CHAP. LVI. 1809. 45. In which the length over The sun set while the contest was still undecided; the moon rose on the deadly strife, and amidst her silvery rays, fire was struck on all sides by the steel upon the armour, and dazzling sparks flew around the combatants, as if a thousand anvils were at once ringing under the Austrian blows of the forgers. Nothing could overcome the heroic horse are at courage of the Imperialists; but their equipment was not thrown. equal to that of their opponents, and in close fight the Austrian horsemen, whose front only was covered, were not an adequate match for the cuirassiers of Napoleon, whose armour went entirely round their body. After a desperate struggle, their numbers were so reduced that they were unable any longer to make head against the enemy, and leaving two-thirds of their number on the field, they were driven in disorder along the chaussée towards Ratisbon. But their heroic stand, however fatal to themselves, proved the salvation of the army. During the engagement, the artillery and infantry withdrew in safety to the rear; and Napoleon, who perceived that the Archduke had brought up the reserve under Lichtenstein, 1 Stut. 146, which had not yet been engaged, dreading a reverse like 85, 94. Jom. that which befell the Austrians in similar circumstances iii. 174, 175. Sav. iv. 54, at Marengo, reluctantly, and against the earnest advice of 55. Lannes, gave orders for the army to halt, and bivouac on the ground which they occupied.1 151. Pel. ii. The situation of the Archduke was now very criticalwith a victorious army, headed by Napoleon, in his front, 46. and the broad Danube, traversed only by the single The Archbridge of Ratisbon, in his rear. By bringing up his duke retreats across the Ratisbon is whole forces from the opposite side of the river, and Danube, and concentrating his troops from Abach and the right, he taken by the was still in a situation to compensate the losses of the French. day, and give battle with eighty thousand admirable troops in front of Ratisbon.* But that field was eminently hazardous, for a serious disaster sustained there might lead to total ruin; and his army was not only extremely fatigued by the constant combats and marches of five successive days, but considerably affected in its spirit by the reverses it had experienced, and seriously *He had sixty thousand men around the walls of Ratisbon the night after the battle: including Bellegarde's corps, which was still on the other side of the Danube, the total force was about eighty thousand.-STUTTERHEIM, 159; and GRUNE'S MS. Correspondence. CHAP. LVI. 1809. weakened by the loss of the reserve parks and ammunition train at Landshut. Five thousand men had been killed and wounded, and seven thousand made prisoners in the battle which had just terminated, besides twelve standards and sixteen pieces of cannon, taken by the enemy; though Lichtenstein's corps much more than supplied these losses, yet the French Guards under Oudinot had just arrived on the field from Spain, and Massena's corps, which had not been engaged at all, was certain to bear the brunt of the next battle which might ensue. Influenced by these considerations, the Archduke resolved to retire during the night, and restore the spirit and recruit the losses of his army in Bohemia, before again engaging in active operations. A bridge of boats was immediately thrown over the Danube, some miles above Ratisbon, and over it and the bridge at that town the army defiled without intermission the whole night. With such expedition and order was this critical operation conducted, that before nine o'clock on the following morning, not only were almost all the soldiers, but all the guns, chariots, and ammunition waggons, safely on the other side. When the French, who, from the large watch-fires kept up on the enemy's lines during the night, supposed a decisive battle was intended for the ensuing day, stood to their arms in 1 Stut. 160, the morning, they beheld with astonishment the whole 93, 99. Jom. plain of Ratisbon deserted, except by a few broken Thib. vii. 234, Waggons or gun-carriages, and saw only in the extreme distance dense masses of cavalry protecting the retreat of the last trains within the walls of Ratisbon.1* 164. Pel. ii. iii. 174, 175. 235. No sooner did Napoleon discover that the Archduke had withdrawn the bulk of his forces during the night, than he moved forward the whole cavalry to attack the rearguard, drawn up in front of Ratisbon. Notwithstanding all their efforts, they could not prevent great The The *The French lost in the battle of Echmuhl about six thousand men. bulletin stated the general loss from the opening of the campaign, at twelve hundred killed, and four thousand wounded; which, according to their usual proportion of admitting only a fourth part of its real amount, would make it about twenty thousand men, which was probably very near the mark. Austrians, in the whole five days, lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, about thirty thousand, and one hundred pieces of cannon.-See First Bulletin, 24th April 1809; PELET, ii. 99; and GRUNE's Correspondence, a copy of which the author obtained from the Imperial archives at Vienna, through the kindness of his valued friend, Captain Basil Hall. CHAP. 1809. 47. bon by the confusion occurring as the last of the carriages withdrew into the town; and nearly a thousand brave horsemen there sacrificed themselves for the safety of the rest of the army. The screen of cavalry which was drawn up round Operations the bridge of boats, happily concealed its existence from against Ratisthe enemy till the troops were all over; but the pontoons French, and themselves were burned, or fell into the hands of the wound of Napoleon. victors. At length, the rearguard was all withdrawn within the walls of Ratisbon, the gates closed, and the ramparts lined with infantry. Napoleon at noon arrived on the spot, and in his anxiety to press the assault, approached so near the walls, that a musket-ball struck him on the right foot, and occasioned a considerable contusion. The pain obliged him to dismount from his horse; the report spread that the Emperor was wounded; and instantly the soldiers broke from their ranks, and leaving their muskets, their guns, their horses, crowded round their beloved chief. Regardless of the cannon-balls which fell among the dense group, fifteen thousand men of all arms hastened to the spot, every one forgetting his own danger in intense anxiety concerning their general's welfare. After a few minutes, the wound was found to be so inconsiderable that the Emperor again mounted his horse; a rapturous cheer from the warlike multitude announced the joyful event to the army; and soon the rolling of the drums and clang of the trumpets recalled the soldiers in all directions to their arms.1 1 Sav. iv. 56, 103, 105. 