CHAP. LIV. -1808. 84. British forces, magazines and depots in the rear: a force which appeared, and doubtless was, if tolerably supported by its Peninsular allies, capable of achieving great things for the deliverance of Europe. Meanwhile, the Spanish troops, Strength of fully five thousand strong, which had been liberated at the united Lisbon, were equipped anew at the expense of the British and their adgovernment, and despatched by sea to Catalonia, from vance into Spain. whence the most pressing representations had been sent of the necessity of regular troops to aid the efforts and improve the discipline of the numerous peasants in arms in the province; the Russian fleet, in conformity with the treaty, was conducted to the British harbours; and a Sent 13 central junta was formed at Lisbon, to administer the 1 Lond. i. affairs of the kingdom in the absence of the Prince Regent. Nap. i. 247, The preparations for the campaign being at length com- 267. Nevis, pleted, the British troops began their march from the ii. 264, 287. Portuguese capital, for the seat of war at the foot of the Pyrenees.1 25. 179, 181. 248. South. i. 85. ing a Central Madrid. The decisive influence of the recent successes and central position of the English army, in possession of the capital and principal strongholds of the country, rendered the Great diffiappointment of a central junta, and the defeat of the culty in formlocal intrigues every where set on foot in order to obtain Junta at a preponderating voice for particular men in its councils, a comparatively easy task in Portugal. But the case was very different in Spain, where jealousy of foreign interference had already risen to a most extravagant height; where the people entertained a most exaggerated idea of their own strength and resources; and many different provincial governments, elected under the pressure of necessity in different parts of the country, had opposite and jarring pretensions to advance for the supreme direction of affairs. Much division, and many dangerous jealousies, were rapidly rising upon this subject, when the junta of Seville, whose prudence and success, as well as the consideration due to the great cities and opulent province which they represented, had already invested Aug. 3. with a sort of lead in the affairs of the Peninsula, had the 2 Tor. ii. 80, good fortune to bring forward a project which, from its lanos Meequity and expedience, soon commanded universal assent. moria, 12, This was, that the different supreme juntas, each on the 277. same day, should elect two deputies,2 who should, when VOL. XII. I 92. Jovel 24. South, il. LIV. 1808. CHAP. united together, form the central government, to which all the local authorities were to be subject; that the local juntas should nevertheless continue their functions, in obedience to the commands of the supreme junta ; and that the seat of government should be some town in La Mancha, equally convenient for all the deputies. 86. of a Central the This proposal having met with general concurrence, different provincial juntas elected their respective repreAppointment sentatives for the central government, which was installed with extraordinary pomp at Aranjuez in the end of September, and immediately commenced its sittings. At first it consisted of twenty-four members, but their ranks were soon augmented, by the number of provinces which claimed the right of sending representatives, to thirty-five: an unhappy medium, too small for a legislative assembly, too large for an executive cabinet. Though it numbered several eminent men and incorruptible patriots among its members, particularly Count Florida Blanca, who, though in the eightieth year of his age, preserved undecayed the vigour of intellect and cautious policy which had distinguished his long administration, and Jovellanos, in whom the severities of a tedious captivity had still left unextinguished the light of an elevated understanding and the warmth of an unsuspecting heart; yet it was easy to foresee, what subsequent events too mournfully verified, that it was not composed of the elements calculated either to communicate vigour and decision to the national counsels, or impress foreign nations with a favourable idea of its probable stability. Formed for the most part of persons who were totally unknown, at least to public life, before the commencement of the revolution, and many of whom had been elevated to greatness solely by its convulsions, it was early distinguished by that overweening jealousy of their own importance, which in all men is the accompaniment of newly, and still more p. of undeservedly acquired power, and torn with intestine i. 298, 308. intrigues. These too broke out at a moment when the South. ii. 277, utmost possible unanimity and vigour were required to enable them to make head against the formidable tempest which was arising against them, under the guidance of the Emperor Napoleon.1 Nap. 313. Jovel lanos Memoria, ii. 12, 34. The central junta displayed a becoming vigour in LIV. 1808. 87. Miserable the Central the Ebro. asserting the inviolability of their privileges against Cuesta, who had arrested one of its members; but they were far from evincing equal energy in the more important duty of providing for the wants of the military force which was to maintain the conflict. So completely had condition of the idea of their own invincibility taken possession of the Government Spaniards, that they never once contemplated the possi- and armies on bility of defeat. All their arrangements were based on the assumption that they were speedily to drive the French over the Pyrenees, and intended to meet the contingencies which might then occur. Nothing was foreseen or provided for in case of disaster; there were no magazines or reserved stores accumulated in the rear, no positions fortified, no fortresses armed; there was no money in the treasury, no funds in the military chests of the generals. The soldiers were naked, destitute of shoes, and rarely supplied with provisions: the cavalry dismounted; the artillery in the most wretched condition; even the magnificent supplies which the generosity of England had thrown with such profuse bounty into the Peninsula, were squandered or dilapidated by private cupidity, and seldom reached the proper objects of their destination. Corruption in its worst form pervaded every department of the state; the inferior officers sold or plundered the stores; the superior, in many instances made free with the military chest: in the midst of the general misrule the central junta, amidst eloquent and pompous declamation, could find no more worthy object of their practical deliberations than discussing the honorary titles which they were to bear, the ample salaries which they assigned to themselves, the dress they were to wear, and the form of the medals which were to be suspended round their necks. In the midst of this general scene of cupidity, imbecility, and vanity, nothing efficient was done, either for the service of the armies, or the defence of the state. This deplorable result is not to be ascribed exclusively, or even chiefly, to the character of the members of the central junta, or the leaders at the head of the troops. 