the Danube, which soon rendered necessary the concentration of the whole forces of the monarchy for the defence of the capital.* CHAP. 1809. 56. the com mencement paign afford Thus, though Napoleon's successes had been great on the Bavarian plains, he had by no means gained any decided advantage: his armies had been routed, or run Hopes which the most imminent hazard, wherever he did not command in person; and disasters which would have been of the camdecisive in any other warfare had been experienced by ed to the his lieutenants on the Italian frontier. It was evident Allies. that the forces of the contending parties were approaching to an equality : the wonted vehemence of the Republican armies had disappeared when led by the marshals of France; the Austrians had clearly proved their superiority to the allies who swelled the columns of their adversaries; and it was the consummate talents, overwhelming force, and paralysing renown of Napoleon, that alone still chained victory to the standards of the Grand Army. Reversing the principles of both parties in the contest, the fortunes of France had come to depend on the genius of a single man—the pyramid rested on its apex. Driven by necessity to a more enlarged policy, Austria was reaping the fruits of popular enthusiasm, and successfully combating the revolution with the arms which itself had created. The aristocratic power, generally successful, failed only from the want of a leader adequate to the encounter of the popular hero; the democratic, elsewhere defeated, prevailed through the extraordinary abilities of one man. Such a state of matters might promise little for present success, but it was pregnant with hope for future deliverance. Great as may be the ascendency, unbounded the activity of a single leader, they cannot, in the long run, compensate general disaster; and, in all prolonged contests, that power is ultimately destined to victory, which, appealing to principles that find a responsive echo in the human heart, rests upon the organised and directed efforts of the many, rather than the abilities, how splendid soever, of the few. * In the order of time, the war in the Tyrol should be treated of immediately after the opening of the campaign in Italy; but the vast moral importance of that contest, as well as its romantic character, require a separate chapter, and will be treated of in a following one, before that which narrates the battle of Wagram. CHAPTER LVII. CAMPAIGN OF ASPERN. CHAP. 1809. IMMEDIATELY after the battle of Echmuhl, Napoleon, LVII. clearly perceiving the expediency of striking at the heart of his enemies' power before the consternation Measures of consequent on the disasters in Bavaria had subsided, Napoleon for issued orders in all directions for the concentration of a grand conhis forces upon the Austrian capital. Orders were descentric attack upon patched on the 24th to Eugene, to press forward in the Vienna. Italian plains; to Bernadotte, who had assumed the command of the Saxons at Dresden, without a moment's delay to enter Bohemia by the northern frontier; and to Poniatowski, who commanded the Polish army, to invade Gallicia, and endeavour to excite an insurrection in that province against the Austrian dominion.* Every preparation was also made for moving the whole Grand Army, with the exception of Davoust's corps, which was left at Ratisbon to observe the Archduke, down the valley of the Danube, into the interior of the monarchy; 1 Pel. ii. 171, and, by daybreak on the 26th, a hundred thousand men were in full march for the Inn and Vienna. At the same time, to impose upon Prussia, and overawe the numerous malcontents in the north of Germany,1 a corps 173. Thib. vii. 243. Sav. iv. 59. *To Eugene he wrote- Advance in full confidence; the Emperor is about to move into the interior of Austria; the enemy will not keep their ground before you any more than they have done in Bavaria. Their army, defeated in its most cherished projects, is totally demoralised." To Bernadotte at Dresden -"Napoleon is about to march upon Vienna, and he expects, with the greatest impatience, your arrival in Bohemia, to co-operate with the Grand Army, which will at once render disposable the corps of Davoust, now left in observation at Ratisbon.' To Poniatowski-"That he fully relied on his zeal in the common cause, and that, as the Emperor was about to march upon Vienna, now was the moment for him to enter Gallicia."-See the original Letters in PELET, ii. 172, 173. of observation was formed, under the orders first of Kellerman, and afterwards of Junot, which, though consisting only of fourteen thousand men, was pompously announced in the bulletins as numbering fifty thousand combatants. CHAP. LVII. 1809. 2. measures of The situation of the Archduke Charles was now embarrassing in the highest degree. By having been driven off from the valley of the Danube, and compelled to take Defensive refuge in the mountains of Bohemia, the approach to the Archduke the capital was left unguarded, save by Hiller's corps and Charles. that of the Archduke Louis, thirty-five thousand strong, which were wholly inadequate to arrest the march of the mighty conqueror. An ordinary general, indeed, responsible to his superiors, would hesitate to advance into the interior of the Austrian monarchy, leaving seventy-five thousand men on one flank in the Bohemian mountains, and the insurgent Tyrol, secure in inaccessible Alps, on the other, to menace or cut off his lines of communication. But it was not the character of Napoleon to be deterred by such obstacles. On the contrary, it was distinctly foreseen, what the event speedily proved was the case, that the French Emperor, relying on the power and terror of the army under his immediate command, would hurry forward to the capital, and trust to his never-failing resources to dissipate any assemblages on his flanks or rear by which his communication might be threatened. Impressed with these ideas, Prince Charles despatched orders on the 23d to Hiller, April 23. to retard as much as possible the advance of the enemy; to the Archduke John, to retreat towards the Hereditary States; while he himself, after forming a junction with Bellegarde, exerted himself to the utmost in reorganising his army, and, with the consent of the Emperor Francis, despatched a courier with a dignified letter proposing au April 28. exchange of prisoners, and hinting at more important Feld. 49. negotiations to Napoleon who arrived, however, at the Stut. 178, French headquarters after they had already been estab- 173, 179. lished in Upper Austria, and too late to arrest the dreaded march of the conqueror to Vienna.1* *To his brother the Emperor, the Archduke wrote-"Finding it impossible to keep my ground with a river such as the Danube in my rear against a victorious enemy in front, I have deemed it expedient to cross to the northern bank and form a junction with Count Bellegarde. You are aware that all the 1 Erz. Johan. 