiles St. Paul said, on a certain occasion, that the saints of his day were not ignorant. Also-he meant, that he desired his disciples to be as wise as the Jews their enemies, who on two occasions are called a generation of vipers, or serpents. So that in our opinion these texts give no countenance to the idea of the wisdom of snakes. But more than this, Mr. Balfour makes Moses choose this creature, not because it is, or was in fact the subtilest beast among animals; but because it was thus celebrated, as he assumes to believe. Such a course would be deception, even in Moses, for if the snake in fact, is not such a creature, then has Moses made his selection unwisely and deceitfully, as he should have been guided, not by a false celebrity, but by matter of fact, or the lusts of Eve were not fitly represented. But here we wish to remark, that in our opinion, this stroke of Mr. Balfour's invention, should go for nothing, as it is not true in its main feature. And what is its main feature? It is this: he says, Moses chose this animal as descriptive of Eve's nature, as it related to her appetites; but where is the proof of this, that Moses chose it for that purpose? we answer there is no proof-while, to the contrary there is proof irrefragible, that he did not. But how is this, says one, did he not write the book of Genesis, where the whole account is found? Most certainly he did. How then is it, that he did not choose this creature for the purpose Mr. Balfour alledges? This is our proof and our reason :----Moses has but recorded the conversation which took place between God and Eve; and says that EvE said the serpent or nachash beguiled her. Now if any body chose an animal for this purpose, it was Eve, herself, while Moses does nothing but rehearse the fact as a matter of history and truth. Are we to believe she chose this horrid animal, to show up to her God, by a hieroglyphic of this sort, the very nature which himself had but a few days previous

created? we think not. She did nothing more than to speak of the creature which she supposed had misled her, having no idea whatever, that the devil who had the power of death, had entered into the animal, and inspired it with the abilities of articulation and reason. Wherefore, so far as we are able to comprehend our subject, Mr. Balfour has failed, totally failed, to make out that either Moses or Eve chose an animal as a representative of her appetites; on which account it remains, that the belief of a real animal called by Eve the nachash, being inspired, by Satan, conversed with her, is a true belief. What follows, therefore, on this fact? it follows that there was an evil spirit or being, who was the real tempter, and not the animal. This is made out from Balfour's own showing; who, in his struggle to oppose the being of Satan, says on page 25 of his work, that a dumb beast could not have thus conversed. To this we agree, no dumb beast could ever talk except by the aid of a superior and competent power. Now, as he has failed in his statement about Moses' choosing this animal for the purpose of a figure, he fails to disprove the existence of the devil in the case of Eve, as the animal could not of itself have said any thing of the matter. We wish to be particular on this subject, in this place, for if we fail to make out in a reasonable manner, the existence of an evil being, who was engaged in Eve's ruin, we fail in a great measure of the main object of this work, as before remarked.

Mr. Balfour thinks it foolish and ridiculous to believe that any animal whatever, was made use of by any being in the ruin of Eve, and contends in his work, page 26, that the doctrine intended by the reference of Moses to an animal, which conversed with woman, is simply to inform us that Eve's lusts or desires, after food when she was hungry, was the true serpent, or devil, which destroyed her, if she was destroyed. But to refute this in another form, we ask: could LUSTS OF DESIRES have known more about the forbidden fruit, and the consequences which would follow on her tasting it, than Eve did herself? Did her appetites know more than her mind? This must have been the case, however preposterous the opinion may appear, if nothing but her appetites are intended by Moses, or by Eve; for we see her lusts, as Balfour calls her desires, commencing the conversation with Eve, by saying, "God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, that your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as the gods [the angels] knowing good and evil." How is it that Eve's superior powers, her mind, her reason, her perception, knew nothing of this, while her inferior powers, her mere animal innocent appetites for food when hungry, knew all about it; we might as well argue that her body, composed of muscles and limbs, were superior in their nature to her mind, her soul, her immortal and her undying intellect. But if indeed, the opinion is correct, as Balfour holds, is it not strange that Moses, who

must have understood the whole matter, speaks of her lusts, in the masculine gender HE, as Eve was a woman: and then again to allude to her lusts, which is plural, in the use of the pronoun HE, which is singular, as if she had but one lust, and that was a he one.

But as to the real fact of the case, this writer, Mr. Balfour, says, the whole matter is to be solved, by supposing Eve to have held a dialogue between herself and her lusts, on the subject of the forbidden fruit, her appetite exciting her to transgress, while her reason opposed it. But as before argued, this was impossible, for neither her reason, or her appetites could foreknow that her eyes should be opened, to know, either more or less. Wherefore, it is as evident as evidence can make it, that there must have been in the case a supernatural evil being, who, thus understood the subject, and thus foretold the effect, if she eat of that fruit.

Universalist writers, however, do not all agree on this subject, for while Mr. Balfour admits the fact of the law which forbade Adam and Eve tasting the fruit of a real tree, situated in the literal garden of Eden, Mr. Ballou reduces the whole account to a mere, but beautiful allegory: setting forth the law of God, and man's natural opposition to it: each writier striking out for himself, a code of opinions, diverse from his fellows of the same communion, so that we know not where to find them as a people, on scarce any subject, except that there is no devil, no hell, and no day of judgment; in this they are all pretty well agreed: insisting that the orthodox sects of the christian world have derived these opinions from the old heathen Persians, by the way of the writings of Zoroaster;-but more of this in another place.

