LVII. 1809. 18. Napoleon's first atten tite future Em press Marie Louise. CHAP. daughter of the illustrious House of Hapsburg. It was by the thunders of artillery, and the flaming light of bombs across the sky, that Napoleon's first addresses to the Archduchess MARIE LOUISE were paid. Informed of the dangerous situation of the noble invalid, he ordered the direction of the pieces to be changed; and while the midnight sky was incessantly streaked by burning projectiles, and conflagration was commencing in every direction around her, the future Empress of France remained secure and unharmed in the Imperial palace. Strange result of those days, not less of royal than national revolution! that a daughter of the Cæsars should be wooed and won by a soldier of fortune from Corsica: that French arms should be exerted to place an Austrian princess on the throne of Charlemagne: that the leader of a victorious invading 1 Pel. ii. 278, host should demand her for his bride; and that the first Thib. vii. 255. acts of attention should be rendered amid the deep booming of the mortars, which, but for his interposition, would have consigned her father's palace to destruction.1 Norv. iii. 211, 212. 19. The Arch duke Maximilian abandons Vienna, tulates. Aware of the danger of his situation, if cut off from all communication with the Danube and the powerful armies on the north bank of that river, the Archduke Maximilian made an attempt, at one in the morning of the following day, to regain the Lusthaus, an important point, which capi- which would have hindered the formation of the bridge the French were preparing from the southern bank of the first island; but the attack, not supported with adequate force, was speedily repulsed. Despairing, after that check, of being able to maintain his ground in the capital, and intimidated by the sight of the flames which were bursting forth in many quarters, the Archduke resolved to abandon it to its fate. The troops of the line, accordingly, with the exception of a few hundred invalids, were withdrawn to the north bank by the great bridge of Thabor, which was immediately afterwards burned. They were just in time; for so rapid had been the progress of the French troops between the battlements and the river, that in a few hours more their retreat would have been irrevocably cut off, and the bridge gained. General O'Reilly, Sav. iv. 67, who was left in command, now lost no time in signifying his readiness to capitulate ;2 and the terms were soon agreed to, and ratified early on the following morning. May 12. May 13. 2 Stut. 217, 224. Pel. ii. 276, 289. Jom. iii. 188. 68. They were the same as those granted in 1804, guaranteeing the security of private property of every description, but enforcing the surrender of all public stores, and in particular the magnificent arsenal, containing four hundred pieces of cannon, and immense artillery stores of every description. Fifty guns in addition, which were on their route for Hungary, were captured by Massena, before they had got many miles from the capital. CHAP. LVII. 1809. 20. the different corps of the armies in the The capture of Vienna was a prodigious stroke for Napoleon; affording him, as it did, a fortified post on the Danube, amply provided with military stores of every Positions of description, and which it was impossible to starve out for fear of destroying the inhabitants of the metropolis. The French French troops took possession of the gates at noon on the middle of 13th, and at that period the positions of the different May. corps of their army were as follows:-The corps of Lannes, with four divisions of cuirassiers of the reserve cavalry, and all the Guards, were stationed at Vienna: Massena, between that capital and the Simmering, with his advanced posts occupying the Prater, and watching the banks of the Danube: Davoust, who had come up from Ratisbon, was advancing in echelon along the margin of that river, between Ebersberg and St Polten, with his headquarters at Melk: Vandamme, with the Wirtemburghers under his orders, guarded the important bridge of Lintz; while Bernadotte, who had at length completed his circular march round Bohemia, with the Saxons,* and other troops of the Confederation, about thirty thousand strong, had arrived at Passau, and was advancing to form the reserve of the Grand Army. Lefebvre, with the Bavarians, was fully engaged in a desperate strife in the Tyrol; but independent of his corps, the Emperor had a 288. Jom. iii. hundred thousand men concentrated between Lintz and 188, 190. Vienna, besides a reserve of thirty thousand approaching to reinforce them from the upper Danube.1+ * Napoleon was exceedingly displeased at the tardy movements and inefficient condition of the Saxons during this period, and shortly before had addressed the following letter to their general Bernadotte, on the subject. "The foot artillery of the Saxons is extremely defective. What I want is warlike troops, and experienced generals to direct their movements. The Saxons are incapable of acting by themselves. There is not one of their generals to whom I can venture to intrust a detached operation. With Frenchmen I can feel assured of energy and experience in the troops; but the Saxons can do nothing. It is indispensable that they should be strengthened and stimulated by the example of troops more warlike than themselves."-PELET, ii. 241. On entering Vienna, Napoleon addressed the following proclamation to his 1 Pel. ii. 286, CHAP. 1809. While these rapid successes were achieved by the Grand Army, the Archduke Charles, with a tardiness which is to this day inexplicable, was pursuing his route from Bohemia towards the capital. After his retreat from Ratisbon, of the Arch- on the 23d of April, he retired to Horasdiowitz, in the duke Charles, southern part of that province, and was followed by and position of his army. Davoust as far as Straubing, who so far imposed upon the 21. Movements May 3. prince as to make him believe that he was pursued by the whole French army. This natural but unfounded illusion, was attended with the most unfortunate consequences. Conceiving that Hiller would be perfectly adequate to restrain any incursion of a detached corps towards the capital, he made his dispositions so as to draw upon himself the weight of the invading army, deeming that the most effectual way to ward off the danger from the capital. No sooner was he undeceived in this particular, than he despatched the most pressing orders to Hiller to defend his ground as long as possible, so as to give him time to join the main army by the bridges of Lintz or Mauthausen, and he himself set out by forced marches