CHAP. 1808. 10. Tenor of the conferences held there. 1 Bout. ii. 34, 35. Hard. x. 234, 240. Las Cas. iv. 232. 11. made by The conferences of Erfurth were not reduced, like those of Tilsit, to formal or secret treaties; at least, if such were signed, they have not yet transpired from any of the European archives. But they were not, on that account, the less important, or the less calculated to determine, for a course of years, the fate of the Continental monarchies. In the verbal conversations which took place, the great object of the two potentates was to obtain the consent of each other to their respective projects of aggrandisement at the expense of the lesser states in their vicinity; and their mutual interests or necessities rendered this an easy task. Alexander gave his sanction to the invasion of Spain and Portugal, and the placing of princes of the Napoleon dynasty on the thrones of the Peninsula, as well as to the establishment of Murat in the kingdom of Naples, and the annexation of Tuscany to the French empire. The effects of this consent soon appeared in the accrediting of Russian ambassadors to the courts of these infant sovereigns. On the other hand, Napoleon consented to the uniting of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia to the already vast dominions of the Czar, admitted his relation and future brother-in-law, the Grandduke of Oldenburg, into the Confederation of the Rhine, gave satisfactory explanations in regard to the Grandduchy of Warsaw, and held out to the Emperor of the East the prospect of obtaining aid from France in the attempt to stretch his mighty arms over the Asiatic Continent, and give a deadly wound to the power of England on the plains of Hindostan.1 In return for so many concessions, he procured from Alexander a promise to aid France with a considerable Concessions force in the event of a war with Austria; and conceded to his earnest entreaties a considerable relaxation of the Napoleon to Russia and oppressive burdens under which Prussia had so long Prussia. groaned. The arrear of contributions, fixed at 140,000,000 Ante, c. lv. francs, by the treaty of 8th September,1 was reduced to 125,000,000; and a more important relaxation took place in the form of payment, by which, in consideration of 50,000,000 of francs received by Daru on the 5th § 4. his states, to resist the danger which was approaching; a danger which promised to be the more terrible, that Russia would have to sustain it to all appearance unsupported, against the accumulated forces of the greater part of Europe."-BOUTOURLIN, i. 45. CHAP. 1808. November, and 70,000,000 more for which promissory notes were granted, the royal revenues were to be restored to the Prussian authorities; and the French troops, which were urgently required in the Peninsula, were, with the exception of the garrisons of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, entirely to evacuate the Prussian dominions. Thus had Napoleon the address to make his disasters in Spain, which imperatively required the removal of the French 1 Hard. x. troops from the North of Germany, the means of gratify- Bout. i. 34, ing Alexander by an apparent concession to his wishes, 35. Las and diminishing the irritation of Prussia, which, in the 233. event of hostilities with Austria, might prove, even after all its disasters, a formidable enemy in his rear.1 239, 245. Cas. iv. 232, 12. rences con Two other more delicate subjects of discussion were, after being touched on, averted rather than settled, by the diplomatic skill of the two Emperors, and left the seeds Their diffeof inextinguishable future jealousy in their minds. The cerning first was a proposal by Napoleon, who already had resolved Napoleon's marriage, to divorce Josephine, for the hand of the Grand-duchess and Turkey. Catherine Paulowna, the favourite sister of the Emperor; an overture, which the astute Russian evaded by referring the matter, not to the reigning Empress, whose ambition its brilliancy might have dazzled, but to the Empress-dowager, whose firmness of character was proof against the seduction. She hastened to terminate the dangerous negotiation by alleging religious scruples, and shortly after marrying her daughter to Prince Oldenburg. The second was, an amicable but resolute contest for the possession of Constantinople. Napoleon, as he himself has told us, ‚* could not bring his mind to cede to his rival the Queen of the East: Alexander, with justice, regarded it 2 Thib. vii. iii. 86. Las. as the outlet to his southern dominions-the back-door of 76, 78. his empire,—and was earnest that its key should be placed 245 Bouti Hard. x. 239, in his hands. Fearful of interrupting their present har- 34, 35. Jom. mony by any such irreconcilable theme of discord, the Cas. iv. 232, subject was, by common consent, laid aside:2 The City of 233. Constantine was suffered to remain in the hands of the 282. Turks, who, in every other respect, were abandoned to "We talked," says Napoleon, "of the affairs of Turkey at Erfurth. Alexander was very desirous that I should agree to his obtaining possession of Constantinople, but I could never bring my mind to consent to it. It is the noblest harbour in the world, is placed in the finest situation, and is itself worth a kingdom."—LAS CASES, iv. 231; and O'MEARA, i. 362. VOL. XII. K O'Meara, i. CHAP. LV. 1808. 13. Treaty with clared King Dec. 2. Muscovite ambition. But the tender point had been touched the chord which jarred in the hearts of each struck; and the inestimable prize formed the secret subject of hostility, which, as much as jealousy of English power, afterwards led the French legions to Borodino and the Kremlin. Immediately after the conference at Erfurth, a formal treaty was concluded with Prussia, by which the alleviations to her miseries provided for by the arbiters of Europe were reduced to writing; and in a short time the evacuation of the Prussian states, with the exception of the three retained fortresses, took place. Restored by this removal, and the recovery of the right of collecting his revenue, in a certain degree to his rank of an independent sovereign, Frederick William, in company with his beautiful Queen, returned to the capital, and made his public entry into Berlin amidst the transports and tears of his subjects. The results of the secret conference at Erfurth soon developed themselves. Murat was declared