to bestow the eating and drinking of excessive dainties, to set a pompous lace upon the superficial actings of state, to pageant himself up and down in progress* among the perpetual bowings and cringings of an abject people, on either side deifying and adoring him for nothing done that can deserve it.

Instead of placing power thus in the hands of a single person, for which, he says-not perhaps without an eye to Cromwell-men have smarted so oft, Milton would have it deposited in those of "a general council of ablest men, chosen by the people, to consult of public affairs from time to time for the common good."

In this grand council must the sovereignty, not transferred, but delegated only, and, as it were, deposited, reside; with this caution, they must have the forces by sea and land committed to them, for preservation of the common peace and liberty; must raise and manage the public revenue, at least with some inspectors, deputed for satisfaction of the people how it is employed; must make or propose civil laws, treat of commerce, peace, or war, with foreign nations, and—for the carrying on some particular affairs with more secresy and expedition-must elect (as they have already†), out of their own number and others, a council of state.

It seems rather extraordinary that, after the experience of the Long Parliament, Milton should propose this council to be perpetual. But he proceeds thus:

:

And although it may seem strange at first hearing-by reason that men's minds are prepossessed with the notion of successive parliaments-I affirm that the grand or general council, being

* These royal progresses, or rounds of visits to the houses of the nobility, had prevailed chiefly in the reign of Elizabeth.

Sc. elected. This omission of the participle was not unusual with our old writers, and, in our opinion, it is not to be disapproved of. "But I have, and do reverence him, for the greatness that was only proper to himself," says Ben Jonson of Bacon.

"More than my own; that am, have, and will be."-Hen. VIII. iii. 2.

well chosen, should be perpetual; for so their business is or may be and ofttimes urgent, the opportunity of affairs gained or lost in a moment. The day of council cannot be set, as the day of a festival, but must be ready always to prevent* or answer all occasions. By this continuance they will become every way skilfullest, best provided of intelligence from abroad, best acquainted with the people at home and the people with them. The ship of the commonwealth is always under sail; they sit at the stern, and if they steer well, what need is there to change them, it being rather dangerous? Add to this, that the grand council is both foundation and main pillar of the whole State; and to move pillars and foundations, not faulty, cannot be safe for the building.

I see not, therefore, how we can be advantaged by successive and transitory parliaments; but that they are much likelier continually to unsettle rather than to settle a free government, to breed commotions, changes, novelties, and uncertainties; to bring neglect upon present affairs and opportunities, while all minds are in suspense with expectation of a new assembly, and the assembly, for a good space, taken up with the new settling of itself. After which, if they find no great work to do, they will make it, by altering or repealing former acts, or making and multiplying new, that they may seem to see what their predecessors saw not, and not to have assembled for nothing, till all law be lost in the multitude of clashing statutes. But if the ambition of such as think themselves injured that they also partake not of the government, and are impatient till they be chosen, cannot brook the perpetuity of others chosen before them, or if it be feared that long continuance of power may corrupt sincerest men, the known expedient is, and by some lately propounded, that annually-or if the space be longer, so much perhaps the better-the third part of senators may go out according to the precedence of their election, and the like number be chosen in their places, to prevent their settling of too absolute a power, if it should be perpetual; and this they call partial rotation.

His chief objection to this plan is, that in this way the best and ablest men might have to retire, and be replaced by those who were raw and inexperienced, or

* I. e. Anticipate, a usual sense of prevent at that time.

ill-affected. He does not seem ever to have thought of obviating this inconvenience, by making the retiring senators capable of re-election. As to the council's

settling of too absolute a power," he thinks there is little danger of it while the people have arms in their hands. He is entirely opposed to a popular assembly in conjunction with the grand council, showing from history its inadequacy for the conservation of liberty. Neither would he have the members of the council chosen immediately by the popular vote. "Another way," he says, "will be to well qualify and refine elections: not committing all to the noise and shouting of a rude multitude, but permitting only those of them who are rightly qualified to nominate as many as they will; and out of that number, others of a better breeding to choose a less number more judiciously; till, after a third or fourth sifting and refining of exactest choice, they only be left chosen who are the due number, and seem by most voices the worthiest."

But the grand council should not be the sole depository of political power. Having spoken of liberty of conscience, which should be unlimited, he adds:

The other part of our freedom consists in the civil rights and advancements of every person according to his merit: the enjoy ment of those never more certain, and the access to them never more open, than in a free commonwealth. Both which, in my opinion, may be best and soonest obtained if every county in the land were made a kind of subordinate commonalty or commonwealth, and one chief town or more, according as the shire is in circuit, made cities, if they be not called so already, where the nobility and chief gentry, from a proportionable compass annexed to each city, may build houses or palaces befitting their quality, may bear part in the government, make their own judicial laws, or use those that are, and execute them by their own elected judicatures, and judges, without appeal, in all things of civil

government between man and man. So they shall have justice in their own hands, law executed fully and finally in their own counties and precincts-long wished and spoken of, but never yet obtained. They shall have none then to blame but themselves if it be not well administered, and fewer laws to expect from the supreme authority; or to those that shall be made, of any great concernment to public liberty, they may without much trouble-in these commonalties, or in more general assemblies, called to their cities from the whole territory on such occasion— declare and publish their assent or dissent by deputies, within a time limited, sent to the grand council; yet so as this their judgement declared shall submit to the greater number of other counties or commonalties, and not avail them to any exemption of themselves, or refusal of agreement with the rest, as it may in any of the United Provinces, being sovereign within itself, to the great disadvantage of that Union.

Controversies between men of different counties might be decided at the capital city, or any more commodious place, by indifferent judges.

In these cities they should also have "schools and academies at their own choice, wherein their children may be bred up in their own sight to all learning and noble education-not in grammar only, but in all liberal acts and exercises." But this, he says,

Monarchs never will permit; whose aim is to make the people wealthy indeed perhaps and well-fleeced, for their own shearing and the supply of regal prodigality; but otherwise softest, basest, viciousest, servilest, easiest to be kept under; and, not only in fleece, but in mind also, sheepishest. And will have all the benches of judicature annexed to the throne as a gift of royal grace, that we have justice done us; whereas nothing can be more essential to the freedom of a people than to have the administration of justice, and all public ornaments, in their own election, and within their own bounds, without long travelling or depending upon remote places to obtain their right or any civil accomplishment, so it be not supreme, but subordinate to the general power and union of the whole republic.

Such were the views of Milton as to the best form of government for England, formed in total ignorance of the character of the English people, the most attached to ancient usages and precedents, and the least inclined to depart from them, of any people in Europe. We need hardly say, then, that his plan was impracticable under any circumstances.