lusia the Caudine Forks. Fame and incorrect information gave greater importance to this triumph than even its intrinsic magnitude deserved. It was unknown or overlooked that it was by a skilful series of military movements on the one side, and an extraordinary combination of errors on the other, that Dupont had been brought to such hazardous straits; by the firmness of the Swiss and Walloon guards, the precision in fire of the Spanish artillery, and the inexperience of his own troops, that he had been compelled to surrender. It was generally imagined that the French veterans had laid down their arms to the Spanish peasants; it was unknown or for gotten that the victory was really gained by experienced soldiers and the imaginations of men, both in the Peninsula and over all Europe, were set on fire by the belief that a new era had dawned upon mankind; that the superiority of disciplined troops and regular armies was at an end; and that popular enthusiasm and general zeal were all that were necessary to secure the victory, even over the greatest and most formidable veteran armies. CHAP. 1808. 38. delusive opi tained of this How widely this belief spread, how generally it was acted upon, and what oceans of blood it caused to be spilt in vain in Spain itself, will amply appear in the Disastrous sequel of this history; and probably, by inspiring the effect of the people of that country with an overweening idea of nion entertheir own strength, and of the capability of raw levies victory. to contend with regular forces, it contributed, in no small degree, to that almost unbroken train of disasters in the field which their armies, when unsupported by the British, subsequently experienced during the remainder of the war. But in the first instance it produced a prodigious and most important burst of exultation and enthusiasm. It determined the conduct of many of the grandees and nobles of Spain, who had at Bayonne adhered to the usurper, but now, with the Dukes del Infantado and del Parque, Cevallos and Penuela, rejoined 1 Montg. vi. the ranks of their countrymen; and by throwing the 110, 114. capital and chief towns of the kingdom, with the excep- Tor. i. 378. tion of the frontier fortresses, into the hands of the Nell. i. 124, insurgents, gave the struggle, in the eyes of all Europe, 64. as well as of the people themselves,2 the character of a 345. Foy, iv. Lond. i. 97. 125. Jom. ii CHAP. 1808. 39. national contest. Nor was the effect less momentous over the whole Continent, by affording a convincing proof that the French were not invincible, and opening the eyes of all governments to the immense addition which the military force, on which they had hitherto exclusively relied, might receive from the ardour and enthusiasm of the people. "Is Napoleon was at Bordeaux when the account of the capitulation reached him. Never, since the disaster at Opinion of Trafalgar, had he been so completely overwhelmed : Napoleon on this capitulafor a time he could not speak; the excess of his tion. depression excited the alarm of his ministers. your Majesty unwell?" said the minister for foreign affairs, Maret. "No."-"Has Austria declared war?" "Would to God that were all !"-" What, then, has happened?" The Emperor recounted the humiliating details of the capitulation, and added, "That an army should be beaten is nothing-it is the daily fate of war, and is easily repaired; but that an army should submit to a dishonourable capitulation is a stain on the glory of our arms which can never be effaced. Wounds inflicted on honour are incurable. The moral effect of this catastrophe will be terrible. What they have had the infamy to consent that the havresacks of our soldiers should be searched like those of robbers! Could I have ever expected that of General Dupont, a man whom I loved, and was rearing up to become a marshal? They say he had no other way to prevent the destruction of the army, to save the lives of the soldiers! Better, far better, to have perished with arms in their hands—that not one should have escaped! Their death would have been glorious: we should have avenged them. You can always supply the place of soldiers : honour alone, when once lost, can never be regained.”1 1 Thib. vi. 439. 40. Shameful violation of the capitula tion by the Spaniards. If the capitulation itself was dishonourable to the French arms, the subsequent violation of it by the Spaniards was still more disgraceful to the victors, and remains a dark stain on the Castilian good faith. From the moment that the long file of prisoners began their march towards Cadiz as the place of their embarkation, it was found to be extremely difficult to restrain the indignation of the people, who loudly complained that so СПАР. large a body of men, for the most part stained by robbery 1 1808. Tor. i. 375, 376. Foy, iv. 107, 108. Nap. i. 125, treatment of These disorders were, perhaps, unavoidable in the circumstances in which the Spanish government of the 41. province was situated, and the unexampled treachery And their with which they had been assailed by the French; but disgraceful for the subsequent violation of the capitulation no sort of the prisoners. apology can be found. Desirous of maintaining their popularity, the junta of Seville acceded to the opinion of Morla, in which they in vain endeavoured to get Lord Collingwood and Sir Hew Dalrymple to concur. In CHAP. 1808. stead of being sent by sea to France, the soldiers and regimental officers were crowded together into the hulks of Cadiz, where, such were the privations and misery to which they were subjected, very few remained at the conclusion of the war.