CHAP. December. mangordo and Miravete, was to cut off the retreat of his whole division. To prevent this he ordered all the artillery, except 1808. four pieces, which formed a battery on the left of the bridge, to retire with the main force to Jaraicejo, for which place he himself set off at midnight with his Aide-de-camps and the cavalry, leaving three companies in charge of the remaining battery under Captain Don Xavier de Hore. This officer was attacked on the following morning by the French; the battery was illplaced, and Hore perceived that the ammunition-carts were within reach of the enemy's fire. He ordered them to be removed behind a bank which would shelter them; . . the muleteers were no sooner out of his sight, than they cut the traces, and fled with their beasts, imitating the conduct of some infantry who took to flight. The enemy soon made themselves masters of the bridge and the battery, and secured some prisoners, . . though but few; for before the French could lay planks over the broken bridge, and pass in sufficient number, most of the Spaniards effected their escape, and afterwards rejoined the General at Miajadas. Dispersion of his army. Galluzo's first thought was to make a stand at Jaraicejo, and with this intent he dispatched orders to General Henestrosa to join him from Truxillo with all the troops which he had collected, and requested the Junta to supply him with as large a force of armed peasantry as possible. But no sooner did he learn that the bridge of Almaraz had been forced, than he gave up this purpose, and resolved to fall back upon Truxillo, apprehending that the enemy might intercept his retreat. His apprehension degenerated into panic, when false intelligence was brought him that the French had entered Deleitosa, a village something less than eight miles to the south-east. This intelligence was followed by other reports equally false and more alarming, which the knavish and the traitorous invented, and the fearful and the suspicious XIV. December. easily believed. The retreat had been begun in perfect order, CHAP. but the army before it reached Truxillo was in a state of total disorganization. Galluzo, confounded at the first approach of 1808. danger, (for if he had deliberately resolved to attempt resistance, the pass of Miravete would have been the place which he would have chosen, after. the bridge was forced,) called a council of war; it was agreed that the defence of Extremadura was no longer possible, and that he should retreat into Andalusia. A chapel, which had been converted into a powder magazine, was now blown up, that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy. The explosion, and the preparations which were made for further flight, excited the utmost terror in the inhabitants of Truxillo, and their lamentations increased the confusion and alarm of the soldiers. It now became a rout;.. most of the troops deserted, plundering the towns and villages through which they passed. Those who still followed the General were no longer under any restraint; they went through Miajadas, Medellin, and Quintania, and in four days reached Zalamea, above an hundred miles from Jaraicejo. Here it had been appointed to halt, and here Galluzo found himself with not more than a thousand men. Nothing could be worse than the conduct of the men during their flight; ..some sold their muskets, . . some threw them away,.. houses were broken open, and upon one individual a piece of church plate was found, . .. a species of robbery which excites peculiar horror in Spain. The officers, instead of endeavouring to restrain these excesses, were some of them active themselves in pillage ; it is probable, indeed, that had they done their duty, the men would have discharged theirs; for those officers to whom the more difficult task of bringing off the artillery had been entrusted, and who were therefore picked men, effected their object: though without an escort, they lost only two pieces of cannon, and carried seventeen to Miajadas,.. from whence part VOL. I. 5 D CHAP. were sent to Badajoz, the rest followed Galluzo to Zalamea. XIV. Trias also effected a far more dangerous retreat than his com1808. mander in good order. He set forward from Castanar for FresDecember. nedoso, and when within a mile of the place, learnt that the French were there, having won the bridge of Almaraz. He had now to tread back his steps, and endeavour to reach Jaraicejo. After a day's march he found that the French were there also, and making for Truxillo, again discovered the enemy in possession of the place to which he was bound. Nevertheless he preserved discipline in his little troop, and that preserved confidence; instead of losing his men by desertion, he collected stragglers as he went, and arrived at Zalamea with a larger force than Galluzo himself had brought there. Galluzo is superseded Before the incapacity of Galluzo was thus decidedly maniby Cuesta. fested, it had been in agitation to remove him from the command, and appoint Cuesta in his place. This General, as an arrested person, followed the Junta on their retreat from Aranjuez. It so happened, that while he was at Merida, some soldiers belonging to the scattered army of Extremadura gathered together in that city, and the owner of the house in which Cuesta lodged persuaded them to demand him for their leader, as it were by, acclamation. The Junta of Merida upon this sent up a representation to the Central Junta, requesting that Cuesta might be appointed to the command. It was replied, that this ought not to be done without the approbation of the Junta of Badajoz, which had made such signal exertions in the patriotic cause, and was not willing to supersede Galluzo, whom it had appointed. But now, after this disorderly flight, he was immediately deprived of the command, and put under arrest, and Cuesta was nominated to succeed him. Cuesta's errors were overlooked, because no doubt of his motives was entertained; and at a time when the cry of treachery once raised against a commander was very XIV. sufficient to break up an army, it was an object of considerable CHAP. importance to find a leader in whom the men would confide. At this moment the whole of Extremadura to the walls 1808. of Badajoz was open to the enemy, and the Junta trembled December. for Seville. Brigadier Don Josef Serrano Valdenebro was sent with as many men as he could collect to guard Santa Olaya and El Ronquillo, in the western passes of the Sierra Morena, and co-operate with Cuesta in covering Andalusia on that side. These means of defence would have been as ineffectual as they were feeble, if Buonaparte had not thought it of more importance at this time to drive the English out of Spain, than to pursue his victories in the south. CHAPTER XV. 1808. Buonaparte reproaches letin. insults Madrid, Dec. 18. CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER SIR JOHN MOORE. In all the bulletins and proclamations of Buonaparte the and English were held up to the Spaniards for indignation and conthe English. tempt; they were a people, he said, who fomented war every 14th Bul- where, and distributed arms like poison, but who shed their own blood only for their own direct interest. At this time it is proGazeta de bable that he sincerely despised the English as a military nation. Can any thing be more ridiculous, it was asked, than that EngDo. Dec. 24. land should pretend to struggle with her land forces against France? she will realize the fable of the frog swelling itself to rival the ox, till it burst. "The day," said Buonaparte," wherein we succeed in seeing these English will be a day of jubilee for the French army. Oh, that they may dye with their blood this continent, which they have desolated with their intrigues, their monopolies, and their frightful selfishness! Oh, that they might be met with to the number of 80,000 or 100,000 men instead of 20,000! that English mothers might feel the evils of war, and the English government cease to sport with the lives and blood 12th Bul- of the continental nations. All the evils, all the plagues, which can afflict the human race, come from London." He represented the Spaniards as complaining that the English had given them arms, powder, and clothing, but had sent troops only to excite them, lead them astray, and forsake them in the hour of danger, 4th Bulletin. letin. 14th Bulletin. |