Mart or reprisal. Which circuit of remedy promised nothing but endless and fruitless delay, in regard that the first degree prescribed was never likely to be effected: it being so wild a chase, as to serve process upon the wrong doer in foreign parts. Wherefore his Lordship said that it must be the remedy of state, and not the remedy of statute, that must do good in this case; which useth to proceed by certificates, attestations, and other means of information; not depending upon a privy seal to be served upon the party, whom haply they must seek out in the West Indies.

For the danger of the remedy, his Lordship directed our considerations to take notice of the proportions of the merchants' goods in either kingdom: as that the stock of goods of the Spaniard which is within his Majesty's power and distress, is a trifle; whereas the stock of English goods in Spain is a mass of mighty value. So as if this course of letters of Mart should be taken to satisfy a few hot pursuitors here, all the goods of the English subjects in Spain shall be exposed to seizure and arrest, and we have little or nothing in our hands on this side to mend ourselves upon. And thus much (Mr. Speaker) is that which I have collected out of that excellent speech, concerning the first main part; which was, the consideration of the petition as it proceeded from the merchants.

There followeth the second part, considering the petition as it was offered in this house. Wherein his Lordship, after an affectionate commemoration of the gravity, capacity, and duty, which he generally found in the proceedings of this house, desired us nevertheless to consider with him, how it was possible that the entertaining of petitions concerning private injuries, and of this nature, could avoid these three inconveniences: the first, of injustice; the second, of derogation from his Majesty's supreme and absolute power of concluding war or peace; and the third, of some prejudice in reason of estate.

For injustice, it is plain, and cannot be denied, that we hear but the one part: whereas the rule, Audi alteram partem, is not of the formality, but of the essence of justice; which is therefore figured with both eyes shut, and both ears open; because she should hear both sides, and respect neither. So that if we should hap to give a right judgment, it mought be justum, but not juste, without hearing both parties.

For the point of derogation, his Lordship said he knew well we were no less ready to acknowledge than himself, that the crown of England was ever invested, amongst other prerogatives not disputable, of an absolute determination and power of concluding and making war and peace: which that it was no new dotation but of an ancient foundation in the crown, he would recite unto us a number of precedents in the reigns of several kings, and chiefly of those kings which come nearest his Majesty's own worthiness: wherein he said that he would not put his credit upon cyphers and dates, because it was easy to mistake the year of a reign, or number of a roll, but he would avouch them in substance to be perfect and true, as they are taken out of the records. By which precedents it will appear, that petitions made in parliament to kings of this realm his Majesty's progenitors, intermeddling with matter of war or peace, or inducement thereunto, received small allowance or success; but were always put off with dilatory answers; sometimes referring the matter to their counsel, sometimes to their letters, sometimes to their further pleasure and advice, and such other forms; expressing plainly that the kings meant to reserve matter of that nature entirely to their own power and pleasure.

In the eighteenth year of King Edward the first, complaint was made by the Commons, against the subjects of the Earl of Flanders, with petition of redress. The King's answer was, Rex nil aliud potest, quam eodem modo petere: that is, that the King could do no more but make request to the Earl of Flanders, as request had been made to him; and yet nobody will imagine but King Edward the first was potent enough to have had his reason of a Count of Flanders by a war; and yet his answer was, nihil aliud potest; as giving them to understand that the entering into a war was a matter transcendent, that must not depend upon such controversies.

In the fourteenth year of King Edward the third, the Commons petitioned, that the King would enter into certain covenants and capitulations with the duke of Brabant; in which petition there was also inserted somewhat touching a money matter: The king's answer was, that for that that concerned the monies, they mought handle it and examine it, but touching the peace he would do as to himself seemed good.

In the eighteenth year of King Edward the third, the Com

mons petitioned that they might have the trial and proceeding with certain merchants strangers as enemies to the state: The King's answer was, It should remain as it did till the King had taken further order.

In the forty-fifth year of King Edward the third the Commons complained that their trade with the Easterlings was not upon equal terms, (which is one of the points insisted upon in the present petition,) and prayed an alteration and reducement: The King's answer was, It shall so be as occasion shall require.

In the fiftieth year of the same King, the Commons petitioned to the King for remedy against the subjects of Spain, as they now do The King's answer was, that he would write his letter for remedy. Here is letters of request, no letters of mart: Nihil potest nisi eodem modo petere.

In the same year, the merchants of York petitioned in parliament against the Hollanders, and desired their ships mought be stayed both in England and at Calais: The King's answer was, let it be declared to the King's Counsel, and they shall have such remedy as is according to reason.

