preceding often bald and incorrect; white iron' instead of tin; Nova Zemlia' for Nova The style of these descriptions is as for instance, fer blanc is translated little offspring,' for few offspring, Zembla, &c. In the account of the Tschutski, who inhabit the north-eastern promontory of Siberia, we are informed that ⚫ their summer is short, and during part of it the sun never sets, but yet never shines with meridian and southern lustre.' The French description is much more perspicuous: Le soleil ne se couche jamais, mais il n'y brille pas du même éclat que sous la ligne, et dans les pays méridionaux.' ་ This elegant work is gratefully dedicated to Mr. Charles Hatchett, so well known in the annals of chemical and mineralogical science, for having liberally supplied the original whence it has been formed. The Costume of Austria has also been published, and we propose to speak of it in our next Number, Moy ART. X. Correspondence in a Series of Letters between a Gentleman in 1T Tappears to us that this publication may be ascribed to the same source with the Plan of National Improvement, and the Sketches of the Strength of France and Russia, which we lately. recommended to the attention of our readers. (Rev. Vol. xlii, pp. 306. and 381.) On the present occasion, the writer hazards opinions on our internal affairs, on our public characters, and on our external policy, of which we deem ourselves more competent to form a judgment than of his former topics; and though we differ from him on several of these points, we still continue to respect his information, and to applaud his patriotism. As before, however, we shall nearly abstain from remarks, in order to communicate the fuller portion of the interesting matter which is here presented to us, The writer of the preface, who professes to be a different person from the author, states that the latter lays it down as a principle, that until the dominion of France be confined within the limits of the late monarchy, Great Britain cannot enjoy peace. It is his opinion, that if the entire independence of Holland and Spain be not secured, the French project to subjugate the British kingdoms will never be abandoned. He is not sanguine that the present quarrel will produce any thing very important to either party; he calls this the second Punic war, and predicts that the third is not far distant, that it will be be a terrible conflict and will finally decide the contest.' The preparations, which he recommends to be made for the above awful struggle, are such as would render the intervening peace a mere cessation of hostilities. If it be humiliating, it may at the same time be profitable, for us to learn this author's sentiments on the state of political information among us; which he specifies by way of introducing his opinion on the conduct of a Northern Potentate, which has been very much a topic of discussion in this country; With respect to the policy of the king of Prussia, in suffering a French army to surround the frontiers of his dominions from Anspach by Wessel to Lubeck, it will be, I am afraid, on my part labour lost to offer you, an English politician, any opinion whatever. Although, of all the people in Europe, the English are the least acquainted with the powers and politics of other states, yet, such is your mania for political reasoning and dogmatical argument, that you will neither allow to other governments the capacity to care for their own interests, nor the honesty to maintain their engagements with their neighbours. Be pleased to know Sir! that to account for the conduct of the king of Prussia upon this occasion, you must be acquainted with the internal strength of the Prussian monarchy; and likewise with the political relationships and future prospects of that government.' Bonaparte, he observes, invaded Hanover without the knowlege, and contrary to the expectation, of the Court of Berlin; and he says that the king of Prussia never enters into a war unless he can discover that it will have a favourable termination. He next enumerates the grounds of the mutual interest which unites Prussia and France; the former is weaker than is generally imagined; and it cannot exist without the protection of its present ally, whose support it engages, because its forces would serve as an avant garde in the case of a war with Russia. If the declaimers against the conduct of Frederic IV. would peruse the curious and sensible observations before us, they would, we believe, discover their error, and prefer silence to the rant in which they have so long indulged. It is here said to have been the plan of the Great Frederic, to extend the domi nion of the House of Brandenburg from the Vistula, by the Rhine, to the Texel and Cuxhaven; and the author does not seem to be hostile to this project. The object of Russia, we are told, from the time of Peter the Great to the present moment, has uniformly been to obtain a dictatorial influence in the politics of Europe. Its cabinet feels no partiality for the British; and the respect in which they were held was in a great measure destroyed by the interferences in favour of Turkey and Poland, and by the attempt to detach Denmark from its interests but its policy dictates the the obstruction of France in her hostility against Great Britain, and in her attempts to attain a naval preponderancy. The author admits that Russia would gladly effect a peace between the belligerent powers, but he is careful to prevent us from regarding this as a consolatory idea: Faithful to her system of universal influence, and which the powers of that empire render a natural system to Russia, the court of Petersburgh must endeavour to maintain between Great Britain and France, an equipoise of power ; or a constant rivalry. The consequence of that rivalry enables Russia to pursue her own projects unmolested ; and it gives to the court of Petersburgh such an ascend. dancy in the politics of Europe, that you see the Russian ministry assume the part of dictatorial mediator upon every occasion which appears to that cabinet, as in anywise calculated to extend the influence or dominion of the Russian empire. Upon this principle, but it can only be on this principle, Russia may no doubt wish to bring about the re-establishment of peace before any blow shall be struck that can give a superiority to either of the belligerent parties. Should Alexander be able to arrange another peace upon the basis of that of Amiens, or, similar to his act de mediation at Ratisbon, the enormous establishments which Great Britain and France will be obliged to keep up, and the state of uncertainty, in which both nations will be left, must inevitably, sooner or latter, ruin the finances, and destroy the national industry, of both countries. ' The following extract will enable the reader to estimate the consideration in which we were lately held at Petersburgh: The influence of the British government at the court of Petersburgh has long been upon the decline. Your very inconsequent interference in favour of Sweden and Turkey during the last war between Russia and these powers, irritated the late empress and diminished her respect for the English nation.