CHAP. LVI. 1809. five thousand cavalry, was to invade the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and avert the calamities of war from the Galician plains. The total number of troops, after deducting the non-effective and sick, might amount to two hundred and twenty thousand infantry and twenty-eight thousand cavalry, with eight hundred pieces of cannon: a prodigious force, when their discipline and efficiency were taken into consideration, and the support which they were to receive, not only from the immense reserves of landwehr in all the provinces, but from the general spirit and unanimity of the monarchy. The commencement of hostilities at once in Bavaria, Italy, the Tyrol, and Poland, might seem an imprudent dispersion of strength, especially when the tremendous blows to be anticipated from Napoleon in the valley of the Danube are duly weighed; but these, in appearance offensive, were in reality strictly defensive operations. It was well known that the moment war was declared, the French Emperor, according to his usual policy, would direct all his forces against the centre of the enemy's power; invasion from Italy, Bavaria, and Poland 40. Pelet, L was immediately to be anticipated; and in maintaining 1 Stut. 34, 166, 173. Jom. iii. 140. 18. the struggle in the hostile provinces adjoining the frontier, the war was in reality averted from their own vitals.1* The utmost efforts were at the same time made to rouse the patriotic ardour of all classes, and government in that Spirit which important duty were magnanimously seconded by the animated all nobles and people throughout the empire. Never, indeed, Austrian since the foundation of the monarchy, had unanimity so classes of the empire. 2 Stut. 34, 41. Erz. Johan. Feld. 29,341 Reg. 1809, 203, 204. universal prevailed through all the varied provinces of the Imperial dominions, and never had so enthusiastic a spirit animated all ranks of the people. The nobles, the clergy, the peasants, the burghers, all felt the sacred flame, and vied with each other in devotion to the common cause. The requisitions of government were instantly agreed to; the supplies of men and money cheerfully voted; the levies for the regular army anticipated by voluntary enrolment; the landwehr rapidly filled up with brave and hardy peasants. At Vienna, in particular, the patriotic ardour was unbounded;2 and when the Archduke Charles, on the 6th April, marched into the city at the * See Appendix, A, Chap. LVI. head of his regiment, one swell of rapture seemed to animate the whole population. That accomplished prince aided the general ardour by an address to his soldiers on the day of his entry, which deserves to be recorded for the generous sentiments which it expresses, as well as the light which it throws on the general reasons for the war.* CHAP. LVI. 1809. 19. matic com March 10. While these immense military preparations were going on upon both sides, the semblance of diplomatic relations was still kept up at Paris. Metternich, who remained Last diplothere to the last, rather as a legitimate spy than in any munications other character, presented a note to the cabinet of the at Paris. Tuileries on the 10th March. He there represented it as an undoubted fact, that since the treaty which followed the evacuation of Brannau, there was no longer any subject of difference between the two powers; and that, although the Emperor of Austria might well conceive disquietude at the numerous movements which had taken place since January, he had no desire except to see Europe in peace. The French cabinet replied, that unques- 1 Thib. vii. tionably no subject of difference remained between the 207, 208. two powers;1 and that, this being the case, the Emperor * "When all endeavours to preserve independence from the insatiable ambition of a foreign conqueror prove fruitless, when nations are falling around us, and when lawful sovereigns are torn from the hearts of their subjects; when, in fine, the danger of universal subjugation threatens even the happy states of Austria, and their peaceable fortunate inhabitants, then does our country demand its deliverance from us, and we stand forth in its defence. On you, my brother-soldiers, are fixed the eyes of the universe, and of all those who still feel for national honour and national prosperity. You shall not incur the disgrace of being made the instruments of oppression; you shall not carry on the endless wars of ambition under distant climes; your blood shall never flow for foreign fleets or insatiable covetousness; nor on you shall the curse alight of annihilating distant nations, and over the bodies of the slaughtered defenders of their country, paving the way for a foreigner