is a fact attested by consciousness; and whether we submit to its guidance or not, we cannot but be conscious that it puts forth a higher claim to our obedience than all other motives and springs of action united. No one had a clearer perception of this fact, or avowed it more frankly, than Hume himself.

"Those," says he, "who have denied the reality of moral distinctions may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human creature could ever seriously believe that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the regard and affection of every one.

"Let a man's insensibility be ever so great, he must often be touched with the images of right and wrong; and let his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe that others are susceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of convincing an antagonist of this kind, is to leave him to himself. For, finding that nobody keeps up the controversy with him, it is probable he will at last, of himself, from mere weariness, come over to the side of common sense and reason."

LECTURE V.

THE NATURE OF MORAL GOVERNMENT.

THE object of my last Lecture was to explain the nature and operations of that faculty by the possession of which, even more than by the gift of reason, man is raised above all the other orders of created being with which we are acquainted. Conscience, I endeavoured to show, is the inlet of a new set of ideas, which differ as widely from those which are furnished by the intellect, as the perceptions of vision do from those of touch and hearing. The object of the intellect is truth; that of conscience is duty. The former teaches us what is; the latter shows us what ought to be. The moral faculty is universal; for the most depraved and wicked person that ever lived is not ignorant of what the words ought and duty mean, though he may not heed them in his conduct. The uninstructed or perverted understanding may apply them wrongfully; but, however applied, their obligatory or binding character is always recognized. The idea of duty or moral obligation is simple or uncompounded; it does not admit of definition, because it is not susceptible of analysis, or of division into parts. Hence, it is not communicable by instruction; if it did not already exist in the infant mind, all the teaching in the world could never place it there, any more than mere words could inform a man what the color yellow is, if he had never seen a yellow object. In the latter case, indeed, the senses give us the necessary information; having once seen the unclouded sky, or the distant hills, or the deep ocean, I can

afterwards form a conception of them, and can then learn what the word blue signifies, or the objects to which it is applicable. Not so in the moral world; sense renders no aid here. The primary application of the words right and wrong is not to visible or tangible things, or even to any outward act, but to the secret purposes of the heart; for however strange or mischievous the deed may appear, as soon as we ascertain that it was unintentional, or that it proceeded from the best motives, we immediately relieve the doer from any moral blame. Just as the understanding discerns resemblance or contrariety between two ideas, does the moral faculty pronounce that truth-telling is right, and falsehood wrong; the only distinction between the two cases is, that, in the former one, the mental act terminates when the judgment is formed, truth or knowledge being the only end in view; while, in the latter, the conception of duty or moral obligation immediately rises, the judgment pointing directly to action. It is not properly a judgment, then, but a precept or command. I not only know that falsehood is wrong, but I feel that veracity is a duty, that I am bound on all occasions to tell the truth. More properly speaking, indeed, the conception of duty is involved in the judgment of right, and forms a part of it; to perceive the motive to be sinful, and to recognize the obligation to repress it, is one and the same act.

It was remarked, further, that the paramount character of moral obligation over all other motives or incentives to conduct is involved in the very idea of obligation. It is an impertinence. to ask for a foundation for the supremacy of conscience. He who commands, indeed, assumes that he has authority; and we often reasonably doubt the fact, and require him to show his commission. But in so doing, we virtually acknowledge that there is authority somewhere, that a higher power exists, whom we are bound to obey, and who is capable of delegating his right to command. Now it is only by a metaphor, though an apt and natural one, that we speak of the commands, or the voice, of conscience. It is the office of this faculty to create that primitive and simple feeling of obligation which is expressed by the word

ought, and which alone gives to duty and authority any proper meaning. There is a common confusion of thought here. With regard to a particular act or duty, it is reasonable to inquire if I am under a moral obligation to perform or to cherish it; but when this point is ascertained, to seek a reason for that obligation is to ask why it is a duty to perform a duty, duty, which is nonsense. It is demonstrable that no answer can be given to the question which will prevent it from being instantly repeated. That what is right is of higher authority than what is merely expedient is evident from the simple fact that right and obligation are correlative terms, or merely two aspects of the same idea; while obligation does not enter at all into the meaning of the word expedient.

It is with great diffidence that I venture to differ on this point from so eminent an authority in ethical science as Sir James Mackintosh. But what he has here attempted to add to the theory of ethics as expounded by Bishop Butler seems to me a violation of the simplicity and truth of the whole scheme, and, instead of furnishing a basis for the authoritative claims of conscience, to deprive this faculty of that original and supreme authority which is its most striking characteristic. There is a fundamental difference between the ideas of obligation and compulsion, which, though often lost sight of in the metaphorical use of language, is essential to any proper understanding of the subject. A subordinate officer may say, that he is obliged to obey the commands of his superior; but this is constraint, not duty; because he knows, that if need were, a file of soldiers would enforce the command. On the other hand, the dictates of conscience are enforced by no power whatever. Any one may disobey them who will. But, even in the moment of disobedience, he is conscious that he is violating an obligation, properly so called, which is in its very nature supreme. We do not do right because God commands it, but God commands it because it is right. The idea of moral obligation, then, I speak it reverently, lies behind the authority of the Almighty, and is the only buttress of his throne. As for the other supports that have

been devised for the sense of duty, that the action is obligatory because it is expedient, or because it is conformable to reason, to order, or to the fitness of things, they hardly merit notice.

And here I rest what I had to say upon the moral nature of man as preparatory to the further inquiry into the attributes of the Deity, and into that manifestation of them which calls for the religious homage of the whole human family. The question now is, — Have we satisfactory assurance, even from the light of nature, that God does indeed govern the earth? and if so, by what rule does he govern it? The doctrine of uninterrupted Divine agency, which was considered at length, and, as I think, established, in the former Course, teaches us, indeed, that all events are of his disposal; but the doctrine was then viewed chiefly in relation to physical occurrences, or to what are called the laws of the outward world. Is the moral world equally under his guidance and dominion? and does conscience, in its purity and supremacy, only mirror to us the light of his countenance? Is man, also, in his intellectual and moral nature, subject to laws as inflexible as those which govern the planets in their courses? and as the latter manifest to us the wisdom and power of the Lawgiver, so do the former evince to us his justice, benevolence, and holiness?

The answer of these questions in the affirmative, upon satisfactory grounds, you perceive, will afford evidence a posteriori of the moral character of the Deity, and, as a necessary consequence, of the religious duties of man. It is customary with writers upon this subject, I am well aware, to proceed entirely upon abstract reasoning, and to deduce the moral attributes from the natural ones, the whole doctrine resting upon arguments a priori. Thus, the doctrine of the omniscience of the Divine Being is upheld as "a necessary inference from that of a universal Creator. He who made all creatures and things that is to say, who gave them their being and properties cannot but know the being and properties which himself has given, and the ways in which they will be developed and will operate." Again,