XV.

theless very great; during the whole of the CHAP. retreat from Christoval, the weather was extremely inclement, the roads excessively deep, 1812. and the supply of provisions irregular.—Sir R. Hill's corps more particularly suffered from the latter cause; whilst at Madrid their line of supply was along the valley of the Tagus, and the arrangements for changing its direction having miscarried, the soldiers, left without extraneous resources or money, were in great measure indebted for sustenance to the sweet acorn, with which the country abounds.

On the 18th, head-quarters entered Ciudad Rodrigo, and so soon afterwards as it could be ascertained that the French armies had retired from the Tormes, the troops were put into extended winter cantonments, the left being retired to Lamego, and the right thrown sufficiently forward to hold the pass of Bejar.

This was the most important campaign of the war, as it decidedly changed the relative feelings and strength of the contending parties. Duly to appreciate its merit, it must be recollected that the military means of Spain were never before or subsequently at so low an ebb. The French forces, including those which entered during the summer, exceeded 190,000, and were formidable beyond their actual numbers from the confidence and skill acquired in twenty years of general success. They were moreover

CHAP. in possession of all the fortresses on the line of XV. operations, and commanded by officers of the 1812. highest reputation. The amount of the British

and Portugueze, including every reinforcement, fell short of 75,000: a portion of which, acting against the general mass, and in actual collision, at various periods, with 130,000 of the French, captured and retained possession of two of the fortresses, and liberated all the southern provinces of Spain; being incontrovertible proof of superiority of tactic and combination, as well as of prowess.

Difficulties nearly amounting to physical impossibilities were to be overcome before subsistence could be obtained for a greater superiority of numbers to oppose to the allies; while the assistance of the Spaniards could not but increase in value from their more extended territory. It has, therefore, only to be granted that man and nature should remain unchanged, to feel assured that whatever might have been the fate of the rest of continental Europe, the subjugation of the Peninsula was no longer to be apprehended after the operations of 1812.

CHAPTER XVI.

Lord Wellington advances into Spain-turns the line of the Douro-manœuvres the French back on Vitoria-defeats them in a general Action-drives them beyond the Pyrenees-blockades Pamplona and besieges St. Sebastian-fails in assaulting the breaches made in the latter place.-The French make a great effort to succour Pamplona-are defeated in a succession of Actions in the Pyrenees.-The town of St. Sebastian carried by storm-the French defeated in an attempt to succour the castle-it surrenders-the left of the Allied Army crosses the Bidassoa-Pamplona surrenders at discretion.

XVI.

DURING the winter cantonments the most un- CHAP. remitting attention was paid to restore the discipline and organization of the army, prepara- 1813. tory to renewed exertion. Various changes were made in its equipments and accompaniments, tending equally to convenience and efficiency. Tents were provided to shelter the men in their bivouacs, and a pontoon train was fitted out for the passage of the rivers, and to enable the columns to act off the great road.

It was now felt by England that the moment was arrived for putting forth her full strength> reinforcements of every description, but more particularly of cavalry, were promptly sent out;

XVI.

1813.

CHAP. the artillery carriages were all replaced, and 1,300 fresh horses added to their establishment. The Portugueze battalions were also completed. No hostile movement took place on either side during the winter, except an attempt made by the French to surprise the post at Bejar, the garrison of which having timely notice of their approach, were on the alert, and in a moment repelled the assailants. The progress of these arrangements was therefore uninterrupted, and in the spring of 1813 the army formed a superb body of 65,000 infantry, and 6,500 cavalry.

App. 15.

The Cortes of Spain, enlightened by the events of the last campaign, and become sensible of the weakness of ranking national pride above the real interests of their country, conferred, in the month of December, the rank and authority of Generalissimo of the Spanish forces on Lord Wellington, who, in a personal conference with the administration at Cadiz, arranged that he should in the next campaign have the active co-operation of 50,000 Spanish troops. The principal divisions to be the army of Galicia under General Giron; a corps under General Freyre; the troops of Morillo, and a force to be organized in Andalusia, as an army of reserve, under the Condé de Bispal.*

* So scanty, however, were the resources of the Spanish government, that Lord Wellington found himself under the ne

XVI.

Thus the united strength of the Peninsula was CHAP. placed in hands capable of wielding it, at the moment when the resources of France were greatly diminished, and her powerful empire shaken to its very centre. Buonaparte, soon

after the opening of the last campaign, carried 400,000 men into the heart of Russia to enforce compliance with his system for regulating the commerce of the world: he pushed on with presumptuous confidence to Moscow, 300 leagues beyond the Vistula, without magazines, without an army of support, or even retaining possession of the country through which he passed, expecting to dictate peace as soon as lodged in the palace of the Czars; but the Russian generals delivering up their ancient capital a prey to the flames, and refusing to enter into any communication with him, he found his expectations thwarted. Unable to carry the war farther forward, and unwilling to confess his disappointment, he lingered so long in a state of inaction, that winter broke in upon his retreat, and the majority of his troops miserably perished by its inclemency, or threw themselves upon the humanity of their pursuers to escape its effects; Napoleon, himself, with only a single attendant, flying into Poland.

cessity of supporting the corps under Morillo during the whole campaign, and the army under General Giron for a considerable period of it.

1813.