"mirth, impart our fecrets, communicate our counfels, " and make mutual compacts and agreements to supply "and affift each other." Confidering fpeech as contributing to fo many good purposes, words that convey clear and diftin&t ideas, must be one of its capital beauties. This caufe of beauty, is too extenfive to be handled as a branch of any other subject: for to ascertain with accuracy even the proper meaning of words, not to talk of their figurative power, would require a large volume; an useful work indeed, but not to be attempted without a large ftock of time, ftudy, and reflection. This branch therefore of the fubject I humbly decline. Nor do I propofe to exhauft all the other beauties of language with respect to fignification: the reader, in a work like the prefent, cannot fairly expect more than a flight sketch of thofe that make the greatest figure. This talk I attempt the more willingly, as being connected with certain principles in human nature; and the rules I fhall have occafion to lay down, will, if I judge rightly, be agreeable illuftrations of thefe principles. Every fubject must be of importance that tends to unfold the human heart; for what other fcience is of greater use to human beings? ; The prefent fubject is too extenfive to be difcuffed without dividing it into parts; and what follows fuggefts a divifion into two parts. In every period, two things are to be regarded: firft, the words of which it is compofed; next, the arrangement of these words the former resembling the ftones that compofe a building, and the latter refembling the order in which they are placed. Hence the beauties of language with refpect to its meaning, may not improperly be diftinguished into two kinds: first, the beauties that arife from a right choice of words or materials for conftructing the period; and next, the beauties that arife from a due arrangement of thefe words or materials. begin with rules that direct us to a right choice of words, and then proceed to rules that concern their arrangement. And with respect to the former, communication of thought being the principal end of language, it is a rule, That perfpicuity ought not to be facrificed to any other beauty whatever; if it should be doubted whether perfpicuity fpicuity be a pofitive beauty, it cannot be doubted, that the want of it is the greatest defect. Nothing therefore in language ought more to be ftudied, than to prevent all obfcurity in the expreffion; for to have no meaning, is but one degree worfe than to have a meaning that is not understood. Want of perfpicuity from a wrong arrangement, belongs to the next branch. I thall here give a few examples where the obfcurity arifes from a wrong choice of words; and as this defect is too common in the ordinary herd of writers to make examples from them neceffary, I confine myself to the most celebrated authors. Livy, fpeaking of a rout after a battle, Multique in ruina majore quam fuga oppreffi obtruncatique. L. 4. § 46. This author is frequently obfcure by expreffing but part of his thought, leaving it to be completed by his reader. His defcription of the sea-fight, 7. 28. cap. 30. is extremely perplexed. Unde tibi reditum certo fubtemine Parcæ [Horace, epod. xiii. 22. Qui perfæpe cava teftudine flevit amorem, Non elaboratum ad pedem. [Horace, epod. xiv. 11. Me fabulofa Vulture in Appulo, Altricis extra linen Apuliæ, Ludo, fatigatumque fomno, Fronde nova puerum palumbes [Horace, Carm. 1. 3. ode 4. Puræ rivus aquæ, filvaque jugerum Paucorum, et fegetis certa fides meæ, Fulgentem imperio fertilis Africa Fallit forte beatior. [Horace, Carm. l. 3. ode 16. Cum fas atque nefas exiguo fine libidinuin Difcernunt avidi. Ac fpem fronte ferenat. [llorace, Carm. !. 1. ode 18. [Æneid. iv. 477 I am in greater pain about the foregoing paffages than about any I have ventured to criticise, being aware that a vague a vague or obfcure expreffion, is apt to gain favour with thole who neglect to examine it with a critical eye: to fome it carries that fenfe which they relish the most; and by fuggesting various meanings at once, it is admired by others as concife and comprehenfive: which by the way fairly accounts for the opinion generally entertained with refpect to moit languages in their infant ftate, of their expreffing much in few words. This obfervation cannot be better illuftrated than by a paffage from Quintilian, transcribed in the first volume for a different purpofe, and which is in the following words. At quæ Polycleto defuerunt, Phidiæ atque Alcameni dantur. Phidias tamen diis quam hominibus efficiendis melior artifex traditur: in ebore vero, longe citra æmu lum, vel fi nihil nifi Minervam Athenis, aut Olympium in Elide Jovem feciffet, cujus pulchritudo adjeciffe aliquid etiam receptæ religioni videtur; adeo majeftas operis. Deum æquavit. The fentence in the Italic characters appeared always to ine extremely expreffive, before I gave it peculiar attention. And yet if one examine it independent of the