CHAP. LVI. 1809. left of the centre, under Napoleon's immediate command, and was to advance on the great road from Kellheim to Landshut; the Wirtemburghers, under Vandamme, were in the centre; the Bavarians on the right, directly opposite to ABENSBERG, under Wrede. Had two of the Austrian corps been concentrated, they might successively have combated this aggregate of allied troops, whose total strength did not exceed sixty-five thousand men; but, unfortunately, they were so much dispersed as to be incapable of opposing any effective resistance to the enemy. Hiller, with twenty-two thousand, was in march from Mainburg to Pfaffenhausen; the Archduke Louis, with ten thousand, guarded Siegenburg, with its bridge over the Aber; the Prince of Reuss, with fifteen thousand, lay in the rear of Kirchdorf; General Thierry, with five 96. Jom. ii. thousand, at Offensteller. Thus, above fifty thousand 168, 169. were in front of the French; but scattered over a space 18. several leagues broad, and without any centre or plan of operations.1 1 Stut. 92, Pel. ii. 12, 35. Not expecting an attack on that day, they were leisurely performing the various movements assigned to them, with a view to the concentration of their troops for the mor- Combats of Abensberg. row, when they were simultaneously attacked by the enemy at all points, who passed at once from cautious defensive to furious offensive operations. They made, in consequence, but a feeble resistance; or rather, they were attacked at so many different points, and so much in detail, that no one general could take upon himself the responsibility of halting to give battle. The day was a sort of running fight, in many detached places, rather than a regular engagement. It proved, however, very disastrous to the Austrians. Thierry, whose troops had not recovered the rout of the preceding day, assailed by Lannes with greatly superior forces, was thrown back in confusion upon Hiller's troops at Rottenburg, who, coming up in haste from Mainburg, instead of arresting, increased the general disorder, and the whole were driven across the bridge of the Laber, which Lannes traversed with bayonets fixed and colours flying. The Prince of Reuss and Bianchi, attacked in front by Lefebvre, and in flank by Vandamme with the Wirtemburghers, deemed themselves fortunate in being able to escape to Pfaffen CHAP. LVI. 1809. hausen without any serious loss; whither they were immediately followed by the Archduke Louis, who had been driven from the bridge of Siegenburg, closely pursued by Wrede and the Bavarians, who, on this occasion, emulated the vigour and rapidity of the French troops. The Austrians were not routed at any point, and no artillery was taken; nevertheless, they had to lament the loss of eight thousand men; the line to Landshut was thrown open to the enemy; they had been deprived of the advantage of the initiative; and, what is of incalculable imporii. 168, 169. tance, had been unsuccessful in the first considerable action of the campaign.1 1 Stut. 92, 99. Pel. ii. vii. 232. Jom, 36. sued to Napoleon was not slow in following up the important blow thus struck in the outset of operations. His great Hiller pur- object was to throw himself upon the Archduke's comLandshut by munications; and the success thus gained against the Napoleon. covering corps of Prince Louis, by opening up the great April 21. road to Landshut, rendered that undertaking an easy task. To cover the movement, and distract his attention, Davoust received orders to threaten the enemy on the side of Ratisbon, where the bulk of his forces was assembled; but the serious operations were conducted by the Emperor in person, against the retiring columns of Hiller, Bianchi, and the Archduke Louis. Uniting their shattered troops, these generals had fallen back in the direction of Landshut, in the hopes of preserving that important passage in the rear, with the immense stores of baggage and ammunition which it contained, from the attacks of the enemy. Thither, however, they were instantly followed by Napoleon, who, putting himself on horseback at daybreak on the 21st, moved every disposable bayonet and sabre in the direction of Landshut; while Massena, on his right, still further in advance, manœuvred in such a way, between Pfaffenhofen and Mosburg, as to render a retreat upon that town a matter of absolute necessity, to prevent the communications of the Grand Army being instantly cut off. At the same time, 3 Stut. 100, Davoust, on the left, was to engage the attention of the Archduke Charles so completely as to prevent him from rendering any effectual assistance.2 104. Pel. ii. 3, 5, 37. These movements, admirably combined, and executed with uncommon vigour and precision, proved completely CHAP. 1809. 37. His defeat successful. The rearguard of the Archduke Louis, warmly attacked on different occasions during the night, was thrown back in disorder in the morning on Furth and Arth, by roads already choked with baggage waggons and all the immense materiel of the grand Austrian by the army. Their confusion became altogether inextricable Emperor. when they approached the valley of the Iser, and the bridges of Landshut, which are traversed only by two chaussées, passing for a considerable distance on the western side through low swamps, altogether impassable for artillery or chariots. To strengthen the rearguard while the retiring columns were defiling through those perilous straits, Hiller ordered General Vincent to hold firm with the cavalry at their entrance. But at that very moment Napoleon, accompanied by a powerful train of artillery, and the cuirassiers of Nansouty, arrived on the ground; and instantly, under cover of a tremendous fire of cannon, the French horse advanced to the charge. Vincent's dragoons were unable to withstand the shock; horse, foot, and cannon, were thrown together in wild disorder on the chaussées, and a vast quantity of artillery and baggage abandoned by the Austrians, who crowded in utter disorder into Landshut. But even behind its ramparts