* Dupont, the officers of his staff, and all the generals, were permitted to return to France; but the remainder, nearly eighteen thousand in number, were kept in lingering suffering in their dismal captivity, and, with the exception of a few who accepted service under the Spanish government, and took the first opportunity to desert to their beloved eagles, and those contained in one hulk, who overpowered their guards during the night and contrived to float her across to the lines of their countrymen three years afterwards, during 377. Nap. i. the siege of Cadiz, hardly any ever revisited their native South. i. 502, country.† This frightful act of injustice was as imwood, ii. 124. politic as it was disgraceful. It gave the French, in their turn, too fair a ground for inveighing against 1 Foy, iv. 107, 109. Tor. i. 375, 125, 127. 510. Colling Feb. 17, 1812. *Sir Hew Dalrymple's answer to the junta of Seville, when his opinion was asked on this subject, is worthy of a place in history. "It is quite clear that the capitulation is binding on the contracting parties, so far as they have the means of carrying it into execution. The laws of honour, not considerations of expediency, should ever govern soldiers in solemn stipulations of this kind; the surrender of General Vedel could only be supposed to have arisen from the confidence which he placed in the honour which characterised the Spanish nation. The reputation of a government, especially one newly formed, is public property, which ought not to be lightly squandered. The matter, therefore, is clear on considerations of honour and justice: even viewed in the light of expedience, it is far from being beyond dispute." Lord Collingwood, when applied to, answered, that if the Spanish government had not seamen enough to man transportvessels for conveying the troops, he would order British seamen to fit out their merchant-vessels for that purpose: that the capitulation must be observed so far as possible; if the conditions were impossible, they annulled themselves."SOUTHEY, i. 502, 504; COLLINGWOOD's Memoirs, ii. 127, 128. The fate of the generals and officers who were returned to France from Cadiz, was hardly less deplorable than that of their comrades who lingered in prolonged torments on board the Spanish hulks. Dupont and all the generals were immediately arrested and sent to prison, where they lingered, without either trial or investigation, for many years afterwards. General Marescot, who, though in a subaltern rank, had taken a certain part in the negotiation, loudly, but in vain, demanded to be brought to a court-martial. Neither he nor Dupont, nor any of the superior officers connected with the capitulation of Baylen, were ever more heard of till after the fall of Napoleon in 1814. In 1812, a court of inquiry sat on the generals, and condemned them all: but public opinion was far from supporting their decision. Shortly after (1st May 1812), an imperial decree forbade, on pain of death, any capitulation in the field which should amount to a laying down of arms. Such was Napoleon's irritation with regard to every thing connected with this convention, that, when he afterwards saw General Legendre, who, as chief of the staff to Dupont, had officially affixed his signature to the treaty, he was seized with a trembling from head to foot, and his indignation exhaled in these words :-" How, General! did your hand not wither when you signed that infamous capitulation?" He never afterwards heard Baylen alluded to without evincing such indignation as showed how deeply it had wounded his mind.-Foy, iv. 110, 113. the perfidy of their enemies, exasperated the feelings of their armies, who had first entered into this contest with lukewarm dispositions or undisguised aversion, and repeatedly afterwards stimulated them to desperate and sanguinary resistance, under circumstances wher, with a more trustworthy enemy, they would have entered into terms of accommodation. CHAP. LIV. 1808. 42. concentration of the French The fatal news of the capitulation of Baylen arrived at Madrid on the 29th July, and diffused universal consternation among the adherents of Joseph. A council of war Departure of Joseph from was immediately summoned by Savary; and opinions Madrid, and were much divided on the course which should be pursued. Moncey proposed that Bessières' division should troops behind be recalled, and that with their united forces they should the Ebro. take up a position in front of the capital, and defend it to the last extremity. But Savary, to whom the situation which he held as lieutenant-general of the King, as well as the known confidence which he enjoyed with the Emperor, gave a preponderating voice in the deliberations, strongly urged the necessity of retiring to the northward, and taking counsel from circumstances, as to the point to which the retreat should be prolonged. On the 30th July the intrusive King commenced his retreat: the hospitals had previously been evacuated for Bayonne; the heavy artillery, which could not be brought away, amounting to eighty pieces, was spiked; but the retiring monarch and his military satellites carried off with them all the jewels and precious articles from the palaces they had so recently occupied. They retired by the great road to Burgos, where headquarters were established on the 9th August; the rearguard collecting as it went along all the garrisons of the towns and castles which had been occupied by the French troops to the south of the Ebro. They experienced no molestation from the Spaniards during their retreat; notwithstanding which, all the villages and hamlets through which they passed were given up to pillage, and a great number burned to the ground. Soon after Joseph reached Burgos, Bessières arrived with 117, 124. his corps, and Verdier came up with the force which had Thib. vi. 442, been engaged in the siege of Saragossa;1 so that, including 275, 277. Moncey's corps and the troops brought up from Madrid, 1 Foy, iv. 443. Sav. iii. |