to a usurped throne. A happier lot awaits you; the liberty of Europe has taken refuge under your banners. Your victories will loose its fetters, and your brothers in Germany, yet in the ranks of the enemy, long for their deliverance. On the fields of Ulm and Marengo, of which the enemy so often reminds us with ostentatious pride, shall we renew the glorious deeds of Wurtzburg and Ostrach, of Stockach and Zurich, of Verona, Trebbia, and Novi. We shall conquer a lasting peace for our country; but that great end is not to be attained without proportionate virtues. Unconditional subordination, strict discipline, persevering courage, unshaken steadiness in danger, are the companions of true fortitude. Nothing but a union of will, and joint cooperation of the whole, can lead to victory. I will be every where in the midst of you; you shall receive the first thanks of your country from your general on the field of battle. The patriotism of the Austrian nobility has anticipated your wants: this is a pledge of the national gratitude. Adorned with the marks of the public esteem, will I present to our sovereign, to the world, those brave men who have deserved well of their country. Civil virtues must also accompany your arms out of the field of battle: the real soldier is moderate, compassionate, humane; he knows the evils of war, and strives to lighten them. It is not the intention of our monarch to oppress foreign nations, but to deliver them, and to form with their princes a lasting peace, and maintain the general welfare and Becurity."-Ann. Reg. 1809, 691; App. to Chron. March 12 CHAP. 1809. 20. Austrian plan of the campaign. could not conceive, either what the Austrians would be at, or what occasioned their pretended disquietudes. Here terminated this diplomatic farce: it deceived neither party; but both had objects to gain by postponing for a short time the commencement of hostilities. The original plan of the Austrians was to invade at once Franconia, Lombardy, the Tyrol, and the Grand-duchy of Warsaw. In all these districts they had numerous and active partisans, and they confidently expected powerful aid from their exertions. For this purpose they had accumulated enormous masses of troops, above a hundred thousand strong, in Bohemia; from whence, as a central point, they were in a situation to issue in any direction which might seem advisable. They were, in March, grouped around Prague, in the north-western extremity of that country, between the Elbe, the Eger, the Moldava, and the Wittawa. The object of this extraordinary concentration of troops was, to advance suddenly into the country of Bayreuth, lend a helping hand to the numerous ardent spirits and malcontents of that quarter of Germany, fall upon Davoust's corps which was assembled at Wurtzburg, before it could receive the reinforcements which were hastening to its support, or be electrified by the presence of Napoleon, and, if possible, drive it back by superior forces to the Rhine.* Such an event, it was well known, would at once bring to the Austrian standards a vast body of ardent recruits, whom the enormous exactions and grinding tyranny of the French armies had filled with unbounded hatred at their dominion, and it was hoped would at the same time overcome the indecision of Prussia, and bring its disciplined battalions to the side of the Imperialists in the great contest for European freedom. This plan was ably conPelet, i. 189, ceived, and if carried into execution with the requisite alacrity and vigour, might have been attended with great results;1 for the French armies were very much scattered 1 Jom. ii. 152, 153. 195. Stut. 40, 49. *The directions of the Aulic Council for the war in Italy and the Tyrol, were to concentrate both corps, under the command of the Archduke John, between Villach and Klagenfurth, and then advance in two columns: one by the Pusterthal into the Tyrol, and over the Brenner to Trent; the other by Ponteba to Bassano, and from thence to the Adige; while the care of observing the lower Isonzo was intrusted to the landwehr of Istria. The cabinet of Vienna calculated with much reason upon the expected insurrection in the Tyrol, to aid and support both these movements.-STUTTERHEIM, 56, 57; and PELET, i. 196. CHAP. LVI. in the end of February, and, by issuing suddenly from the great salient fortress of Bohemia, and pressing forward towards the Rhine, the Archduke Charles might have entirely separated Oudinot, who lay in Swabia, from Feb. 27. Davoust, who was cantoned on the banks of the Maine. 