In the second year of King Richard II. the merchants of the sea-coast did complain of divers spoils upon their ships and goods by the Spaniard: The King's answer was, that with the advice of his counsel he would procure remedy.

His Lordship cited two other precedents; the one in the second year of King Henry IV. of a petition against the merchants of Genoua; the other, in the eleventh year of King Henry VI. of a petition against the merchants of the Still-yard; which I omit, because they contain no variety of answer.

His Lordship further cited two precedents concerning other points of prerogative, which are likewise flowers of the crown; the one, touching the King's supremacy ecclesiastical, the other touching the order of weights and measures. The former of them was in the time of King Richard II. at what time the Commons complained against certain encroachments and usurpations of the Pope; and the King's answer was, the King hath given order to his Counsel to treat with the bishops thereof. The other was in the eighteenth year of King Edward the first, at which time complaint was made against uneven weights and the King's answer was, Vocentur partes ad placita regis, et fiat justitia; whereby it appeared that the Kings of this realm still

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used to refer causes petitioned in parliament to the proper places of cognizance and decision. But for matter of war and peace, as appears in all the former precedents, the Kings ever kept it in scrinio pectoris, in the shrines of their own breast, assisted and advised by their Counsel of estate: inasmuch as his Lordship did conclude his enumeration of precedents with a notable precedent in the seventeenth year of King Richard II. a prince of no such glory nor strength; and yet when he made offer to the Commons in Parliament that they should take into their considerations matter of war and peace then in hand, the Commons in modesty excused themselves, and answered, the Commons will not presume to treat of so high a charge. Out of all which precedents his Lordship made this inference, that as die s diem docet, so by these examples wise men will be admonished to forbear those petitions to princes, which are not likely to have either a welcome hearing, or an effectual answer.

And for prejudice that might come of handling and debating matter of war and peace in parliament, he doubted not but that the wisdom of this house did conceive upon what secret considerations and motives that point did depend. For that there is no King which will providently and maturely enter into a war, but will first balance his own forces, seek to anticipate confederacies and alliances, revoke his merchants, find an opportunity of the first breach, and many other points, which, if they once do but take wind, will prove vain and frustrate. And therefore that this matter, which is arcanum imperii, one of the highest, must be suffered to be kept within the veil; his Lordship adding, that he knew not well whether in that which he had already said out of an extreme desire to give us satisfaction, he had not communicated more particulars than perhaps was requisite. Nevertheless he confessed that sometimes parliaments had been made acquainted with matter of war and peace in a generality; but it was upon one of these two motives; when the King and Counsel conceived that either it was material to have some declaration of the zeal and affection of the people, or else when the King needed to demand moneys and aids for the charge of the wars. Wherein if things did sort to war, we were sure enough to hear of it: his Lordship hoping that his Majesty should find in us no less readiness to support it than to persuade it.

Now (Mr. Speaker) for the last part, wherein his Lordship

considered the petition as it was recommended from us to the upper house, his Lordship delivered thus much from their Lordships; that they would make a good construction of our desires, as those which they conceived did rather spring out of a feeling of the King's strength and out of a feeling of the subjects' wrongs, nay more out of a wisdom and depth to declare our forwardness, if need were, to assist his Majesty's future resolutions (which declaration might be of good use for his Majesty's service, when it should be blown abroad); rather, I say, than that we did in any sort determine by this our overture, to do that wrong to his highness' supreme power, which haply might be inferred by those that were rather apt to make evil than good illations of our proceedings. And yet that their Lordships, for the reasons before made, must plainly tell us, that they neither could nor would concur with us, nor approve the course; and therefore concluded that it would not be amiss for us, for our better contentment, to behold the conditions of the last peace with Spain, which were of a strange nature to him that duly observes them; no forces recalled out of the Low Countries; no new forces (as to voluntaries) restrained to go thither: so as the King may be in peace, and never a subject in England but may be in war: and then to think thus with ourselves, that that King, which would give no ground in making his peace, will not lose any ground upon just provocation to enter into an honourable war. And that in the mean time we should know thus much, that there could not be more forcible negociation on the King's part, but blows, to procure remedy of these wrongs; nor more fair promises of the King of Spain's part, to give contentment concerning the same; and therefore that the event must be expected.

And thus (Mr. Speaker) have I passed over the speech of this worthy Lord, whose speeches, as I have often said, in regard of his place and judgment, are extraordinary lights to this house; and have both the properties of light, that is, conducting and comforting. And although (Mr. Speaker) a man would have thought nothing had been left to be said, yet I shall now give you account of another speech, full of excellent matter and ornaments, and without iteration. Which nevertheless I shall report more compendiously, because I will not offer the speech

The MS. has their. But they has been corrected into we in the line before, and their into our, three lines further on.