LVI. CHAP. were the most brilliant of his life ;* and without going the length of so extraordinary an eulogium, it may safely be affirmed, that they never were excelled by the operations either of himself or any other general. 1809. 51. scene in the ours at Ratisbon. On the day following, the Emperor reviewed a great part of his army at Ratisbon, and one of those imposing Impressive spectacles was exhibited, which, almost as much as his military talents, contributed to his astonishing successes. conferring of military hon- As each regiment defiled before him, Napoleon demanded from the colonel who were the most deserving among the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, and in presence of the army conferred on them the honours and distinctions assigned to them. On these interesting occasions he himself decided on every case, and often conferred the reward on a common soldier, in preference to those of higher grade who were recommended. He recognised some of the veterans of Marengo or the Pyramids as they were presented to him, and when conferring the cross, gave them a signal of recognition by a slight tap on the cheek or clap on the shoulder, accompanied by a kind expression, as "I make you a baron or a chevalier." One of these veterans, on 1 O'Meara, li. 206. "The greatest military manœuvres I ever executed, and those for which I give myself most credit, were performed at Echmuhl, and were infinitely superior to those at Marengo, or to any other of my actions." "On this day, I heard the Emperor repeat what I had often previously heard him say, that the finest manœuvres of his life were those which preceded the battle of Echmuhl."-LAS CASES, v. 168, 169. The details of the grounds on which this striking opinion is formed, are thus given by Pelet, and quoted by Las Cases. "In four days of combats and manœuvres, were completed the destinies of the Austrian army-of that army, recently so numerous and arrogant, the most formidable and perfectly equipped which Austria had ever sent forth. By his first dispositions, Napoleon had organised the plan of his great battle, secured his outposts, and reconnoitred the ground for a battle in front of Augsburg, according to the direction which the enemy's columns seemed disposed to take. He had corrected the false dispositions of Berthier, and collected his forces in such masses on each wing, as to preclude the danger which he had induced. On the 18th April, he arrived on the ground and made his dispositions, and announced that in three days all would be accomplished on the 19th it commenced, and the junction of the wings took place under the cannon of the Archduke: on the 20th, he broke the enemy's centre at Abensberg, and entirely separated their left wing from their centre on the 21st, he routed the left wing at Landshut, got possession of its magazines, park equipages, and communications. Quick as lightning, he returned on the 22d to Echmuhl, to deal out his final blows against the army of the Archduke; the remains of which with difficulty saved themselves behind the walls of Ratisbon and the mountains of Bohemia. Had Massena, as he was ordered, attacked Landshut on the 21st, on the right bank of the Iser, at the same moment when Napoleon pressed him on the left bank, the remains of Hiller's corps would have been entirely destroyed: had Ratisbon not been delivered up to the Archduke, the remains of his army, cooped up in the bend formed by the Danube at that place, would have been utterly ruined. Thus, but for these untoward incidents, the vast army of the Archduke would have been cut to pieces in these four days; as it was, it was severed in two, and found salvation only in flight."-LAS CASES, v. 196. CHAP. LVI. 1809. being presented, asked the Emperor if he did not remember him. "How should I?" answered Napoleon.—" It was I," replied the soldier, "who in the desert of Syria, at the moment of your utmost necessity, gave you a portion of my rations." Napoleon at once recognised him, and said, "Oh! I recollect you perfectly, and make you a chevalier, with an annual endowment of twelve hundred francs," (£50.) These heart-thrilling scenes excited the usual transports among the French soldiers; but on the troops of the Confederation, upon whom honours and bounties were wisely and profusely showered, and to whom they were perfectly new, they produced an unbounded impression. It then appeared how strongly the German heart was capable of being moved by those appeals to honour and generous feeling, of which the Allied sovereigns in after times so largely availed themselves. At the same time, forty of the most deserving of the 65th regiment, which had capitulated at Ratisbon, were admitted