A thinking thing," it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses; that imagines, also, and perceives. Assuredly, it is not little if all these properties belong to... The Logic of Definition: Explained and Applied - Página 217por William Leslie Davidson - 1885 - 353 páginasVista completa - Acerca de este libro
| René Descartes - 1880 - 498 páginas
...distinctness. But what, then, am If A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing ? It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives],...wills, refuses, that imagines also, and perceives. Assuredly it is not little, if all these properties belong to my nature. But why should they not belong... | |
| 1882 - 646 páginas
...truly affirmed of the psychologist's Reason. Moreover, the description seems a contradiction in terms. In like manner, Reason is not identical with Thought..."), but also " volitions, affections, and judgments ". The word " form," even in its most attenuated sense, means limitation; and a limited unlimited is,... | |
| 1886 - 548 páginas
...distinctness. But what, then, am I? "A thinking thing," it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives],...wills, refuses; that imagines, also, and perceives. Assuredly, it is not little if all these properties belong to my nature. But why should they not belong... | |
| Henry Coppée - 1893 - 560 páginas
...distinctness. But what, then, am I? "A thinking thing," it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives],...wills, refuses; that imagines, also, and perceives. Assuredly, it is not little if all these properties belong to my nature. But why should they not belong... | |
| Oliver Joseph Thatcher - 1907 - 484 páginas
...distinctness. But what then am I ? A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives],...wills, refuses, that imagines also, and perceives. Assuredly it is not little, if all these properties belong to my nature. But why should they not belong... | |
| 1908 - 768 páginas
...distinctness. But what, then, am I? A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives],...wills, refuses, that imagines also, and perceives. Assuredly it is not little, if all these properties belong to my nature. But why should they not belong... | |
| Theodore De Laguna, Grace Mead Andrus De Laguna - 1910 - 276 páginas
...is intuitively known as thinking. And, if one further asks what a thinking being is, he replies: "It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives,]...wills, refuses; that imagines also, and perceives." All these properties unite in his nature, as certainly as he exists — even though they should convey... | |
| James Hugh Ryan - 1924 - 426 páginas
...what, then, am I? A thinking thing (res cogitans) it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, conceives, affirms,...wills, refuses, that imagines also and perceives." stream the Occasionalism of Malebranche, and, in another, the Idealism of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and... | |
| Henry Maudsley - 1925 - 488 páginas
...„ i , But what, then, am I? (A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing ? It is a thing that doubts, understands, [conceives],...wills, refuses, that imagines also, and perceives?^ Assuredly it is not little, if all these properties belong to my nature. But why should they not belong... | |
| Paul Carus - 1926 - 836 páginas
...embrace in imagination belongs to the knowledge which I have of myself. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands (conceives), affirms,...wills, refuses, that imagines. also and perceives (notice that the I am or Personality or Existence is not here included.) Is there nothing of all this... | |
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