to join him at one or other of these points. It was to gain time for the effecting of this junction, that Hiller, who had not force sufficient to make head at Lintz, maintained so desperate a resistance at Ebersberg. But that action took place on the 3d May, and on the evening of the same day the Archduke arrived at Budweiss with the bulk of his army, about forty leagues to the northwest of Vienna. At that place he remained for three days; a delay which was the more inexplicable, as he heard, in the course of the 4th, of the forcing of the bridge of Ebersberg, which in effect opened the road to the capital to the French army. In truth, he was impressed with the idea troops: Soldiers! In a month after the enemy passed the Inn, on the same day, at the same hour, we entered Vienna. Their landwehrs, their levies en masse, their ramparts, created by the impotent rage of the princes of the House of Lorraine, have fallen at the first sight of you. The princes of that house have abandoned their capital, not like soldiers of honour, who yield to circumstances and the reverses of war, but as perjurers haunted by the sense of their own crimes. In flying from Vienna, their orders have been murder and conflagration like Medea, they have, with their own hands, massacred their offspring. Soldiers! the people of Vienna-according to the expression of a deputation of the suburbs-abandoned, widowed, shall be the object of our regard. I take its good citizens under my special protection; as to the turbulent and wicked, they shall meet with exemplary justice. Let us exhibit no marks of haughtiness or pride; but regard our triumphs as a proof of the Divine justice, which punishes, by our hands, the ungrateful and the perjured.”— THIBAUDEAU, vii. 256; Moniteur, 29th May 1809. CHAP. LVII. 1809. that Napoleon would never advance to Vienna while so formidable an army menaced his line of communication; and accordingly, instead of hastening towards it, he merely pushed on Kollowrath with twenty thousand men towards the bridge of Lintz, and sent orders to the Arch- 1 Pel. ii. 253, duke John to abandon Italy, and make for the same 230. Jom. iii. point; vainly hoping that the concentration of such forces 183. in his rear would compel Napoleon to abandon his attack on the capital.1 May 8. 254. Stut. 22. duke at wards Vienna Awakened, at length, by the pressing representations of the Archduke Maximilian, to the necessity of instantly providing for the protection of Vienna, he commanded The ArchHiller, who, in obedience to his orders, had passed over, length adafter the combat at Ebersberg, by the bridge of Maut- vances tohausen to the northern bank, to advance by forced marches to the metropolis; and, breaking up from Budweiss on the morning of the 8th, he himself followed in the same direction. But it was too late; the repose of three days at that place had given his indefatigable adversary the start of him by a day. Hiller received his orders on the 10th, at two in the morning, and, marching twelve leagues that day, reached, with his advanced guard, Nussdorf, a league from Vienna, before night, but found the town already invested; while the Archduke advanced by Twetel towards Krems, hoping still to be in time to throw himself between the invader and the capital. Not- May 13. withstanding all their efforts, however, they were too late. Hiller, indeed, occupied the isles of the Danube on the 11th, the day before the Archduke Maximilian withdrew from the city, but not in time to prevent its complete investiture; and the advanced guard of the Archduke Charles reached the northern extremity of the bridges late on the evening of the 15th, when the enemy was already fully established in the capital. But for the delay at May 16. Budweiss, and the order to Hiller to cross over to the northern bank, the army would have been up in time to combat for Vienna; for on the 16th, the junction was fully effected with Hiller a few miles to the north of Vienna, on the left bank of the river; and as from Bud- 258. Jom. iii. weiss to that place is just six days' march, Prince Charles, 183, 185. Stut. 230, who arrived at this first town on the 4th, might have 235. reached the capital with ease on the evening of the 11th, 2 Pel. ii. 253, LVII. CHAP. twenty-four hours before it actually surrendered, and long before, if garrisoned by the united forces of Hiller and Maximilian, consisting of thirty thousand good troops, it could possibly have been reduced. 1809. 23. Archduke John from Italy. April 29. The disasters in Bavaria, and the rapid advance of Napoleon to Vienna, produced an immediate change on Retreat of the the aspect of affairs in the Italian plains. Cut short in the career of victory, not less by the necessity of making considerable detachments to the right and left, to watch the progress of Marmont in Dalmatia, and aid the insurrection in the Tyrol, than by the peremptory orders of the Archduke Charles to draw near to the Hereditary States for the defence of the capital, the Archduke John broke up from the position of Caldiero on the Adige. In order to conceal his real intentions, he made, on the 29th April, several attacks on the enemy, but without effecting his object; for Eugene was aware of the events in Bavaria, and had concentrated his troops to resume the offensive the moment that his adversary retired. Orders arrived on that day from Vienna, to suspend as little as possible his offensive operations in Italy; but to open a communication with Hiller, who was to fall back to the Enns; and to be prepared to maintain himself in Styria, Carinthia, and the Tyrol, as a vast fortress, where he could keep his ground though detached altogether from the other Imperial armies. The Archduke John, however, was of an opposite opinion, and, deeming it indispensable to concentrate all the forces of the monarchy in the centre of the Hereditary States, he stated his intentions of acting differently in a despatch to the Emperor Francis on 30th April, and on the first May commenced his retreat by Friuli. Eugene followed the enemy leisurely, and the Austrians reached the Brenta without sustaining any loss, where Prince John was distracted by new orders from the Archduke Charles, dated Cham, 29th April, directing him to co-operate with the intended movement of the general-in-chief, from the north bank of the Danube upon Lintz, so as to threaten the enemy's communications. Pel. ii. 180, But the progress of events both on the Danube and the Italian plains disconcerted all these projects, and rendered a retreat upon Vienna, in Prince John's opinion, a matter of necessity.1 1 Jom. iii. 224, 225. 195. Erz. Johan, Feldz. 104, 107. |