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APPENDIX.

TERMS DEFINED OR EXPLAINED.

VERY thing we perceive or are conscious of,

Ewhether a being, or a quality, a paffion or an

action, is with refpect to the percipient termed an object. Some objects appear to be internal, or within the mind; paffion, for example, thinking, volition: fome external fuch as every object of fight, of hearing, of fmell, of touch, of taste.

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2. That act of the mind which makes known to me an external object, is termed perception. That act of the mind which inakes known to me an internal object, is termed consciousness. The power or faculty from which consciousnefs proceeds, is termed an internal fenfe. The power or faculty from which perception proceeds, is termed an external fenfe. This diftinction refers to the objects of our knowledge; for the senses, whether external or internal, are all of them powers or faculties of the mind.

3. But as felf is an object that cannot be termed either external or internal, the faculty by which I have knowledge of myfelf, is a fenfe that cannot properly be termed either internal or external.

4. By the eye we perceive figure, colour, motion, &c. by the ear we perceive the different qualities of found, high, low, loud, foft: by touch we perceive rough, fmooth, hot, cold, &c. by taste we perceive fweet, four, bitter, &c by fmell we perceive frag.ant, fetid, &c. Thefe qualities partake the common nature of all qualities, that they are not capable of an independent existence, but muft belong to fome being of which they are properties. A being with respect to its qualities is terined a fubject, or fubftratum; because it fupports its qualities, which are fpread, as it were, upon it. Every fubftratum of vifible qualities, is termed fubftance, and of tangible qualities, body.

5. Subftance and found are perceived exifting at a diftance from the organ; often at a confiderable distance. But fmell, touch, and tafte, are perceived as exifting at the organ of sense.

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6. All the objects of internal fenfe are attributed: witness deliberation, reasoning, refolution, willing, confenting, which are internal actions; as alfo paffions and emotions, which are internal agitations. With regard to the former, I am confcious of being active; with regard to the latter, I am confcious of being paffive.

7. Again, we are conscious of internal action as in the head; of paffions and emotions as in the heart.

8. Many actions may be exerted internally, and many effects produced, of which we are not conscious : when we investigate the ultimate cause of the motion of the blood, and of other internal motions upon which life depends, it is the most probable opinion that fome internal power is the caufe; and if fo, we are so far unconscious of the operations of that power. But confciousness being imply'd in the very meaning of delibe.. rating, reasoning, refolving, willing, confenting, fuch operations cannot efcape our knowledge. The fame is the cafe of paffions and emotions; for no internal agitation is denominated a paffion or emotion, but what we are confcious of.

9. The mind is not always the fame: by turns it is chearful, melancholy, calm, peevish, &c. Thefe differences may not improperly be denominated tones. An object, by making an impreffion, produceth an emotion or paffion, which again gives the mind a certain tone fuited to it.

10. Perception and fenfation are commonly reckoned fynonymous terms, fignifying that internal act by which external objects are made known to us. Perceiving is a general term for hearing, feeing, tafting, touching,. fmelling; and therefore perception fignifies every internal act by which we are made acquainted with external objects: thus we are faid to perceive a certain animal, a certain colour, found, tafte, fmell, &c. Senfation: properly fignifies that internal act by which we are made confcious of pleasure or pain felt at the organ of fense: thus we have a fenfation of the pleasure arifing from warmth, from a fragrant fmell, from a fweet tafte; and of the pain arifing from a wound, from a fetid fmell, from a difagreeable tafte. In perception, my attention. is fixed upon the external object: in fenfation, it is fixed upon the pleasure, or pain I feel..

The

The terms perception and fenfation are fometimes employ'd to fignify the objects of perception and fenfation. Perception in that fenfe is a general term for every external thing we perceive; and fenfation a general term for every pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense.

11. Conception is different from perception. The latter includes a conviction of the reality of its object: the former does not; for I can conceive the most extravagant stories told in a romance, without having any conviction of their reality. Conception differs alfo from imagination. By the power of fancy I can imagine a golden mountain, or an ebony fhip with fails and ropes of filk. When I defcribe a picture of that kind to another, the idea he forms of it is termed a conception. Imagination is active, conception is paffive.