by Napoleon King of Naples and Sicily; and, leaving the theatre of his sanguinary measures and rash hostility in the Peninsula, hastened to take possession of his newly acquired dominions. He was received with universal joy by the inconstant people, who seemed equally delighted with any sovereign sent to them by the great northern conqueror. His entry into Naples was as great a scene of triumph, felicitations, and enthusiasm, as that of Joseph had been. Shortly afterwards, however, he gave proof of the vigour which was to attend at least his military operations, by a successful expedition against the Island of Capri, which the English had held for three years, but now tens, Sup. i. yielded with a small garrison under Sir Hudson Lowe, 106. Thib. which capitulated and was sent back to England, to a iv. 237, 239. vigorous and well-conceived attack from the French forces.1 1 Montg. vi. 365. Mar vii. 149. Bot. 14. Napoleon returns to Secured by the conferences at Erfurth from all danger in his rear, Napoleon speedily returned to Paris; and, after presiding over the opening of the legislative assembly, then resolved, with his wonted vigour, to set out for the sets out for Pyrenees. He was determined by a sudden attack to disperse the Spanish armaments and capture Madrid, before either the English auxiliaries could acquire a solid footing in Paris, and the Ebro. CHAP. 1808. Nov. 3. the Peninsula, or Austria could gain time to put in motion the extensive armaments she was preparing on the Danube. Leaving Paris in the end of October, he arrived at Bayonne on the 3d November, and immediately Oct. 29. disposed his forces for active operations. The effect of the vigorous exertions which he had made to strengthen his armies in that quarter, was now beginning to display itself. The fifty thousand soldiers who in the middle of August were concentrated on the Ebro, dejected by disaster, had swelled by the end of September, as if by enchantment, to ninety thousand men present under arms in Navarre, besides twenty thousand, under St Cyr, in Catalonia. This body, already so formidable, subsequently received vast accessions of force from the troops 1 Nap. i. 361, arriving from Germany, especially the Imperial Guard, 363. Thib. and the corps of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, all of which Tor. ii. 119. were veterans from the Grand Army, confident in themselves, and inured to victory. vii. 156. force there During the whole of October, the road from Bayonne to Vittoria was crowded with horsemen and carriages; 15. through every opening in the Pyrenees, foot-soldiers were Immense pouring in endless multitudes to reinforce the grand mus- collected by ter in Navarre. Conformably to his general custom, Napoleon. Napoleon divided the whole army into eight corps, commanded by as many marshals, whose names, already rendered immortal in the rolls of fame, seemed a sure presage to victory.* Their united force, when the Emperor took the field in the beginning of November, was not less than three hundred thousand men, of whom fully forty thousand were cavalry; and, after deducting the troops in Catalonia, and those which required to be maintained in garrison in the northern fortresses, and the sick and absent, at least a hundred and eighty thousand could be *First corps, Victor, Duke of Belluno, 33,937 Second corps, Bessières, Duke of Istria, afterwards Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, 33,054 Third corps, Moncey, Duke of Cornegliano, 37,690 Fourth corps, Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic, 25,984 Fifth corps, Mortier, Duke of Treviso, 26,713 Sixth corps, Ney, Duke of Elchingen, Seventh corps, General St Cyr in Catalonia, Eighth corps, Junot, Duke of Abrantes, 38,033 42,107 25,730 42,382 14,060 319,690 CHAP. 1808. relied on for offensive operations on the Ebro. But the magnitude of this force, great as it was, constituted the least formidable part of its character. It was its incomparable discipline, spirit, and equipment, the skill and vigour of its officers, the docility and experience of its soldiers, the central and impregnable position which it occupied among the mountains of Navarre, and the unity of design which it was well known would soon be com1 Tor. ii. 119. municated to its operations by the consummate talents of Napier, i. 361, 362, 377. Napoleon, which constituted its real strength, and renSouth. ii. 386, dered the friends of freedom in Europe justly fearful of vii. 150, 152. the collision of such a host with the divided and inexperienced armies of the Spanish provinces.1* 387. Thib. 16. strength of the Span iards. These armies, though very numerous on paper, and in considerable strength in the field, were far from being in Positions and a situation, either from discipline, equipment, or position, to make head against so formidable an enemy. The Spanish troops were divided into three armies; that of the right under Palafox, consisting of eighteen thousand infantry and five hundred horse, occupied the country between Saragossa and Sanguessa, and was composed almost entirely of Arragonese. The centre, under Castanos, which boasted of the victors of Baylen in its ranks, was twenty-eight thousand strong, including thirteen hundred horse, and had thirty-six pieces of cannon; it lay at Tarazona and Agreda, right opposite to the centre of the French position. The left, under Blake, thirty thousand in number, almost entirely Galicians, but with hardly any cavalry, and only twenty-six guns, was stationed on the rocky mountains near Reynosa, from whence the Ebro takes its rise. Thus, seventy-four thousand infantry, and two thousand horse, with eighty-six guns, were all that the Spaniards could rely upon for immediate operations on the Ebro; for although considerable reserves were collecting in the rear, yet they were too far from the scene of action, and their discipline and equipment not in a sufficient state of forwardness to per * Before assuming the command of the army, Napoleon had said, in his opening address to the legislative body at Paris, "In a few days I shall set out to place myself at the head of my army, and, with the aid of God, crown at Madrid the King of Spain, and plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon !"— Discourse, 25th Oct. 1808. Moniteur, 26th October 1808; and THIB. vii. 86. And Imperial Muster-Rolls, NAPIER, i. 88, Appendix |