and boiling oil, was prepared on the flat tops of the houses to rain down death on the enemy. CHAP. 1808. 15. the city. Its The wreck of the troops and armed peasants who had combated at the Cabrillas, took refuge in the intrenched camp at Cuarte without the walls, where they occupied Attack on in force the sides of the canal which unites the waters of repulse. the Guadalaviar to those of the Fera. In that position they were attacked early on the morning of the 27th, June 27. and, after three hours' firing, driven back to the batteries and intrenchments in front of the gates. There, however, a more determined stand was made: and Moncey, desirous of bringing up his whole forces and artillery, deferred the attack on the city itself till the following day. Hardly an eye was closed in Valencia during the succeeding night. All ranks, and both sexes, laboured incessantly to complete the preparations for defence; and so great was the universal activity, that when the rays of the morning sun appeared above the blue expanse of the Mediterranean, it was hardly possible for the assailants to hope for success except from the pusillanimity of the defenders. Moncey disposed his field-pieces in the most June 28. favourable situations to reply to the heavy artillery on the ramparts and outworks, and, having driven the enemy through the suburbs, commenced the assault. Such, however, was the vigour of the defence, that very little advantage was gained: the light artillery of the French was soon overpowered by the heavy cannon on the walls; a murderous fire of grape was kept up from the top of the rampart and the intrenchments round the entrance of the city; while the new levies, wholly unable to withstand the shock of their veteran opponents in the open field, contended on terms of comparative equality in the houses and behind the walls or enclosures adjoining the gates. The enthusiasm within increased as the fire approached their dwellings: the priests traversed the streets with the cross in their hands, exhorting the people to continue the contest; the women brought up ammunition to the combatants; and when the grapeshot began to fail, the ladies of rank instantly furnished 1 Tor. i. 333, 336. Nap. i. an ample supply of missiles to charge the guns. A city 94, 95. Foy, so defended was beyond the reach of a coup-de-main :1 the iii. 254, 259. French troops rapidly melted away under the dropping СНА.Р. 1808. 16. tion and partial suc cesses of the patriots in July 1. July 3. fire with which they were assailed from many different quarters; and in the evening Moncey drew off to Cuarte, having lost two thousand men in this fruitless attack. The spirit of the Valencians was roused to the very highest pitch by this glorious result: and in the first Progress of burst of their triumph they confidently expected that the insurrec- the Conde Cervellon, who commanded a corps six thousand strong, consisting chiefly of armed peasants, on the banks of the Xucar, would fall upon the enemy in his that quarter. retreat, and complete his destruction. But it is a very different thing for insurgents to repulse an assailant from behind walls, and to defeat him in the open field. While these flattering illusions were filling the city with transport, Cervellon himself narrowly escaped destruction. Attacked by Moncey in his retreat, he was surprised with one-half of his corps on one side of the river, and the remainder on the other. The part first assailed made a feeble resistance: in the confusion of the rout, the French made themselves masters of a bridge, and, rapidly passing over, soon completed the defeat of the portion on the other side. Two days after, three thousand, who had escaped from the first disaster, were attacked and dispersed, with the loss of all their artillery, near Almanza, the celebrated theatre of the victory of the French over the Allies in the Succession War. But these advantages, though considerable, gained by a retreating army in the course of its flight, were no counterpoise to the disaster experienced before Valencia. The whole province was up in arms at the glorious tidings; the communication both with Catalonia and Madrid was cut off; Cuença was besieged by a body of seven thousand peasants, who overpowered the detachment left in that town; and though the victors were themselves assailed two days after, and dispersed with great slaughter, by Caulaincourt, whom Savary despatched from Madrid with a powerful body of horse to restore the communication with Moncey in that 1 Nap. i. 97, quarter, yet the object of the advance towards Valencia 336, 343. was totally lost. The French general, finding that Foy, iii. 260, Frère, with his division, on whose aid he had calculated in a renewed attack which he was preparing against that city,1 had been recalled to Madrid by orders of July 1. July 3. 98. Tor. ii. 262, and iv. 40, 44. Savary, who was alarmed at the advance of Cuesta and Blake towards the Guadarrama pass, gave up the expedition in despair, and returned by Ocana to the capital. CHAP. 1808. 17. Cuesta in Leon on the munications. The ultimate failure of the expedition of Moncey towards Valencia was occasioned by the terror excited in the capital by the threatening advance of Cuesta and Advance of Blake, with their united forces, upon the French line of communication between Madrid and the Bayonne fron- French comtier. There, it was evident, was the vital point of the contest; there a disaster would instantly be attended with fatal consequences: secured in that quarter, the failure of less considerable expeditions emanating from the capital was of comparatively little importance. Napoleon, who was strongly impressed with these views, had used the utmost efforts to reinforce Bessières, to whom the defence of the line through Old Castile was intrusted; and after providing for the occupation of the various points in which he had so early and successfully suppressed the insurrection, he could concentrate twenty thousand men to act against the enemy, who were approaching from the Galician mountains. But meantime the enemy had not been idle. Filanghieri, captaingeneral of Galicia, had, with the aid of the bountiful supplies of England, succeeded in organising twenty-five thousand men-including the soldiers who had come to Corunna from Oporto, originally part of Junot's expedition, and the garrisons of that place and Ferrol—with considerable train of artillery, and taken post in the mountains ten miles in the rear of Astorga. The situation of this corps, threatening the line of communication 1 sav. iii. between Bayonne and Madrid, was such as to excite the 248, 250. utmost disquietude in the breast of Napoleon; and he Nap. i. 101. sedulously impressed upon Savary that it was there that the decisive blow was to be struck.1* That general, however, was not so well aware as his "A stroke delivered by Bessières," said he, "would paralyse all Spain. What signifies now Valencia and Andalusia? The only way really to strengthen Dupont is to reinforce Bessières. There is not a citizen of Madrid, not a peasant in the remotest valleys of Spain, who does not feel that the fate of the campaign is exclusively in the hands of Marshal Bessières. What a misfortune, then, that in so important an affair we should lose a chance, how inconsiderable soever, of success."