1809. April 1. The Austrians had taken Napoleon, in a certain degree, at unawares; as not only was the flower of his veteran 21. troops in Spain, but the forces which still remained in Plans of Napoleon Germany, though extremely formidable if once assembled together, were scattered from the Alps to the Baltic, at a great distance from each other. His plan, therefore, contrary to his usual policy, was strictly defensive in the outset, to gain time for the concentration of his troops. At the same time, as he deemed it unfitting that he himself should be at the head of his army before any decisive blows were struck, and where, possibly, disasters might be incurred, Berthier was despatched early in April to assume the command of the whole until the arrival of the Emperor a convenient arrangement, as, if his operations proved successful, they would, of course, be ascribed to the intelligence and ability of his superior in command; if the reverse, the whole blame of a miscarriage might be laid upon himself. From the period of his arrival, the whole troops, both French and those of the Confederation of the Rhine, were formed into one army, to be called the army of Germany. It was divided into eight corps,* commanded by the most distinguished marshals in the French service, and mustered two hundred thousand effective men. The Emperor was indefatigable in his efforts to provide subsistence, clothing, and ammuni 50,000 men 60,000 But at least one hundred thousand of them had not yet arrived: the Guard and reserve cavalry were on their march from Spain; Bernadotte's corps was still at a distance in the north of Germany; and the contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine were far from being complete. Still a hundred and forty thousand French troops and sixty thousand of those of the Confederation might be relied on for active operations in the valley of the Danube.-THIBAUDEAU, Vii. 214. CHAP. 1809. tion for this enormous multitude; among other things, twenty-five million ball-cartridges were collected. But he enjoined that the system should be rigorously followed out of making war support war, and strictly forbade any stores or provisions being purchased in France for the use of the troops, if they could be procured by requisitions or military contributions on the other side of the Rhine. Rapid concentration of his troops was enjoined to Berthier around the Lech; but no offensive operations were to be commenced before the arrival of the Emperor, who was expected about the middle of April. To all who were acquainted with the character Jom. iii. 152, of his movements, it was evident that the moment he arrived, and deemed himself in sufficient strength, he would commence a furious onset, and pour with concentrated masses down the valley of the Danube.1 Thib. vii. 214, 223. 153. Stut. 58, 64. 22. ment of hos Austrians The cabinet of Vienna took the initiative. On the 8th of April, the Austrian troops crossed the frontiers at once Commence- on the Inn, in Bohemia, in the Tyrol, and in Italy. Had the tilities by the original plan of the Aulic Council been followed out, and the Archduke Charles, at the head of a hundred thousand men, debouched from Bohemia, midway between the Maine and the Black Forest, and advanced towards Manheim, this commencement of hostilities might have been attended with most important effects; for dissatisfaction with the French rule was universal in that quarter: and had a powerful demonstration from England, on the coast of Flanders, seconded this irruption, the seat of war might have been permanently fixed on the middle and lower Rhine.* On the 17th March, Austria had a hundred and forty thousand men on the two banks of the *The instructions of the Aulic Council in the outset of the campaign were, "to advance in large masses, and attack the French army wherever it might assemble, either on the Maine, the Naab, or the Danube. Should a French corps enter Bavaria, the grand Austrian army was not to swerve from its direction, but trust to arresting the movement on Bavaria, by threatening the advancing corps on the side of Ratisbon or Donauwerth. If Marshal Davoust retired in order to avoid any engagement before the arrival of his reinforcements, the grand Austrian army was nevertheless to continue its advance with all possible expedition, and take up a central position between the Black Forest and the Maine, and there be regulated by the forces of the enemy, and the chances of successful operations which were afforded. The issue of the war depends on this operation, and on the issue of the first battle, which will, in all probability, if successful, rouse the malcontents of Bayreuth, overawe Saxony, and bring over to the standards of Austria great part of the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine which are now arrayed against her." STUTTERHEIM, 64-69; PELET, i. 194. |