CHAP. 1808. April 14. measure, to the system approved of by both sides of the House in the finance debates of the preceding year, of providing for the increased charges of the year and the interest of the loans, in part at least, by an impignoration, in time of peace, of the war taxes. A subsidy of £1,100,000 was provided for the King of Sweden. But these sums, great as they are, convey no adequate idea of 1 Parl. Deb. the expenditure of this eventful year; the budget was and App. No, arranged in April, before the Spanish contest had arisen; 1. Ann. Reg. and for the vast expenses with which it was attended, 105. Mar- and which, not having been foreseen, had not been proshall's Tables. vided for, there was no resource but a liberal issue of Exchequer bills, which fell as an oppressive burden upon future years.1* xi. 14, 21, 1808, 103, Statement, No. I. 61. Immense extent of the supplies which were sent out to Spain from Great The supplies of all sorts sent out during this year to the Spanish patriots, though in great part misapplied or wasted, were on a princely scale of liberality, and worthy of the exalted station which, by consent of all parties, England now took at the head of the alliance. In every province of the Peninsula juntas were established, and to all British envoys were sent, who made as minute inquiries into the wants and capabilities of the district as the circumstances would admit, and received ample powers from government to afford such aid, either in money, arms, clothing, or warlike stores, as they deemed it expedient to demand. Supplies of all sorts were, in consequence of these requisitions, sent to Corunna, Santander, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Valencia, Malaga, and other places, with a profusion which astonished the inhabitants, and gave them at least ample means to fit themselves out for the contest in which they were engaged.† It may readily be conceived, that from the enthusiasm and animation of the insurgent provinces, and the uni * Appendix A, chap. LIII. The following is a statement of the sums of money and warlike stores sent by Great Britain to the Peninsula, from the beginning of the contest in June 1808, to the commencement of 1809 : CHAP. LIII. 1808. versal transport with which the British envoys were received, abundance of room was afforded for misrepresentation or delusion; that the accounts transmitted to government must, in many cases, have been inaccurate; and that, amidst the extraordinary profusion with which supplies of all sorts were poured into the country, there were many opportunities afforded to the native authorities of fraud or embezzlement, of which, amidst the general confusion, they were not slow to avail themselves. In truth, lamentable experience afterwards demonstrated that great part of these magnificent supplies was misapplied or 1808, 184. neglected; the money being squandered or secreted, the Hard. x. 190, stores sold or wasted, the arms piled and forgotten in 102. magazines, when the patriots in the field were in want of the most necessary part of military equipment.1 1 Ann. Reg. 192. Lond. i. 62. effects with attended. Still, with all these evils, inseparable probably from the condition of a country thus driven into a dreadful contest in the absence of any regular government, and unavoid- Beneficial ably thrown under the direction of local and recently which these elected authorities, alike destitute of the knowledge, un- efforts were acquainted with the arrangements, and relieved from the responsibility requisite for the faithful discharge of official duty, the prodigal bounty of England was attended with the most important effects upon the progress of the strife. It removed at once the imputation of cautious and prudential policy, which the incessant declamations of the French writers during the former periods of the war, joined to the feeble temporising measures of preceding cabinets, had so strongly affixed to the British name. demonstrated the sincerity and energy of a cabinet which thus, with unprecedented profusion, spread abroad in every quarter the means of resistance; and 'inspired boundless confidence in the resources of a power which, great at all times, seemed capable of gigantic expansion at the decisive moment, and appeared rather to have increased than di- 2 Tor. i. 301, minished from a contest of fifteen years' duration.2 It 307. Ann. Reg. 1808, -See Parl. Pap., July 16, 1808, aud HARD Xx. 492; Pièces Just. In addition to these immense national supplies, private subscriptions were entered into in the chief towns of the empire, and large sums collected and remitted from the British Islands to the Spanish patriots.-Annual Register, 1808, 195. CHAPTER LIV. NAPOLEON'S FIRST DISASTERS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. CHAP. 1808. 1. Military measures adopted by Napoleon against the No sooner was Napoleon made aware, by the general progress and formidable character of the insurrection, that a serious contest awaited him, than he set about, with all his usual caution and ability, preparing the means of overcoming its difficulties. Bessières received orders to put Burgos into a state of defence, to detach Lefebvre Desnouettes, with five thousand foot and eight insurrection. hundred horse, against Saragossa, and to move his main body so as to overawe the insurgents in Biscay, Asturias, and Old Castile. A reinforcement of nine thousand men was prepared for Duhesme in Catalonia, which it was hoped would enable him to make head against the enemy in that quarter. A reserve was organised, under General Drouet, on the Pyrenean frontier of Navarre, which, besides affording Bessières continual additions of force, placed five thousand men in the openings of the valleys towards the castle of Jaca, which was in possession of the enemy; another reserve was established in Perpignan, and detachments were stationed in the eastern passes of the mountains. The communications and rear being thus adequately provided for, Marshal Moncey was directed, with part of his corps, to move upon Cuença, so 1 Napoleon's as to prevent any communication between the patriots of Valencia and Saragossa, and subsequently threaten the App. No. 2. former city; while Dupont, with two divisions of his Foy, il 265, corps, ten thousand strong, received orders to proceed across the Sierra Morena towards Cordova and Seville.1 The remainder of his corps and of that of Moncey was Orders. Napier, i. Ibid. i. 60. 