On the 30th page of his Enquiry, Mr. Balfour endeavors to show that because the New Testament writers speak of the lusts of the human heart, as being the root and origin of sin: that of necessity we are to refer this fact to Eve's case, as if she was in the same fallen and depraved condition before her fall, that she was after. This is a strange way of reasoning, and will not answer, unless we are to believe that God placed lusts as the origin of sin, in the soul of Eve, on purpose for her ruin. Now Universalists-with Ballou and Balfour at their head-make a great matter of it, because the orthodox sects believe in the existence of a devil, who tempted Eve, and ask, and wonder why God did not prevent his doing so, as if he certainly ought so to have done, and yet they say God himself did it, by creating in the soul of Eve-what they improperly call her lusts, which became the occasion of her ruin. Is not this a strange thing to wonder at? Is it not as well that Satan should tempt man to his ruin, as that God should do it by his own direct will?

But we deny, and no man can make it appear, that the simple fact of Eve's having the natural appetites to eat and to drink when

hungry and thirsty, were lusts in any sense; more than the same desires or appetites are lust in a wild fawn of the woods. Lust is a moral disqualification of the spirit or mind of man, consisting in a will to disobey the commands of God, or to outrage moral principle in some way or other, after corruption has entered, and not before. Eve had no such lust, as she came pure from the hand of God; yet she had appetite for food or she could not have lived, however pure and innocent she was, but cannot be termed lust in any sense of the word. But no doubt the grand secret of this doctrine of Universalists, respecting Eve's being created with lustful appetites and desires, is to make out that man is not fallen in Adam, as held by the orthodox sects, and that man is not sinful by nature, but only by accident, or fortuitously and relatively. Men, therefore, are now by nature, exactly what they were in their original heads-Adam and Eve-until they do something which is considered merely relatively wrong. This is the reason why thorough bred Universalists deny the use of the vicarious atonement made for the world, by the voluntary death of Jesus Christ; as from that view of theirs, it is not needed; this is deism. Mr. Balfour says, on page 30, of his Second Enquiry, that "lust, the source of sin, is always represented in Scripture as being deceitful and beguiling." This we admit, but deny that Eve came from the hand of God in such a condition, having within her the seeds of moral death; for if she did, then the occurrence of sin is but the fruit of the planting of God himself, and the horrible harvest of moral depravity is of his own providing. On this view of the subject, there is no sin in the world, as God can do no evil.

But if Eve was created with lusts, and these lusts were to be in their inevitable operation her ruin, to be demonstrated as soon as the law of God should be given her, against which they were to act in war and conflict; might she not have exclaimed, even before she had sinned:-O wretched WOMAN that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death! What a picture is this of man's original condition! We do not wonder that Universalism is the timber out of which the whole superstructure of modern infidelity to the Scriptures is made; as with such views, and such conclusious, of what they teach respecting the origin of good and evil, it is no marvel that they should offend the reader. The Scriptures state that Christ was manifested to destroy the works of the devil. Well, what is this devil which he came to destroy? Why; according to Universalists, it is the lusts of Eve and all her race. Well, who made the lusts of Eve and her race? Why, God-say they-as he is the only Creator. What then follows on this view? Why, that Christ came as the Son of God to destroy that which his father had made, and called very good, in the beginning. Is not this a kingdom divided

against itself, and therefore cannot stand? No wonder deism flourishes under the auspices of such theology.

Mr. Balfour complains in his Enquiry, and says that Moses ought to have stated plainly that the serpent which tempted Eve was a fallen angel, if the thing is true. But on the part of the orthodox, have we not as good a right to complain that Moses has not said that there is not, or at least we have a right to complain that the cause of her ruin is so mysteriously hidden under the cover of a deep and difficult allegory, or under the term serpent, which creature after all is but a hieroglyphic, intended to represent certain passions and appetites? If the truth is, that it was her lusts or appetites which destroyed her, how is it that Moses does not say so; as he easily might have done;-as plain fact, stated in the plainest manner, best becomes the dignity of holy inspiration. That he did state plainly, that there is such a being as a wicked fallen angel, now called Satan, is shown when he says, that Eve said, the serpent beguiled her; as we know, as before argued, that no beast can or ever did use articulate speech, except by mere imitation; it follows, therefore that an evil being destroyed her by temptation. To us it appears that the orthodox sects, in their view of this subject, are much more modest and retiring than are Universalists; as the former charge the blame on Satan as a mere tempter, and on Adam and Eve as dupes; while the latter at once and unblushingly ascribe the whole to God; when they say he created them with lusts, the very seeds of their ruin as shown in their fall.

Mr. Balfour in the 3d section of his Second Enquiry, endeavors to make it appear that the word Satan, in the original Hebrew and Greek, meant in no case where it is used, a fallen angel, a supernatural wicked spirit or being. But contends that the word was restricted solely to such beings and subjects as are in opposition to each other; and from the fact of such opposites, the term Satan is made out signifying merely an adversary. Though this may be true in relation to any ordinary subject it may be applied to, yet we do not perceive how this can exclude its application to such a being as Satan is supposed to be. He is shown in Scripture to be opposed to God's holy government of the universe, and is therefore a Satan, meaning an enemy. But when we consider that God is opposed to sin, we dare not say he is therefore a Satan, as such a course would be to confound and abuse language, distracting the reader with ideas of good and bad Satans. Because this term may be applied to ordinary cases-such as enmity between men or nations-is it therefore to be excluded from a higher and more extended meaning? We should suppose not. The idea of good is derived from God, because he is good; and from that, the word good has its being. But on this account, are we to exclude its higher signification, and application to God? By no means. How then