-The familiarity with which certain of your public men affected to treat Paul I, and the expedition to Holland, detached that prince from your interests, and made him your enemy.After the battle of Copenhagen, a British minister, under the pretext of wishing to settle your differences with that court, but in reality to create a distrust and coolness between Denmark and Russia, and thereby dissever the northern league, induced the Danish secretary of state, Count Bernstorff, to come over in an extraordinary official capacity to London; this ill contrived artifice Alexander saw through, and he took the first opportunity that occurred to manifest his disapprobation of it; as Mr. Garlick and Lord St. Helen's can testify. These ministers had the mortification to see, upon all public occasions, a decided precedence expressly given by the emperor himself to Duroc, Bonaparte's aide de-camp. I shall only notice here one particular circumstance which created much speculation, and not a little pleasantry, in the diplomatic circles at Petersburgh; viz, shortly after Lord St. Helen's arrival in that capital, his Lordship gave a grand dinner to his suite, and invited several Russian officers, on board of the Latona frigate which brought him out. On the day appointed appointed by the British embassador, for his grand entertainment, as if to exhibit to the world a marked deference for the First Consul of the French republic, His Imperial Majesty ordered a martial fête to be given, and a flottilla of Russian gallies and gunboats to manœuvre for the Consul's messenger Duroc on the opposite side of Cronstadt haven, almost under the guns of the British frigate: As it is natural to be supposed, the principal Russian officers attended the emperor and Bonaparte's Prefect du Palais. It may be, that Alexander had on this occasion no particular design; allowing that to be the case, and that the emperor's fête was accidental, yet the singularity of the circumstance (with perhaps some other trifling matters) deprived his Lordship of that consideration which a British minister at the court of Russia ought always to enjoy. How far the brave mariner, whom you have since that time metamorphosed into an embassador, will be able to recover your influence in the speculative court of Petersburgh, a very little time will now determine." The author may be said to reprobate, in guarded terms, the blockade of the Elbe and Weser. It is, he says, of advantage to Prussia, as it favours the traffic along the Oder to the Baltic, while it adds a million to the expence of the transit of British goods; and it may induce the powers of the continent to devise expedients not very palatable in Great Britain, to prevent the trade of the North of Germany from being disturbed by the quarrels of England and France. He has no doubt that Denmark might have been persuaded to secure the neutrality of the Elbe. We hope that the whole of this work will meet the eye of administration, and that this part of it will engage its serious consideration. A very interesting and flattering sketch is given of the present state of Denmark, Its strength and force are represented as far more considerable than they are generally imagined to be; and very plausible reasons are assigned, to shew the eligibility of an alliance between that kingdom and Great Britain. The subsequent passage, though it does not seem to have any immediate relation to the objects of the letter, is too curious to be passed over; and, as well as several others which we could point out, it proves its author to be no mean projector. There are in Europe four localities where grand navigable canals would be of universal benefit to the trade and industry of all nations, viz. between the Trave and the Elbe; from the river Po to the Mediterranean; between the Gulph of Lions and the Garonne; and from the North sea to the Irish channel. I mean canals on which ships of all sizes could navigate. To the construction of such works, all the states of Europe and America should contribute.' In a letter on the present state of Austria, the writer observes to his correspondent: It is a notorious truth, that prior to the peace of Luneville the Austrian armies were exhausted; neither your embezzled subsidies, nor * * See a contradiction of the whole of this statement, in the Corespondence, Review for November 1800. founded on the authority of Lord St Helens himself nor her own, perhaps on some occasions, ill-guided efforts, were suf ficient to oppose the enemy; she therefore made peace. Not however like you, to husband her resources by diminishing her force: Austria made peace to obtain time to draw forth her resources and to re-organize her strength. To recruit her armies and recover her finances, the present war is a most propitious circumstance; it delivers the government of Austria from the menacing part of the intrigues of France; it disconcerts the plans of France and Russia, and renders the co-operation of their rowers, were they inclined to co operate, much less formidable. Under these circumstances, whatever the cabinet of Vienna may think proper to profess, it is the immediate interest of the emperor to endeavour, in as far as his influence will go, to protract the present contest until he shall be able to consolidate the rank and independence of the Austrian monarchy upon its own internal strength.' After having given a picture of Europe, as newly modelled by the late wars and commotions, the author says: The cabinet of Vienna has maturely calculated the probable ef fects that may result from the present state of things; that government is convinced that, to maintain the integrity of the monarchy and the independence of the state, it is now become indispensably necessary to organize and keep up such a defensive force as may at all times be equal to the most virgorous offensive measures. To organize this force, and to provide for its permanent maintenance, is therefore now, as it ought to be, the principal concern of the Austrian government. At the peace of Luneville, Austria had on foot, and able to bear arms, only about 150,000 men; by the indefatigable exertions of the Arch-Duke Charles, although he has been but ill supported by a wretched system of finance, the Austrian army, at this moment, amounts to 400,000 effective men; the best troops and the best equipt of any in Europe. This army is raised upon a population of nearly 26 millions of people, the most patriotic, loyal, and brave, of perhaps any nation in the world. With this force, and able to keep it up, Austria may still resume her long lost rank and political consequence in Europe. Her finances however require, that if she can, consistent with her honor and safety, she should yet for some time maintain her neutrality; and which she will in all likelihood endeavour to do-except she be vexed and insulted by France, or encouraged and properly guarantied by Great Britain and Russia.' *In the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, a great proportion of the peasantry are in feodal vassalage: at this moment the Arch-Duke Charles has it in contemplation to offer these men civil liberty, and the right of citizens on condition, that, in case the state shall have occasion to require it, their young men shall enrol themselves for six years military service. Should the Duke, in spite of the pride, ostentation, and bigotry of the land proprietors, be able to carry this proposed measure into effect; he may in the course of three months after the publication of the ordinance, command a million of such volunteers as would soon manage Bonaparte's conscripts and veterans, were the Consul with his Guides at their head.' 2 • To |