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CHAPTER XVIII.

Military Position of Europe-Lord Wellington forces the Passage of the Nivelle-places the Right of his Army beyond the Nive -Marshal Soult successively attacks the Left and Right of the Allies-is repulsed at both Points—the Army goes into Winter Cantonments-again moves forward-the Left blockades Bayonne--the Right forces the Passage of the Gaves of Mauleon and Oleron—gains a Victory over Marshal Soult at Ortheswho subsequently manœuvres to his Left-a Detachment of the Allies, in consequence, gain Possession of Bordeaux-the remainder manœuvre against Soult in the direction of Toulouse -attack and carry his Entrenched Position round that City -General Peace.

XVIII.

DURING the summer and autumn of 1813, the CHAP. military affairs of Europe underwent a complete change, and the French armies, heretofore so 1813. formidable, were beaten in every quarter. An armistice to negociate a peace, under the mediation of Austria, followed the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, in which the arrogant pretensions of Buonaparte proving that nothing less than the dictatorship of Europe would satisfy his ambition, the Emperor Francis, whose alliance had been that of temporary convenience and family interest, rather than cordial attachment, joined his forces to those of Russia and Prussia to limit the French empire to the boundary of

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CHAP. the Rhine. An outline of the military events which followed this decision may be traced in a few sentences.

1813.

Buonaparte had 250,000 men to support his pretensions; the allies to oppose them, a still greater number. The former made Dresden the pivot of his actions, stationing there his guard, his cavalry, and the élite of his troops, to the number of 70,000; the remainder of his force he divided into three armies, making face to Silesia in his front, towards Berlin on his left flank, and towards Bohemia on his right: Dresden, being thus a reserve and point of support to all his corps, and containing every thing he possessed in the shape of a depôt, was entrenched. His left army had the further support of the fortress of Magdeburg, and several well secured bridges over the Elbe; his right had no local advantages, and opposite to it the main force of the confederates assembled.

Early in August the Prussians seriously pressed the French troops in Silesia, which, inducing Buonaparte to march his reserves to their support, the allied main body, crossing the Elbe in Bohemia, attacked Dresden on the left of the river. Buonaparte, interrupted in his operations by intelligence of this movement, hastened back, and luckily arrived to succour the town at the moment the assailants were penetrating through its weak retrenchments. The confederated ar

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1813.

mies, foiled in this well-judged attempt, bivou- CHAP. acked in position from the river above to the river below the town, forming nearly a semicircle on the left bank, of seven miles periphery. The communications along this extensive front being every where bad and tedious and nearly impracticable in the centre, Buonaparte endeavoured, by a vigorous attack, separately to overwhelm one wing.

Having detached 30,000 men to cross the Elbe about fifteen miles above Dresden, and take post in rear of the right flank of the confederates, he attacked them in front with his main body. In person he was successful, completely beating back those opposed to him; but not pressing the retiring force, they proved too powerful for the corps detached to their rear, which, attempting to stop their retreat, was, after a short combat, made prisoners. A variety of minor affairs, generally successful, followed, with the French corps in Buonaparte's front and on his left flank; nevertheless he remained obstinately stationary at Dresden, wearing away his troops with attempts to make head on each point, till at length the allies, having completed their arrangements, decided to unite their forces in his rear. Having drawn their separated armies together, into two bodies, one marched from Prussia by the French left, the other from Bohemia by their right; and on the

CHAP. 15th October were within a few miles of effectXVIII. ing their junction at Leipzig, when Buonaparte 1813. interposed between them, having remained till

the last moment at Dresden, and ultimately leaving there above 30,000 men. His little care of his troops, and his losses in battle, added to 70,000 locked up in various garrisons, had reduced his forces to 170,000 combatants. He endeavoured, with 25,000 men, to check the march of the corps of the allies advancing from Prussia, whilst with the remainder of his army, he attacked the other. This manœuvre, which had so frequently given him victory when tried on a great scale, and by a wide movement, failed of effect when the two corps were within a few hours march of each other: the operations of his main body promised success; but his weak defensive corps being forced back on Leipzig, his only passage over the Elster, he was paralysed in his exertions, and finally obliged to retrograde to preserve his communications. The main body of the allies pressed around him in overpowering numbers, and the Saxons quitted his ranks retreat could not be attempted in day-light, from the numberless obstacles in his rear, and he had to contend for existence till night, when about two-thirds of his force filed through the town, the remainder surrendering prisoners the following morning on being attacked. The premature explosion of a bridge

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