thus discovering the agreement or disagreement. Thus the truth that "things will be in agreement with past experience, unless there is some reason for the contrary," is a truth which every mind believes. Whenever, therefore, any event has been repeatedly an object of past experience, it is compared with this truth already believed, and found to be included under it, and therefore entitled to the same credit. Thus also the truth that "things which equal the same things, equal one another," is one which every mind believes. When any object by examination is found to be included under that class of objects, which are thus equal to the same thing, it is an act of reasoning when we infer that they are equal to one another. CHAPTER VIII. SUSCEPTIBILITIES. When the mind is in a state of emotion, this state is always either pleasurable or painful, and it will be found that destre relates to the attainment of some object, which will be a cause of pleasurable emotions, or else the avoidance of something, which will cause painful emotions. This feeling of desire for pleasurable emotions, and for the avoidance of painful ones, is the main-spring of all mental activity. When this desire is not in existence, neither the powers of the mind, or of the body are called into active exercise. The mind at such times is in a dreamy sort of reverie, from which no results arise, while the muscular system does not operate except at the bidding of desire. There are various sources of enjoyment, or causes of pleasurable emotions, to the mind of man, which may be definitely pointed out. The first cause of enjoyment at the commencement of existence is that of sensation. This at first, is small in amount, compared with what it becomes, when association lends its aid to heighten sensative enjoyment. The light of day, the brilliancy of colour, the sweetness of perfume, the gratification of taste and touch, the magic influence of sound, and the pleasure resulting from muscular activity, are probably the chief sources of enjoyment to the infant mind. As life advances, all these modes of sensative gratification become connected with others of an intellectual and moral nature, so that at mature years, it is difficult to determine how much of the enjoyment we derive from the senses, is the result of association, and how much is simply that of sensation. The second source of enjoyment, is the discovery of certain qualities in intelligent minds. The perception of the qualities of matter, through the medium of the senses, is a very inferior source of gratification, compared with the discovery of these qualities of mind. This is the source of the highest enjoyment of which the mind is capable. The emotions thus awakened are called esteem, veneration, love, gratitude, &c. Love in its most general sense is used for the pleasurable emotion, which is felt in the discovery of any quality that is agreeable, either in matter or mind. Thus we are said to love the beauties of nature, to love delicious fruit, and to love the society of friends. But in relation to intelligent beings, it signifies, a pleasurable emotion in view of certain qualities and actions, attended with the desire of good to the object loved, and also, a desire for reciprocated affection. There are certain qualities and attributes of mind which may be pointed out as the causes of affection. The first is intellectual superiority. Our estimate of intellect is altogether relative. What in a child seems an astonishing display of it, would be considered as puerility in a man. What excites admiration in a savage, or in the unlettered, is regarded with little emotion in the man of education. There are various qualities of intellect which awaken admiration. Quick perceptions, and ready invention, are the peculiar attribute of some minds; others are endowed with great sagacity and wisdom in adapting the best means to accomplish the best ends; others possess an energy, and force of purpose, which enables them to encounter difficulties, sustain bodily fatigue, and even to face death without shrinking; others possess a power of forming new and varied combinations that gratify the taste; others seem to possess a readiness and versatility of mind, which enables them to succeed in almost any object they undertake. The exhibition of any of these operations of intellect, are causes of emotions of pleasure and admiration to other minds. A second quality of mind, which becomes a cause of affection is the power of Sympathy. There is nothing which so powerfully draws the mind toward another being as the assurance that all our pleasures will be his, and that " in all our afflictions he will be afflicted." It is probable that a being entirely destitute of this susceptibility, however he might excite the mind by displays of intellectual power, never could be regarded with the warm and tender emotions of affection. If we encountered a mind, that we realized looked upon our happiness, without one glimmering of pleased delight, and who could gaze upon our sufferings without one shade of sympathising woe, it is probable the mind, when fully aware of this fact, would turn with only dissatisfaction from this exhibition of a mind, so void of one of its most endearing attributes. A third quality of mind, which becomes a cause of love, is the power of giving and of appreciating affection. There is nothing which is an object of such constant and fervent desire as the admiration and affection of other minds. To be an object of attention, and of admiration to others, has been the aim that has stimulated the efforts and nerved the arm of all the heroes and conquerors of the world. To gain the esteem and affection of other minds, is what regulates the ac tions, the plans, and the hopes of all mankind. If therefore a mind should be destitute of this susceptibility, that which gives the chief interest to any mind would be withdrawn. If we should find also that the gift of our affections was of no value to another mind, this would deprive it of much that awakens interest and pleasure. It is the excessive indulgence of this desire for admiration of other minds which leads to ambition and pride, those principles which have filled the world with contention, and deluged it with blood. Pride may be defined as an excessive desire for the estimation of other minds, or as the feeling which exists from the supposed possession of characteristics that will awaken such admiration. Vanity is an exhibition of the pleasure which is felt, at the supposed possession of desirable qualities. Haughtiness and arrogancy are the displays of a conscious superiority to others around, in those particulars which awaken admiration. All these originate from this implanted desire for the estimation of other minds; a desire which in itself is not evil, and becomes a cause of evil only by perversion, or excessive indulgence. A fourth quality of mind, which secures affection, is that of benevolence. This consists in such a love for the happiness of other minds, as induces a willingness to make sacrifices of personal enjoyment, to secure a greater amount of good to others. Every mind is so made, that if its own interests are not interfered with, it is more agreeable to see others happy around it, than to see them miserable. There have been cases of such perversion of our moral nature, that some have seemed to find pleasure in the simple act of inflicting pain upon others. But this seldom occurs until after a long course of self-indulgence and crime. Most persons if it cost no sacrifice, would prefer to make others happy; for as mind is formed for sympathy, the sight of suffering is painful, and of happiness agreeable, from the very constitution of mind. But there is a great difference in the character of minds in this particular. Some, when they find that certain modes of personal enjoyment interfere with the interests and happiness of others, can find a pleasure in sacrificing their own lesser enjoyment, to secure greater good for others. But other minds are so engrossed by exclusive interest in their own happiness, that they will not give up the smallest amount of their own good, to secure any amount of benefit to others. The mind of man is so constituted as to love benevolence, and to hate selfishness.* If we see a character who is ever ready to sacrifice any enjoyment to promote the greater good of others, it is impossible not to feel some pleasure in witnessing such a trait of character, unless some other painful association should be united with this exhibition. If the display of benevolence in others, exhibits the deficiencies of another mind in contrast, the pleasure which that mind would otherwise experience in view of it, would be banished by the pain of a contrast so disadvantagous. For all ideas of excellence are relative, and therefore this contrast would be the means of lessening that esteem and admiration so ardently desired from others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to love any mind so utterly devoid of benevolence, that it would never make the least sacrifice to secure any amount of good to others. All minds, whatever their own character may be, detest selfishness in others, and never can bestow any great affection where this is a prevailing trait. These are the leading characteristics of mind, which are causes of admiration and affection. There are other more specific exercises, such as modesty, humility, meekness, &c. which also awaken admiration and affection. But all these traits of character, which in themselves considered, are causes of pleasure, in certain circumstances, may, to a selfish mind, become causes of unmingled pain. If the displays of intellect, or of the exhibition of the amiable susceptibilities in another being, are viewed, by a selfish mind, as the cause of disparagement, and disadvantageous contrast to *This term is here used in its popular, and not in its strictly theological sense. |