LVI. CHAP. loudly reproaching the Austrians with the commencement of hostilities, he promised to lead them to yet more glorious fields of fame.* 1809. 29. of the two armies towards each other. April 18. Notwithstanding the pressing instance of the Emperor, and their own sense of the urgency of the case, Davoust Movements and Massena could not reach the places assigned to them so early as he had anticipated, and the former, in consequence, was exposed to the most imminent danger. The messenger ordering Davoust to draw towards the Lech had been despatched from Donauwerth at two o'clock in the morning of the 17th, and his instructions were to march forthwith on Ingolstadt; while Wrede with his Bavarians was stopped in his retreat at Neustadt, and ordered to concentrate with the Wirtemburghers, behind the Abens. Davoust received his orders at midnight of the 17th, but his divisions were dispersed in the villages around Ratisbon, as well as in that town, and could not be instantly put in motion; while the bulk of Massena's forces, being six or eight leagues behind Augsburg, could not be concentrated till the night of the 18th, even at that town, or reach Pfaffenhofen till late on the following evening. Davoust, having collected his whole force during the 18th, commenced the evacuation of that town at daybreak on the following morning; and by mid-day on the 19th, was already approaching Neustadt; leaving only a single regiment, three thousand strong, to guard the important bridge of Ratisbon. On the same day the Archduke divided the army which he commanded in person into two parts; and while he left the Archduke Louis with fifteen thousand men to watch the troops of the Confederation on the Abens, he himself, with seventy-five 1 Stut. 76, 81. Sav. iv. 50. thousand, moved towards Ratisbon, in hopes of making Thib. vii.226, himself master of that important passage over the Danube during the absence of Davoust's corps. By this means he would at once gain possession of both banks of that river, April 19. 228. Pel. i. 281, 293. "Soldiers! the territory of the Confederation of the Rhine has been violated. The Austrian general supposes that we are to fly at the sight of his eagles, and abandon our allies to his mercy. I arrive with the rapidity of lightning in the midst of you. Soldiers! I was surrounded by your bayonets when the Emperor of Austria arrived at my bivouac in Moravia; you heard him implore my clemency, and swear an eternal friendship. Conquerors in three wars, Austria has owed every thing to our generosity; three times she has perjured herself! Our former successes are a sure guarantee for our future triumphs. Let us march, then, and at our aspect let the enemy recognise his conquerors.”— Moniteur, 26th April 1809; and THIBAUDEAU, vii 224. and open up a secure communication with his two corps under Klenau, on its opposite bank. The worst was to be apprehended for Davoust, if,' in the course of his march to Neustadt, he had encountered this formidable mass, moving in a direction almost perpendicular to his flank, and not more than a few leagues distant. The two armies crossed without the bulk of the forces meeting. CHAP. LVI. 1809. 30. ations. Its Napoleon's plan was now clearly formed: it was to concentrate his whole army as rapidly as possible on the Abens, in advance of Pfaffenhofen ; and drawing back his Napoleon's left, to throw his right, under Massena, forward, so as to plan of operdrive back the Archduke Louis; separate altogether the great dangers. Grand Army under the Archduke Charles from Jellachich and Hiller, who were nearer the Alps, and force it up into the narrow space formed by the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon. He then hoped either to compel it to surrender, from the impossibility of finding an egress, if that town was still held by the French troops, or at least induce the sacrifice of its artillery and baggage in the confusion of defiling in front of a victorious army over the narrow bridge which that town commanded. But the execution of this plan was exceedingly hazardous, and in presence of an enterprising enemy might have led to fatal results. Abensberg was the vital point: whoever reached it first in sufficient strength, gained the means of preventing the concentration of his adversary. Davoust, to reach his destination, required to traverse the defiles of Abach and Portsaal, within two leagues of Abensberg, and this defile was much nearer the camp of the Archduke Charles on the 18th at Rohr, than the point from which Davoust set out from Ratisbon. Eighty thousand Austrians might with ease have occupied the important posts of Abensberg and Portsaal, which would have effectually barred the way to Davoust's corps, and thrown him back upon Ratisbon, and the cul-de-sac formed by the bend of the Danube, over which there was no other bridge the very fate which Napoleon designed for the army of Prince Charles. When, therefore, instead of pushing on with an overwhelming force to this vital point, the Archduke Charles, 164, 165. when within a day's march of it, divided his army on the Thib. vii. 227. 18th, and bent his course, with the bulk of his forces, 295. towards Ratisbon, now almost destitute of defenders,1 1 Jom. iii. Pel. i. 286, VOL. XII. P CHAP. Napoleon had some reason to say that his star had not yet deserted him.* LVI. 1809. tween 31. at Thaun. April 19. The covering troops of Davoust, however, encountered and had a rude shock with those of the Archduke, near Actions be the village of Thaun. St Hilaire and Friant had arrived Davoust and on the heights of Salhaupt and Tengen, where they were Hohenzollern stationed in order to protect the French left, and cover the march of the remainder of the corps, with its artillery and trains, through the important defile of Portsaal, when the light cavalry of Hohenzollern appeared in sight, whose province in like manner was to cover the left of the Austrian army, and secure their march to Ratisbon. Fresh troops were successively brought up by either party as the day advanced, and before the evening twenty thousand men were engaged on both sides. The combat soon became extremely warm; some woods on the field were successively taken and retaken, and the greatest valour was mutually displayed. At length a violent thunder-storm, which came on at six o'clock, separated the combatants, after each had sustained a loss of three thousand men, without either being able to boast of as decisive advantage. But although both retained their positions, yet as the French, under cover of their resis1 Pel. i. 294, tance at this point, succeeded in passing unmolested 300. Stut. 84, through the important defile, and before nightfall reached: the vital point of Abensberg, they with reason claimed the victory.1 89. Jom. iii. 