they were no longer in safety; for on the same morning Massena had gained possession of the bridge of Mosburg, and was rapidly advancing, agreeably to his orders, down the right, or eastern bank of the Iser. Alarmed by his approach, the Austrians put the torch to the long wooden bridge which leads into the town, and kept up a heavy fire upon it from the neighbouring houses and churches. General Moulon, however, at the head of the French grenadiers, advanced through a shower of balls, amidst the flames, to the portcullis, which was speedily demolished, and the heroic assailants burst into the town. Hiller now only fought to gain time to draw off his artillery and chariots; but such was the rapidity of Massena's advance, whose dense columns now covered the opposite side of the river, Stut. 101, and had reached to within a mile of the town, that a 35, 49. Jom. large part of them required to be sacrificed.1 The iii. 170, 171. Austrian general at length, after having made a most 233. gallant resistance, drew off towards the Inn in the 109. Pel. ii. Thib. vii. 232, CHAP. 1809. 38. Davoust and Charles in the centre. direction of Oetting, where he crossed on the following day, having lost nearly six thousand men, twenty-five pieces of cannon, six hundred ammunition waggons, a pontoon train, and an enormous quantity of baggage, in this disastrous affair.* The task assigned to Davoust, while Napoleon was in this manner destroying the left wing of the Imperialists, Operations of and laying bare their vital line of communications to the Archduke Landshut and the Inn, was to occupy the attention of the Archduke Charles, who with the whole centre of the army had diverged to Ratisbon, in order to make himself master of the important bridge at that place, and open up the communications with the two corps of Klenau and Bellegarde on the opposite side of the Danube. Rightly judging that the best way to impose upon his adversary, and inspire him with a mistaken idea of his own strength, was to assume the offensive, the French marshal, early on the morning of the 21st, commenced an attack in the woody country which lies on the banks of the Laber, and after a warm contest drove the Austrians across that river. Though their positions were strong and their forces numerous, yet Hohenzollern was so much deceived by the vivacity of the French attack, and by the idea that two divisions of their army would never have ventured, unsupported, to hazard an assault upon the dense masses of his own and Rosenberg's corps, that he never doubted that it was only a part of a general movement to pierce the Imperial centre, and that he would soon have Napoleon thundering on his flank. He gave orders for his troops, accordingly, at noon, to fall back and take up a new position facing the south, on the right or eastern bank of the Laber, between that river and Dinzling. Forty thousand Austrian foot and five thousand horse were in two hours collected there, where they were soon assailed by thirty-five thousand French and Bavarians, under * A singular trait of heroism occurred on this occasion, on the part of an Austrian grenadier, which is recorded with generous eulogy by the French historian Pelet. Two companies of Austrian grenadiers of Teuchmeister were closely pursued by the French cavalry, and on the point of being surrounded. A grenadier ran to an ammunition waggon and set it on fire; he was instantly blown up with it, but, by his death, and the admiration which it inspired in the pursuers, arrested the pursuit, and saved his comrades.-STUTTERHEIM, 108; PELET, ii. 48. CHAP. LVI. 1809. Davoust, Lefebvre, and Montbrun, whom the Emperor, after the victory of Abensberg, had detached to assist in that quarter, while he himself followed up his decisive successes against Hiller at Landshut. The action was warmly contested till nightfall, when both parties maintained their positions; and though each had to lament the loss of three thousand men killed and wounded, both claimed the victory. But, as the operations of Davoust were intended rather as a feint than a serious attack, 49, 57. Jom. and they had completely the desired effect of preventing Thib. vii. 233, any reinforcements being sent from the centre to the left Davoust's wing under Hiller, then in the act of being crushed by the Pelet, ii. 416. overwhelming legions of the Emperor, the French with reason claimed the advantage.1 1 Stut. 109, 115. Pel. ii. ii. 172, 173. Report. 39. Ratisbon by trians. While these important events were shaking the Austrian left wing and centre, the Archduke Charles with the main strength of the army was pressing the attack on Ratisbon. Attack and That town, commanding the only stone bridge over the capture of Danube below Ulm, and opening up a direct communi- the Auscation with the two Austrian corps on its northern bank, was at all times a point of consequence. But it had now become, unknown to the Austrians, of incalculable importance, as forming the only line of retreat for the army, now that its communication with the Inn was cut off April 20. by the capture of Landshut, and the alarming progress of the Emperor on the left. Fully sensible of the value of such an acquisition, the Archduke, as soon as Davoust had left the town, ordered Kollowrath to attack it on the northern, and Lichtenstein on the southern side. The former quickly obeyed his orders, and appeared on the 19th in great strength in the villages at the northern extremity of the bridge, which were carried by assault. Soon after a dense column burst open the gates, and advanced by the great street to the northern end of the bridge; but, being there stopped by the palisades, and severely galled by a cross-fire from the houses, it was obliged to retire after sustaining a severe loss. In the afternoon, however, Lichterstein, with the advanced guard of the grand Austrian army, approached from the southern side, and attempts were made by the French garrison to destroy the bridge. But that solid structure, the work of the Romans, composed of large |