for evidence, and obtain of the knowledge necessary to enable them to judge correctly. The estimation of guilt among mankind in reference to wrong belief, is always proportioned to the interests involved, and the opportunities for obtaining knowledge. In the minute affairs of life, where but little evil is done from false judgments, but little blame is attached to a man for believing wrong. Neither is a man severely judged if the necessary knowledge was inaccessible, or very difficult to be obtained. But where a man has great interests committed to his keeping, and has sufficient opportunity for obtaining evidence of truth, the severest condemnation awaits him, who through inattention or prejudice, hazards vast interests by an incorrect belief. If an agent has the charge of great investments, and through negligence, or indolence, or prejudice, ruins his employer, his sincere belief is no protection from severe condemnation. If the physician has the health and life of a valued member of the community, and the beloved object of many affections, entrusted to his skill, and from negligence and inattention, destroys the life he was appointed to save, his sincere belief is but a small palliation for his guilt. If a judge has the fortune and life of his fellow citizens entrusted to his judicial knowledge and integrity, and through a want of care and attention, is guilty of flagrant injustice and evil, the plea of ignorance and wrong belief, will not protect him from the impeachment, and just indignation which awaits such delinquencies, There is no point where men are more tenacious of the obligations of their fellow men, than on the subject of belief. If they find themselves calumniated, unjustly dealt with, and treated with contempt and scorn, from prejudice, or want of attention, the honesty of belief, is no palliation of the guilt of those, who thus render them injustice. Men sensibly feel the obligations of their fellow men to know the truth, in all that relates to their interests, honour, and good name; and often, there is scarcely any thing which it is so difficult to forgive, as the simple crime of wrong

belief. It may be laid down as a long established axiom, in regard to this subject, that men estimate the guilt of wrong belief, in all matters relating to the welfare of mankind, in exact proportion to the value of the interests involved, and to the opportunities enjoyed for obtaining information. The only modes by which men attempt to justify themselves for guilt of this nature, is to show, either that the matter was of small consequence, or that the means of learning its importance, and of obtaining the other necessary information, was not within reach.

LANGUAGE.

CHAPTER XIV.

INTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE.

The mind of man is confined in its operations by the material system it inhabits, and has no modes of communicating with other minds, except through the medium of the eye and the ear. It is by signs addressed to the eye, and by sounds affecting the ear, that ideas are communicated and received. It is by the power of association, which enables us to recall certain ideas together, that have been frequently united, that the use of language is gained. The infant finds certain states of mind produced by material objects, acting on the senses, invariably connected with certain sounds, and this is done so often, that whenever a certain perception of any object of sight is awakened, at the same time the sound recurs which has been so often united with it, in past experience.

If language is correctly defined as " any sound or sign which conveys the ideas of one mind to another," it is probable that children learn language at a much earlier period than is generally imagined. It is impossible to know how soon the in

fant notices the soft tones of its own voice when happy, or the moaning, or shrill sound, that expresses its own painfulness, and by comparing them with those of its mother, learns through its little process of reasoning, that another spirit like itself exists, and has emotions of pleasure and pain corresponding with its own. Nor can we determine how soon, these pleasant sounds of the mother's voice, begin to be associated in memory with the benignant smile, or the tones of grief, with the sorrowful expression, or the tones of anger, with the frowning brow. It seems very rational to suppose that sound, to the infant mind, is what first leads to the belief of the emotions of another mind, by means of a comparison of its own sounds with those originating from another. After this is done, the eye comes in for a share in these duties. The little reasoner, after thousands of experiments, finds the pleasant sound always united with the smiling face, until the object of vision, becomes the sign for recalling the idea, at first obtained by sound. In gaining the common use of language, we know this is the order of succession. We first learn the sounds that recall ideas, and then by means of a frequent union of these sounds with some visible sign, the power once possessed simply by the sound, is conveyed to the sign.

The communion of one spirit with that of others, in every day life, is maintained ordinarily through the medium of sounds; but when distance intervenes, or when some record is to be preserved of the thoughts and feelings of other beings, then signs addressed to the eye are employed. In civilized nations the signs used, are a certain number of arbitrary marks, which are arranged in a great variety of combinations, and each particular combination is employed to recall some particular idea, or combination of ideas, These arbitrary signs are called letters, and in the English language there are only twenty-six. Yet by the almost infinite variety of combination, of which these are capable, every idea, which one

mind ever wishes to communicate to another, can be ex

pressed.

A word is a single letter, or a combination of letters, used as a sign to recall one or more ideas. It is considered by the mind as a unit, or whole thing, of which the letters are considered as parts, and is shown to be a unit by intervals or blank spaces that separate it from the other words of a sentence. The fact that it is considered by the mind as a unit, or separate sign, from all other combinations of letters, is the peculiarity which constitutes it a word. A syllable is a combination of letters, which is not considered as a unit, but is considered as a part of a word. The mind resolves words into these syllables, or parts, for the purpose of more readily learning to combine the letters which form a word. Spelling is the act of combining the letters which form words into syllables, and the syllables into words, either by making the sounds which designate the letters, or else the visible signs.

It is by the power of Association, that we learn to employ sounds and signs that recall ideas of particular existences. Had the infant no other faculty, if the sound mother, had ever been united with the particular form, that was the source of his enjoyment, they would be invariably connected together in his mind.

But the use of common names, is gained by the powers of Abstraction and Judgment. The child notices that the same sound is connected with a great variety of objects, which, in many particulars do not resemble each other, and in many respects are alike. He then exercises the powers of Judgment and of Abstraction, by noticing the relation of resemblance, in certain respects, and abstracting these qualities from all others. He learns by oft repeated observation and experience, that names are given to certain combinations of qualities, wherever they may be met, and in process of time he thus learns to apply common names. Thus when using any common name, it is by the power of Judgment we notice

the relation of resemblance; by Abstraction we attend to such qualities, as separate from the others; and by Association we recall the sound, or sign, usually connected with this combination of qualities.

The power of the mind, called Abstraction, enables us continually to alter the nature of our conceptions in one respect, which is of the utmost consequence in regard to the use of language. This is in reference to the idea of unity. This idea first must exist, in regard to our own mind and body, when we learn the existence of other objects, and realize, that other things are distinct and separate existences, and not a part of ourselves. We feel that we are one independent being, having powers of body and mind, under the control of our own will, while we learn by a process of reasoning the existence of other beings, that like us, have powers and faculties under the control of another will, which is not The idea of unity, or oneness, then, must first relate to the qualities of our own mind, which we find we can contemplate, as separate and distinct from all other existences.

our own.

This power of considering a collection of qualities, powers, and changes, as belonging to our own existence, is soon extended to other things without ourselves; but the idea of unity, in regard to other things, is similar to what it is in reference to ourselves. Any thing is considered as a unit which is an existence, that we consider as separate and distinct from all other existences, just as we consider our own mind and its powers and operations, separate and distinct from all others.

But owing to the power of Abstraction, the mind can separate any object of conception into parts, and then can attach the idea of unity to any one of the parts, by considering it as one and distinct from every other existence. Thus it can conceive of a picture as a unit, or one single existence, having qualities and relations, separate from all others. It can then select a tree from this picture, and regard this as a unit,