165. Reassured by the junction effected by Davoust with the Bavarians under Lefebvre, at this point, as to the security of his centre, Napoleon resolved to commence a vigorous. offensive, and by advancing his right against Landshut, *Napoleon's plans at this critical juncture are clearly developed in the letter which he wrote to Massena at twelve o'clock noon on the 19th. "Prince Charles, with his whole army, was this morning a day's march from Ratisbon, having his base and communications on Landshut. Davoust has evacuated Ratisbon to move upon Neustadt, and join the Bavarians: I look, therefore, for an affair every minute; nevertheless, it is now noon, and I have not heard the cannon. You will perceive at a glance that I am keeping back my left to throw forward my right, which you form, and which to-day should enter into action. Push Oudinot forward to Neustadt. From thence I shall probably direct the 4th corps to Landshut; and then Prince Charles, attacked on his left, will find he has lost his line of operations upon the Iser. Every thing will be cleared up to-day; the moments are precious; hours must be counted. Twelve or fifteen thousand of such rabble as you have defeated this morning, should be easily disposed of by six thousand of our people."-NAPOLEON to MASSENA, 19th April, 1809; PELET, i. 285, 286. CHAP. 1809. 32. Positions of armies on the both threaten the Archduke's communications, and throw him back into the net prepared for him by the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon. Early on the morning of the 19th, when this bloody combat was going on upon the banks of the Danube at Thaun, Massena had encountered the two a body of five thousand infantry and cavalry at Pfaffen- night of the hofen, and defeated it in a few minutes, with the loss of 19th. several hundred killed and wounded. In the course of the day, he had concentrated all his corps at that place: Oudinot was still further in advance towards Freysing, with his light troops stretching along the Iser, so as to intercept all communication between the Archduke and his left wing at Munich: the corps of Davoust was grouped in the villages around Abensberg; while Lefebvre, Wrede, and Vandamme, with the troops of the Confederation, were at Neustadt and Biburg. Thus the whole French army, at length concentrated in a line of ten leagues broad, was in a condition to take part in any general battle or in common operations on the following day. The Austrian troops were assembled in the narrow space formed by the Iser as a base, and the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon as a curve ; Lichtenstein was at Eglossheim, Hohenzollern at Hausem, Rosenberg at Dinzling, and the remainder in the villages from Mainburg on the south to the neighbourhood of Ratisbon on the north; but their principal masses were grouped around ECHмUHL. They were less prepared than the French, however, for a decisive affair on the morrow, being spread over a surface at least sixteen leagues in extent; and what was still worse, the great mass under the Archduke was separated, by an unoccupied space four 164, 165. leagues in breadth, from the corps of General Hiller at Pel. i. 305, Mosburg; and two powerful corps under Klenau were 90, 92. uselessly lost on the northern bank of the Danube, where there was not an enemy to oppose them.1 1 Jom. iii. 306. Stut. German con Being well aware, from the position of the respective armies, that a decisive affair was at hand, Napoleon 33. adopted the generous, and at the same time prudent Napoleon's policy, of combating in person at the head of the troops of address to the the Confederation, leaving the native French to their federates. inherent valour, their experienced skill, and the direction of their veteran marshals. He repaired to the head- April 20. quarters of their commanders, and, according to custom, CHAP. 1809. visited at daybreak the bivouacs of the troops, which he traversed from right to left along their whole extent, accompanied only by the officers and generals of the Bavarians. He was received with the loudest acclamations, and a transport rivalling that of his own veteran soldiers; so contagious is the feeling of military ardour, and so winning was the confidence with which the mighty conqueror threw himself on the support of his new allies. Clapping the Prince Royal of Bavaria on the shoulder, he exclaimed, when the inspection was finished—“Well, Prince Royal, this is the way in which one must be King of Bavaria; when your turn comes, all the world will follow you if you do the same; but if you remain at home, every one will go to sleep; adieu empire and glory." To the Wirtemburghers, at the same time, he spoke of the glories they had acquired while combating the Austrians in the wars of the Great Frederick; and of the laurels which they had won in the last campaign in Silesia. These words, translated into German by their respective officers, excited great enthusiasm, which was soon raised to the very highest pitch by the proclamation to the troops, in which the Emperor declared that, without any French to aid them, he was to combat that day at their head, and announced a glorious destiny to their countries.* PerPel. ii. 8, 10. ceiving that the spirit of the troops was now roused to the highest point, the Emperor gave the signal to engage.1 Notwithstanding, however, the deserved confidence which he placed in the German troops, Napoleon did not Their danger- trust the result of the day exclusively to their exertions. ous situation. April 20. Lannes, who the day before had joined the army from Saragossa, was intrusted with the command of two French divisions, drawn from Massena's corps, which formed the 1 Sav, iv. 49. Thib. vii. 229, 231. 34. *"Bavarians! I do not come among you as the Emperor of the French, but as chief of the Confederation of the Rhine and protector of your country. You combat to-day alone against the Germans; not a single Frenchman is to be seen in the first line; they are only in reserve, and the enemy are not aware of their presence. I place entire confidence in your valour. I have extended the limits of your country; but I now see that I have not done enough. Hereafter, I will render you so great, that, to sustain a war against Austria, you will no longer have need of my assistance. Two hundred years the Bavarian banners, protected by France, resisted Austria; now we are on the march for Vienna; where we shall punish her for the mischief which she has always done to your forefathers. Austria intended to have partitioned your country into baronies, and divided you among her regiments. Bavarians, this war is the last which you will have to sustain against your enemies: attack them with the bayonet, and annihilate them."-THIBAUDEAU, vii. 230, 231. |