context, its proper meaning, is not what is intended: the words naturally import, that the beauty of the ftatues mentioned, appears to add fome new tenet or rite to the eftablished religion, or appears to add new dignity to it; and we must confult the context before we can gather the true meaning; which is, that the Greeks were confirmed in the belief of their established religion by these majestic ftatues, fo like real divinities. There is want of neatnefs even in an ambiguity fo flight as what arifes from the conftruction merely; as where the period commences with a member conceived to be in the nominative case, and which afterward is found to be in the accufative. Example: "Some e"motions more peculiarly connected with the fine arts, "I propofe to handle in feparate chapters *." Better thus: Some emotions more peculiarly connected with "the fine arts, are propofed to be handled in feparate chapters." 66. * Elements of Criticifm, vol. 1. p. 43. edit. 1. I add I add another error against perfpicuity; which I mention the rather because with fome writers it paffes for a beauty. It is the giving different names to the fame object, mentioned oftener than once in the fame period. Example: Speaking of the English adventurers who first attempted the conqueft of Ireland," and inftead of reclaiming the natives from their uncultivated manners, "they were gradually affimilated to the antient inhabi"tants, and degenerated from the cuftoms of their own "nation." From this mode of expreffion, one would think the author meant to distinguish the antient inhabitants from the natives; and we cannot difcover otherwife than from the fenfe, that these are only different names given to the fame object for the fake of variety. But perfpicuity ought never to be facrificed to any other beauty, which leads me to think that the paffage may be improved as follows: " and degenerating from the "cuftoms of their own nation, they were gradually af "fimilated to the natives, inftead of reclaiming them ❝from their uncultivated manners." The rule next in order, becaufe next in importance, is, That the language ought to correfpond to the fubject: heroic actions or fentiments require elevated language; tender fentiments ought to be expreffed in words foft and flowing; and plain language devoid of ornament, is adapted to fubjects grave and didactic. Language may be confidered as the drefs of thought; and where the one is not fuited to the other, we are fenfible of incongruity, in the fame manner as where a judge is dreffed like a fop, or a peafant like a man of quality. Where the impreffion made by the words refembles the impreffion made by the thought, the fimilar emotions mix fweetly in the mind, and double the pleasure *; but where the impreffions made by the thought and the words are diffimilar, the unnatural union they are forc 'd into is difagreeable t. This concordance between the thought and the words has been obferved by every critic, and is fo well undertood as not to require any illuftration. But there is a concordance concordance of a peculiar kind that has been scarcely touched in works of criticism, though it contributes greatly to neatnefs of compofition. It is what follows. In a thought of any extent, we feldom mifs to find fome parts intimately united, fome flightly, fome difjoined, and fome directly oppofed to each other. To find thefe conjunctions and disjunctions imitated in the expreffion, is a great beauty: because fuch imitation. makes the words concordant with the fenfe. This doc. trine may be illuftrated by a familiar example: when we have occafion to mention the intimate connection that the foul hath with the body, the expreffion ought to be, the foul and body; because the particle the, relative to both, makes a connection in the expreflion, refembling in fome degree the connection in the thought: but when the foul is diftinguished from the body, it is better to fay the foul and the body; because the disjunction in the words refembles the disjunction in the thought. I proceed to other examples, beginning with conjunctions. Conftituit agmen ; et expedire tela animofque, equi tibus juffis, &c. [Livy, l. 38. § 25. Here the words that exprefs the connected ideas are artificially connected by fubjecting them both to the regimen of one verb. And the two following are of the fame kind. Quum ex paucis quotidie aliqui eorum caderent aut vulnerarentur, et qui fuperarent, feffi et corporibus et animis effent, &c. [Livy, 1. 38. § 29. Poft acer Mneftheus adducto conftitit arcu, But to justify this artificial connection among the words, the ideas they exprefs ought to be intimately connected; for otherwife that concordance which is required between the fenfe and the expreffion will be impaired. In that view a paffage from Tacitus is exceptionable; where words that fignify ideas very little connected, are however forc'd into an artificial union. Here is the paffage : Germania omnis a Galliis, Rhætiifque, et Pannoniis, Rheno |