12. Feeling, befide denoting one of the external fenfes, is a general term, fignifying that internal act by which we are made confcious of our pleasures and our pains; for it is not limited, as fenfation is, to any one fort. Thus, feeling being the genus of which fenfation is a fpecies, their meaning is the fame when apply'd to pleasure and pain felt at the organ of fenfe; and accordingly we fay indifferently, I feel pleasure from "heat, and pain from cold," or, "I have a fenfation "of pleasure from heat, and of pain from cold." But the meaning of feeling, as is faid, is much more extenfive: it is proper to fay, I feel pleasure in a fumptuous building, in love, in friendship; and pain in lofing a child, in revenge, in envy fenfation is not properly apply'd to any of these.

The term feeling is frequently used in a lefs proper fenfe to fignify what we feel or are confcious of; and in that fenfe it is a general term for all our paflions and emotions, and for all our other pleasures and pains.

13. That we cannot perceive an external object till an impreffion be made upon our body, is probable from reason, and is afcertained by experience. But it is not neceffary that we be made fenfible of the impression a in touching, it is true, in tafting, and in fmelling, we are fenfible of the impreffion; but not in feeing and hearing. We know indeed from experiments, that be-

fore

fore we perceive a visible object, its image is spread upon the retina tunica; and that before we perceive a、 found, an impreffion is made upon the drum of the ear: but we are not confcious either of the organic image or of the organic impreffion; nor are we conscious of any other operation preparatory to the act of perception: all we can fay, is, that we see that river, or hear that trumpet.

4. Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of memory. When I recall an object of fight in that manner, it appears to me precifely. the fame as in the original furvey, only more faint and obfcure. For example, having feen yefterdey a fpreading oak growing on the brink of a river, I endeavour to recall these objects to my mind. How is this operation performed? Do I endeavour to form in my mind a picture of them or reprefentative image? Not fo. I tranport myself ideally to the place where I faw the tree and river yesterday; upon which I have a perception of these objects, fimilar in all refpects to the perception I had. when I viewed them with my eyes, only more obfcure. And in this, recollection, I am not confcious of a picture or representative image, more than in the original furvey the perception is of the tree and river themfelves, as at firft. I confirm this by another experi-. After attentively furveying a fine ftatue, I close my eyes. What follows? The fame object continues, without

ment.

Yet a fingular opinion, that impreffions are the only objects of perception, has been efpoufed by fome. philofophers of no mean rank; not attending to the foregoing peculiarity in the fenfes of feeing and hearing, that we perceive objects without being conscious of an organic impreffion, or of any impreffion. See the Treatife upon human nature; where we find the following paffage, book 1. p. 4. fect. 2. Properly fpeaking, it is not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and members; fo that the afcribing a real and corporeal exiftence to these impreffi"ons, or to their objects, is an act of the mind ass difficult to explain," &c.

without any difference but that it is lefs diftinct than formerly. This indiftinct fecondary perception of an object,

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*This experiment, which every one may make and reiterate till entire fatisfaction be obtained, is of greater importance than at firft view may appear; for it trikes at the root of a celebrated doctrine that for more than two thousand years has mifled many philofophers. This doctrine as delivered by Ariftotle is in fubftance, "That "of every object of thought there must be in the mind. "fome form, phantafm, or fpecies; that things fenfi"ble are perceived and remembered by means of fen"fible phantafms, and things intelligible by intelligible "phantafms; and that thefe fpecies or phantafms have. "the form of the object without the matter, as the impreffion of a feal upon wax has the form of the fealwithout its matter." The followers of Ariftotle add, "That the fenfible and intelligible forms of things, are. "fent forth from the things themselves, and make im"preffions upon the paffive intellect, which impreffions "are perceived by the active intellect." This notion differs very little from that of Epicurus, which is, " That "all things fend forth, conftantly and in every direction, "flender ghosts or films of themfelves, (tenuia fimulacra, "as expreffed by his commentator Lucretius); which ftriking upon the mind, are the means of perception, dreaming, "&c. Des Cartes, bent to oppose Arifto. tle, rejects the doctrine of fenfible and intelligible phantalis; maintaining however the fame doctrine in effect, iz. That we perceive nothing external but by means of fome image either in the brain or in the mind: and thefe images he terms ideas. According to thefe philo fophers, we perceive nothing immediately but phantafins or ideas; and from these we infer, by reafoning, the existence of external objects. Locke, adopting this doctrine, employs almost the whole of his book about ideas. He holds, that we cannot perceive, remember, nor imagine, any thing, but by having an idea or image of it in the mind. He agrees with Des Cartes, that we can have no knowledge of things external but what we acquire by reafoning upon their ideas or images in the

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