182. Pel. ii. СНАР, 1809. 3. Napoleon advances to the borders of the Traun. April 26. The Emperor's dispositions being all completed, the Grand Army was, to a certain extent, divided: Davoust, whose corps, exhausted by the fatiguing marches it had undergone, and seriously weakened by the losses of the campaign, stood in need alike of reinforcement and repose, was left at Ratisbon to guard the passage of the Danube, and watch the retiring columns of the Archduke; Lefebvre, with the Bavarians, was detached into the Tyrol, to make head against the insurrection in that province, which was daily assuming a more menacing aspect; while the Emperor himself, at the head of the corps of Massena, Lannes, and Bessières, still, notwithstanding all the losses of the campaign, above eighty thousand strong, proceeded direct by the great road along the southern side of the Danube to Vienna. Vandamme followed at a little distance, with the troops of the Confederation, eighteen thousand more; and as soon as Bernadotte, with the Saxons, who was toiling round the external frontier of the Bohemian mountains, relieved Davoust at Ratisbon, he too was to follow in the same direction with his corps, still numbering forty thousand men. Every disposition being thus made to secure his rear, and station his troops in echelon, so as to ensure his communications, Napoleon left Ratisbon on the 26th, and arrived the same day at Landshut, where he found operations of the campaign were based on the probability of early success, and on the co-operation of the troops of the Rhenish Confederacy, who have, in fact, declared against us. Would it not be expedient, then, to try the result of a negotiation, before the enemy has invaded Austria, and while in Italy and Tyrol there remain successes to counterbalance his advantages?" The Emperor despatched Count Stadion with his reply, which approved of overtures by the Archduke, provided they did not compromise his dignity. The latter accordingly wrote to Napoleon on the 30th April: "Your Majesty has announced your arrival by a salvo of artillery; I had no time to reply to it; but though hardly informed of your presence, I speedily discovered it by the losses which I sustained. You have taken many prisoners from me, and I have taken some thousands from you in quarters where you were not personally present. I propose to your Majesty to exchange them, man for man, rank for rank; and, if that proposal proves agreeable to you, point out the place where it may be possible to carry it into effect. I feel flattered, sire, in combating the greatest captain of the age; but I should esteem myself more happy if Heaven had chosen me to be the instrument in procuring for my country a durable peace. Whatever may be the events of war, or the chances of an accommodation, I pray your Majesty to believe that my desires will always outstrip your wishes, and that I am equally honoured by meeting your Majesty either with the sword or the olive branch in your hand."-But all this graceful flattery was thrown away; for, before it reached Napoleon, he was far advanced in the valley of the Danube, and the terrible combat of Ebersberg had opened to him the gates of Upper Austria, when nothing remained to stay his triumphant march to Vienna.-ERZH JOHANN's Feldzug in jahre 1809, 55, 56; and PELET, ii. 176, 179. CHAP. LVII. 1809. the whole Guard, both horse and foot, assembled, having just come up from Spain. This veteran corps, full twenty thousand strong, proved a most important addition to his invading force; and when it is recollected that in the 1 Pel. ii. 180, beginning of January it was at Astorga at the foot of the 181. Sav. iv. Galician mountains,* it must be admitted that few more 182, 187. rapid marches are on record in the whole annals of military achievement.1 60, 61. Stut. 4. army to Meanwhile, the vanguard pressed on with ceaseless vigour, and soon the advanced posts were on the Inn. The rocky banks of that river, flanked by the ramparts March of the of Brannau and Passau, afforded an apparently favourable Ebersberg. situation for arresting the advance of the enemy; but the April 28. vast line, above thirty leagues in length, would have required a hundred thousand men for its defence, and the Austrian general had not above a third of that number at his disposal. For the same reason he contented himself with breaking down the bridges over the Salza, which had the effect of retarding, by two days, the advance of the French army. Napoleon arrived at Brannau on the 1st May, and pressed on with ceaseless May 1. activity the march of his troops; while Hiller, abandoning the woody range and unformed intrenchments of the Kirchbergwald, took post at the formidable position of EBERSBERG, to defend the passage of the Traun, and cover the wooden bridge, which at Mauthausen, or a little farther down the Danube, formed an important line of communication with the northern bank of the river. It was of the most vital consequence to gain possession of this post, for a few hours would suffice, with a corps such as Hiller's, to put it in a posture of defence; and if the Archduke, who was following by Budweiss 61. Stut. 182, down the left bank, should arrive before it was forced, it 187. might retard, or altogether defeat, the projected march upon Vienna.2 2 Jom. iii. 181. Pel. ii. 181, 199. Sav. iv. 60, 5. The scenery in the vicinity of Salzburg, particularly that of the Konig See, the valley of Berchtolsgaden leading to it, the defile above Hallein, the Traun, Aber and Alter Description Sees, and the whole valley from the Danube up to Gasterns, is perhaps the most magnificent in Europe. It burg. rivals the Grand Chartreuse in grandeur, and unites to * Ante, c. lv. § 46. of the scenery near Salz |