into the Old Guard, to show that the Emperor entertained no displeasure at that corps for that unto- 1 Pel. ii. 111, ward event; and a proclamation was addressed to the vii. 237. army, which, with just pride, though in exaggerated terms, recounted their great exploits.1 1* 112. Thib. Bavarians by But though these splendid triumphs attended the arms of Napoleon, where he commanded in person, the fate of 52. war was very different in other quarters; and already Defeat of the were to be seen convincing proofs, from the disasters Hiller. attending them under the direction of his lieutenants, April 24. that the invincible veterans of the republic were fast wearing out, that the conscripts of the empire possessed no superiority over the now improved and invigorated armies by which they were opposed, and that the successes, where he in person commanded, were owing to *"Soldiers, you have justified my anticipations; you have supplied by bravery the want of numbers, and marked the difference which exists between the soldiers of Cæsar and the armed rabble of Xerxes. Within the space of a few days we have triumphed in the battles of Thaun, of Abensberg, and Echmuhl, and in the combats of Pleissing, Landshut, and Ratisbon: one hundred pieces of cannon, forty standards, fifty thousand prisoners, three bridge equipages, three thousand baggage waggons with their horses, all the regimental caissons, such are the fruits of the rapidity of your marches and of your courage. The enemy, seduced by a perjured cabinet, appeared to retain no recollection of you: his wakening has been speedy, for you have appeared more terrible than ever. Lately he crossed the Inn and invaded the territory of our allies; lately he talked of nothing less than carrying the war into the bosom of our country: now defeated, dispersed, he flies in consternation. Already my advanced guard has passed the Inn; in a month we shall be at Vienna."-NAPOLEON to his Troops, April 24, 1809; PELET, ii. 115. CHAP. LVI. 1809. the talent of his combinations or the terrors of his name. Hiller, who had retired to the Inn after the disaster of Landshut, finding that he was not pursued by the French troops, and having ascertained that Napoleon had diverged with the bulk of his forces in another direction, deemed it a favourable opportunity to take vengeance on the Bavarians, by whom he had been somewhat incautiously pursued, for the losses which he had experienced. Having collected some small reinforcements on the Inn, and divided his troops, about thirty thousand strong, into three columns, he remeasured his steps, and suddenly attacked the Bavarians under WREDE, who, along with the reserve under Bessières, were advancing beyond the defile of Neumarck, and had taken post on the heights in front of St Verti. The Bavarians made at first a stout resistance, but being outnumbered and outflanked, they were soon driven back; and though Molitor came up to support them with some regiments of the Imperial Guard, they too were compelled to retreat, and sustained a considerable loss. Before night the French and their allies were driven entirely off the field, with the loss of fifteen hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. But the intelligence which Hiller received in the night of the battle 1 Stut. 172, of Echmuhl and retreat of the Archduke upon Ratisbon, 176. Jom. iii. induced him to halt in the career of victory, and remea178. Pel. ii. 166, 170. sure his steps to the Inn, in order to cover the approach to Vienna.1 53. Successful operations of the Arch duke John Italy. A disaster of a still more serious description was sustained about the same period, by the Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais, in the Italian plains. On the same day on which the Archduke Charles crossed the Inn, his brother, in the Archduke John, passed the mountain frontier of the kingdom of Italy with forty-eight thousand men, and after defiling over the Isonzo at Gorizia, and going through Udina, poured down on the Italian plains, and took post in front of Passeriano, already famous in the diplomacy of Napoleon.* The viceroy had above fortyfive thousand men to oppose the invader; but they were, in great part, of Italian extraction, and could hardly be relied upon to withstand the shock of the Transalpine forces. This inferiority speedily appeared in the first actions of the campaign. Eugene fell back across the * Ante, c. xxvi. § 3. 