102. Lond. i. It arose from the nature of things, the overthrow of all 200, 203. regular government in Spain, and the jarring and conflicting interests of the popular assemblages by which its place had been supplied.1 Democratic energy is a powerful 1 Tor. ii. 95, Nap. i. 310, 311. South. 298, 307, 315. LIV. 1808. CHAP. auxiliary, and when directed or made use of, in the first instance, by aristocratic foresight or despotic authority, it often produces the most important results. But its vigour speedily exhausts itself if not sustained by the lasting compulsion of terror or force; and the tyranny of a Committee of Public Salvation is not less necessary to give success to its external operations than to restore credit or usefulness to its internal administration. 88. tains infor mation of what is going 1 Ante, c. xlvi. § 5. In the north of Europe, however, decisive steps were adopted by the British government, which had the hapThe Marquis piest results, and succeeded in restoring to the Spanish Romana ob- standards ten thousand of the veteran soldiers whom the prudent foresight and anticipating perfidy of Napoleon on in Spain. had so early removed from the Peninsula. It has been already mentioned, that so early as spring 1807, the French Emperor had made it the price of his reconciliation with Spain, after the premature proclamation of the Prince of Peace in the October preceding, that she should furnish sixteen thousand men to aid in the contest in the north of Europe, and that the corps of the Marquis of Romana was in consequence forwarded to the shores of the Baltic. Soon after the commencement of hostilities in the Peninsula, Castanos, who had entered into very cordial and confidential communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple, then chief in command at Gibraltar, strongly represented to that officer the great importance of conveying to the Spanish corps, which was stationed in Jutland, secret information as to the real state of affairs, which was likely to lead to their at once declaring for the cause of their country. In consequence of this advice, the English government made various attempts to communicate with the Spanish forces, but they were at first frustrated by the vigilant eye which the French kept on their doubtful allies. At length, however, by the address of a Catholic priest named Robertson, the dangerous communication was effected, and Romana was informed, Tor. ii. 68, in a secret conference held in Lahn, of the extraordinary events which had occurred in the Peninsula-the victory in ii. 336, 345. Andalusia, the repulse from Saragossa, the capitulation of Junot, the flight from Madrid.2* 69. Nap. i. 337. South. * Robertson was despatched in a boat from Heligoland, of which the English had recently taken possession, to the coast of Jutland: but the principal СНАР. 1808. 89. Escape of the his troops. Violently agitated at this heart-stirring intelligence, the noble Spaniard did not for a moment hesitate as to the course which he should adopt. Robertson was immediately sent back with a request that a British naval force might be forwarded to convey away his troops, and that, Marquis and if possible, the assistance of Sir John Moore and the Eng- Aug. 9 and lish troops at Gottenberg might be granted in aid of the 13. undertaking. The latter part of the request could not be complied with, as Sir John Moore, with the British troops, had already sailed for England; but Admiral Keats, with the fleet stationed in those seas, drew near to the coast of Jutland, and suddenly appeared off Nyborg in the island. of Funen. Romana, having seized all the Danish craft he Aug. 9. could collect, pushed across the arm of the sea which separated the mainland from that island, and, with the assistance of Keats, made himself master of the port and castle of Nyborg. From thence he traversed another strait to Langland, where all the troops he could collect were assembled together, and publicly informed of the extraordinary events which had occurred in the Peninsula, and which went to sever them from the connexion they had so long maintained with their brethren in arms. Kneeling around their standards, wrought to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by the intelligence they had received, 70. Nap. i with hands uplifted to heaven and tears streaming from 337,338 their eyes, they unanimously swore to remain faithful to 336, 337. their country, and brave all the anger of the Emperor Napoleon, in the attempt to aid its fortunes.1 Such was the universal zeal which animated them, that one of the regiments which lay at Ebeltoft having received the intelligence at ten in the evening, immediately started, and journeying all night and the greater part of the next day, reached their comrades at the point of embarkation in time to get off, after having marched difficulty was to furnish him with a secret sign of intelligence, which, beyond the reach of any other's observation, might at once convince Romana of the reality and importance of his mission. This was at last fallen upon in a very singular way. Romana, who was an accomplished scholar, had been formerly intimate with Mr Frere when ambassador in Spain; and one day, having called when he was reading the Gests of the Cid, the English ambassador suggested a conjectural emendation of one of the lines.* Romana instantly perceived the propriety of the proposed emendation; and this line so amended was made the passport which Robertson was to make use of, which at once proved successful. See SOUTHEY, ii. 337. • Aun vea el hora que vos Merezea dos tanto. 1 Tor. ii. 68, South. |