268. stationed in reserve in La Mancha to keep up the communications of the divisions pushed forward, and be in readiness, if necessary, to support either which might require assistance. With so much foresight and caution did the great commander distribute his forces, even against an insurgent peasantry, and an enemy at that period deemed wholly unable to withstand the shock of his veteran legions. CHAP. LIV. 1808. 2. Successful Bessières and gents. The first military operations of any importance were those of Marshal Bessières in Biscay and Old Castile. That able officer was at Burgos with twelve thousand operations of men, when the insurrection broke out with great violence in all directions around him. At the same moment he Castile and Leon against received advices that a body of five thousand armed men the insurhad got possession of the important depot of artillery at Segovia, and another assemblage of equal force was arming itself from the royal manufactory of arms at Palencia; while General Cuesta, the captain-general of the province, with a few regiments of regular troops and a strong body of undisciplined peasantry, had taken post at Cabeçon on the Pisuerga. These positions appeared to Savary, who was now the chief in command at Madrid, so alarming, as threatening the communications of the French with the capital and all the southern provinces, that he detached General Frère with his division, forming part of Dupont's corps, in all haste to Segovia, where he routed June 6. the peasantry, and made himself master of all the artillery they had taken from the arsenal, amounting to thirty pieces. Meanwhile Bessières divided his disposable force into several movable columns, which, issuing from Burgos as a centre, traversed the country in all directions, every where defeating and disarming the insurgents, and reinstating the French authorities whom they had dispossessed. One of these divisions, under Verdier, routed the June 6. enemy at Logrono, and with inhuman and unjustifiable eruelty put all their leaders to death; another under Lasalle, broke the armed peasantry at Torquemada, June 7. burned the town, pursued them with merciless severity, and entered Palencia on the day following; while a i Napier, i. third, under Merle, uniting with Lasalle, made straight 62, 63, For for Cuesta at Cabeçon,1 who accepted battle, but was i. 300. speedily overthrown, and his whole new levies dispersed, June 12. 269. Tor. СНАР. 1808. 3. Which had the effect of entirely subduing that part of the country. June 23. 1 Napier, i, 62, 64. Tor. i. 300, 307, Foy, iii. 269, 285. Arragon. First siege of with the loss of all their artillery and several thousand muskets, which were thrown away in the pursuit. By these successes the whole level country in the upper part of the valley of the Douro was overawed and reduced to submission. Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, and all the principal towns which had revolted, were compelled to send deputies to take the oath of allegiance to Joseph; and the terrible French dragoons, dispersing through the smaller towns and villages, diffused such universal consternation, that all the flat country in this quarter submitted to King Joseph and the French. Requisitions and taxes were levied without difficulty throughout the whole remainder of the campaign. General Merle continuing his success, marched northward against the province of Santander in Asturias, forced the rugged passes of Lantuerio and Venta d'Escudo, and descending the northern side of the ridge of Santander, in concert with a portion of the reserve which the emperor despatched to his assistance, made himself master of that town, and forced the intrepid bishop, with his warlike followers, to take refuge in the inaccessible fastnesses of the neighbouring mountains.1 While Leon and Castile were the theatres of these early and important successes, the province of Arragon, though Operations in almost entirely destitute of regular forces, was successful, after sustaining several bloody reverses, in maintaining a more prolonged resistance to the enemy. By indefatigable exertions, Palafox and the energetic junta of Saragossa had succeeded in arming and communicating the rudiments of discipline to a tumultuary assembly of ten thousand infantry and two hundred horse, with which, and eight pieces of artillery, his brother, the Marquis Lazan, ventured to march out of the city and await Lefebvre in a favourable position behind the Huecha. But though the French were not more than half the number of the enemy, they were, from the want of discipline in their opponents, and their own great superiority in cavalry, much more than a match for them. The peasants withstood, without flinching, several attacks in front; but a vigorous assault in flank threw them into disorder, and a gallant charge by the Polish lancers completed their rout. Notwithstanding this defeat, the June 12. |