1 CHAP. 1809. April 14. Tagliamento, and established his headquarters at SACILE. The Austrians, two days after, came up in great force, and at Pordenone surprised the 35th French regiment, which, with its eagle and four pieces of cannon, fell into the enemy's hands. Stung to the quick by this disgrace, and fearful of the effect of any further retreat upon the spirit of his troops, the Viceroy determined to hold firm and give battle to the enemy. Orders accord- 1 Erzh. ingly were given for the whole army to suspend its retreat, 44, 52. Peland retrace its steps, on the 15th; and on the day follow- iii. 141, 152 ing he made an attack on the Imperialists between Sacile and Pordenone.1 Johan. Feld. 54'. of Eugene April 16. The field of battle, which lay between Vigo-nuova and Porcia, on the gentle slopes where the Alps of Roveredo melt into the Italian plains, was singularly favourable Total defeat for the operations of cavalry, in which arm the Austrians Beauharnais had considerably the advantage. So little did they anti- at Sacile. cipate, however, an attack, that at the moment when it commenced, the Archduke John was engaged in hearing mass at Pordenone, and one of his corps was considerably in the rear at Palse. The best dispositions, however, which circumstances would admit, were made to repel the enemy; and as the troops in the rear successively came up, they were passed on to the plain of Vigo-Nuova, so as to menace the communication between Eugene and the bridge of Sacile. The combat was very warm, and in the first instance, before the corps of Chastellar came up, Prince Eugene had the advantage; and at the village of Porcia, in particular, which was repeatedly taken and retaken, a frightful carnage took place. Gradually, however, the Austrians, who had outflanked their opponents, cooped up their line within very narrow limits; and at length it was driven into the space between Fontana, Fredda, and Porcia, which did not exceed two miles in breadth. Fearful of the consequences of any disaster upon troops confined within such narrow limits, Eugene gave the signal to retreat, which was effected at first by squares in echelon, which arrested their pursuers by alternate volleys as on a review day. But at the defile occasioned by the bridge of the Levinza and the marshes on either side of the stream, they fell into disorder, which was soon augmented by the intelligence that seven thousand men of the corps in reserve had LVI. 1809. 1 Erz. CHAP. passed them, and already occupied Sacile. The whole army, upon this, fell into confusion. Horse, foot, and cannon became blended together in frightful disorder, and fled towards the Adige, without either direction or further attempt at resistance. The approach of night alone saved them from a total overthrow; but as it was, 163. Jom. iii. they lost four thousand killed and wounded, and an equal number of prisoners, besides fifteen pieces of cannon; while the Austrians had not to lament the loss of half the number.1 Johan. Feld. 44, 52. Pel. iii. 141, 179, 180. Stut. 164, 169. 55. effects of this victory on the paign. This important victory in the outset of the campaign was likely to prove decisive, as that of Magnano in 1799 had Important been,* of the fate of Italy, and would have been attended with not less material results upon the general issue of the Italian cam- war, had its effects not been obliterated, and the career of success in the plains of Lombardy arrested, by the rapid and overwhelming advance of Napoleon to Vienna. As it was, however, and even though the Archduke John was far from following up his successes with the vigour which might have been expected, the results of the battle were in the highest degree important. Eugene, reinforced by some battalions which he had left at Verona, succeeded in at length reorganising his army, and took post behind the fortified line of the Adige, already immortalised in the campaigns of Napoleon. The Archduke, though obliged to send three divisions at this period to observe Marmont in Dalmatia, and considerably weakened by the necessity of making large detachments to mask Venice and Palma-Nuova, in which the enemy had large garrisons, followed his retreating adversary, and took post, with thirty thousand excellent troops, in the famous position of Caldiero, a few miles from Verona. But the spirit of the two armies was essentially changed; the Italians, depressed and weakened by defeat, felt the old superiority of the Transmontane forces, and were prepared to fall back, as in the time of Suwarroff, to the furthest verge of the Italian Feldz. 53, 57. Peninsula; while the Austrians, roused to the highest Pel. ii. 163, degree by their early success, confidently anticipated a repetition of the glories of Novi and the Trebbia.2 But the expectations of both parties were traversed by the extraordinary progress of Napoleon down the valley of 2 Erz. Johan. 167. Stut. 179, 182. Jom. iii. 180, 181. * Ante. c. xxvii. § 36. |