57. Pel. ii. 48. This perilous incident retarded only for a few minutes the progress of the attack. Lannes, who directed the operations, perceiving a large house which rested against Its assault. the rampart, pointed several guns against its walls, which speedily reduced them to ruins, and formed a sort of breach, by which access might be obtained to the summit. A heavy fire, however, was kept up from the rampart, which rendered the crossing of the glacis highly dangerous; and for long, no soldiers could be found who would incur the hazard. Impatient of the delay, Marshal Lannes seized a scaling-ladder, and himself ran forward over the perilous space, swept in every part by the enemy's balls. Animated by this example, the troops rushed on, cleared the glacis, leaped into the ditch, and, crowding up the breach formed by the ruined house, VOL. XII. LVI. 1809. CHAP. forced their way into the place: LABEDOYERE, reserved for a melancholy fate in future times, was the first man who was seen on the summit. The troops now followed rapidly into the town: the gates, attacked in flank, were seized and opened, and the streets filled with a multitude of ferocious assailants. Still the Hungarian grenadiers maintained their resistance: slowly retiring towards the bridge, they kept up an incessant discharge upon their pursuers; the houses took fire in the conflict; the ammunition waggons were only rescued from the flames by the united efforts of both friends and foes; and, after losing half their numbers in the desperate strife, they reached the barricades of the bridge, where the cannonade from the opposite side was so violent as to 1 Stut. 162, render all further pursuit impossible. The French headquarters were established for the night in the convent of Prull, under the walls; in the course of it, the bridge vii. 235, 236. was evacuated, and next day, the Austrian rearguard was discovered beyond Stadt-am-hoff, covering the retreat of the army to the woody heights of the Bohmervald.1 169. Jom. ii. 176, 177. Pel. ii. 103, 111. Thib. Sav. iv. 57, 58. 49. of these actions. The advantages gained by these brilliant operations to Napoleon were very great. Twelve days only had elapsed Great results since he left Paris; and already he had reassembled the army after its imprudent dispersion by Berthier, combated the Austrians on four successive days, separated Hiller and the Archduke Louis from the Archduke Charles, thrown the two former back upon the Inn, in too inconsiderable strength to be able to cover Vienna, and driven the latter to an eccentric retreat into the Bohemian mountains. Thirty thousand Austrians had fallen or been made prisoners in these disastrous engagements; a hundred pieces of cannon, six hundred ammunition waggons, two pontoon trains, and an immense quantity of baggage taken; and the spirit of the vanquished so thoroughly broken, as to render them incapable for some time of engaging in active operations. The road to Vienna lay open to the conqueror: it was a matter of mere convenience to him when he should step forward and seize the capital of the monarchy, its magnificent arsenal, and boundless resources of every kind. Twenty thousand men were lost to the French army;2 but what were they amongst such a host, and what such a diminu 2 Jom. iii. 177. tion compared to the incalculable moral influence upon his own troops and those of the allies, in consequence of such a series of successes at the very outset of the campaign! If ever the words of Cæsar, Veni, vidi, vici, were applicable to a modern conqueror, they might have been used by Napoleon on this occasion. СНАР. LVL. 1809. diers was the principal successes. It was by indefatigable activity, and the nicest calculation of time, that these astonishing results had been 50. obtained; and never had the Emperor displayed in a The indefatimore striking manner the untiring energy of his gable activity of Napoleon character. Unwearied by a rapid journey, night and day, and his solfor six successive days from Paris, he no sooner arrived at Donauwerth, than he began the incessant questioning and cause of these correspondence, which, with him, were the invariable preludes to great achievements. His letters to his lieutenants during the next five days, would of themselves make a volume. His calculation of time was so exact, and the habits of precise obedience on the part of his generals so complete, that his divisions invariably arrived on the ground assigned them at the very moment on which he relied, and when their operation was required; and generally again marched and combated on the day following, without any intermediate repose. By this means, though his forces were not, upon the whole, more numerous, at least at that period, than those of the Austrians, they were almost always greatly superior at the point of attack. Nor did the Emperor shun the fatigue which he thus imposed upon his soldiers: on the contrary, not one of them underwent any thing like the mental and bodily labour to which he subjected himself. From the morning of the 19th, when the battle of Abensberg began, till the night of the 23d, when that of Ratisbon terminated, he was on horseback, or dictating letters, at least eighteen hours a-day; he had outstripped his own saddle-horses by the rapidity of his journey, and knocked up those of the King of Bavaria, by the fatigue they had undergone. When all around him were ready to drop down with exhaustion, he began to read and dictate despatches, and sat up half the night receiving 1 Sav. iv. 83, reports from the generals and marshals, and completing 234. Pel. the directions for the succeeding day. He has himself 120, 121. told us, that his manœuvres at this period in Bavaria 59. Thib. vii. |