-NAPOLEON to SAVARY, July 13, 1808; Foy, iv. 45, 46; and NAPIER, i. Appendix, No. 1. Tor. ii. 341. LIV. 1808. Bessières CHAP. imperial master where the vital point was to be found; and, instead of reinforcing Bessières with all his disposable forces, he despatched Frère with his division on the 18. track of Moncey, to endeavour to re-open the communicaOperations of 'tion with that marshal, which the intervening insurrection had entirely cut off; and sent on Vedel and Gobert, with their respective divisions, to reinforce Dupont, who had by this time crossed the Sierra Morena, and was far advanced in his progress through Andalusia. Impressed, in a short time afterwards, with the increasing danger to his communications which arose from the junction of the Galician army near Astorga with that which still kept its ground in Leon under Cuesta, he hastily countermanded these orders; recalled Frère to Madrid; ordered Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont himself, to remeasure their steps, and held himself in readiness to march from the capital with all the disposable troops he could collect, to reinforce Bessières on the line of the great northern communication. These dispositions, as usual with alterations made in general designs on the spur of the moment, and in presence of the enemy, were essentially erroneous. The decisive point should have been looked to at first; the subsequent vacillation was too late to strengthen Bessières, but was calculated essentially to weaken Dupont, whom it went to deprive, in circumstances of imminent danger, of one of his best divisions. As such, they excited the greatest displeasure in Napoleon, who Tor. ii. 344, gave vent to it in an able and acrimonious despatch 345. Foy, iv. (which throws great light on the state of the campaign at this period,) and never afterwards in military transactions intrusted Savary with any important command.1* But 1 Sav. iii. 248, 252. 40, 47. Nap. i. 101, 102 "The French affairs in Spain," said Napoleon, "would be in an excellent state if Gobert's division had marched upon Valladolid to support Bessières, and Frère's division had occupied San Clemente, alike ready to reinforce Moncey or Dupont, as circumstances might require. Instead of this, Gobert having been directed upon Dupont, and Frère being with Moncey, harassed and weakened by marches and counter-marches, our situation has been sensibly injured. It is a great mistake not to have occupied the citadel of Segovia; of all positions in that quarter it is the most dangerous to the French army, as, situated between two roads, it intercepts both communications. If Dupont should experience a check, it is of no consequence; the only effect of it would be to leave him to repass the mountains; but a stroke delivered to Marshal Bessières would tell on the heart of the army, would give it a locked jaw, and speedily be feit in all its extremities. It is on this account that it is so unfortunate that the prescribed orders have not been specifically obeyed. The army of Bessières should have had at least eight thousand men more than it has, in order to remove all chance of a disaster in that quarter. The affair of Valencia was a matter of no importance; Moncey alone was adequate to it; it was absurd to think of rein meanwhile the danger had blown over in the north. Bessières, though unsupported, had not only made head against Cuesta and Blake, but defeated them; and a great victory in the plains of Leon had opened to Joseph the gates of Madrid. СНАР. LIV. 1808. 19. preparatory Blake, with the army of Galicia, having effected a junction with the remains of Cuesta's troops which had escaped the rout of Palencia, their united forces left a di- Movements vision at Benevento to protect their stores, and advanced to a battle on into the plains of Leon to give battle to Bessières. This both sides. plan could not but appear rash, considering the veteran character of the French troops, their superiority in cavalry, and the undisciplined crowd of which a large part of the Spanish levies was composed. It was undertaken solely on the responsibility of Cuesta, who had assumed the chief command, and against the strongest remonstrances of Blake, who urged that, by falling back to the frontiers of Galicia, where the French general could never pretend to follow them, they would gain time to discipline and equip their troops, and would soon be enabled to advance again at the head of forty thousand effective men. This sage counsel was rejected. Cuesta, who was a brave but inexperienced veteran, equally headstrong and obstinate, insisted upon an immediate action; and finding that Blake still declined to obey, he addressed himself to the junta of Galicia, who, yielding to popular clamour, seconded his orders, and directed Blake forthwith to advance and give battle. Having now no alternative but submission, Blake did the utmost in his power, during the short interval which remained, to put his troops into good condition; forcing him. If he could not take that town with the forces he had, he could not have done so with twenty thousand more; in that case it would become an affair of artillery. You cannot take by a single stroke a town with eighty thousand or a hundred thousand inhabitants, who have barricaded the streets and fortified the houses. Frère, therefore, could have added nothing to the means of Moncey against Valencia, while the abstraction of his division seriously weakened Dupont. Moreover, if the latter general was to be succoured, it would have been better to have sent him a single regiment direct, than three by so circuitous a route as that by which Frère was ordered to march. In civil wars it is the important points which must be defended, and no attempt made to go every where. The grand object of all the armies should be to preserve Madrid; it is there that every thing is to be lost or won. Madrid cannot be seriously menaced except by the army of Galicia: but it may be so there; for Bessières has not adequate forces to ensure its defeat. It may be threatened by the army of Andalusia, but hardly endangered; for in proportion as Dupont falls back, he is reinforced, and with their twenty thousand men he and Vedel should at least be able to keep the enemy in check in that quarter."-Notes addressed to SAVARY on the affairs of Spain by NAPOLEON, 13th July 1808; taken at the battle of Vittoria in King JOSEPH's Portfolio; NAPIER, i. Appendix, No. 1. |