XII. beginning so glorious, and facilitate the ruin of Spain. This CHAP. they were endeavouring to guard against, protesting, before God and man, that they wrote nothing but what was dictated by 1808. the love of their country, being ready to hear the opinions of other provinces, and to amend their own errors, whenever it should be shown that they had committed any. The chief care should be to avoid whatever might serve to sow disunion: of this nature were all discussions concerning the royal house, and the order of succession in the different families which derived a right from it. The laws upon this point were well known; but are we, said they, in a situation to talk of this? Long live King Ferdinand VII. and his august brothers, heirs of the crown after his attested decease! Why anticipate inquiries which could only be necessary in default of them? The second question which agitated the people was of a different nature.. Was there a necessity for creating a supreme government, which should unite the sovereign authority of all the provinces, till the restitution of Ferdinand to his throne? From the beginning they had been persuaded such a government was by all means necessary. Many Juntas and many military commanders had expressed their conviction of this truth,..a conviction arising from the necessity in every nation of a civil government, to which the military may be subordinate. Spain, deriving wisdom from history, had never thought of appointing a dictator. Her generals (and the fact was most honourable to the Spanish name) had been the first to acknowledge a system of things as ancient in Spain as the monarchy itself. The confidence of the people in the Supreme Juntas, the abundance with which pecuniary resources had been placed at their disposal, the heroic loyalty wherewith the army had obeyed them, and the happy issue, thus far, of their civil administration, and of the military enterprises which they had directed, placed in the most VOL. I. 4 K CHAP. conspicuous light, and established, beyond all doubt, this fundaXII. mental truth, and most essential political principle. But who 1808. was to create this supreme civil government? Who were to compose it? Where should be its place of residence? What the extent of its authority? How might it be established, without producing disunion among the different provinces? These were the important questions to be examined. It had been said that the Cortes ought to assemble, that the Council of Castille should convoke them, and the whole proceedings be executed under the authority of that tribunal. But the Council of Castille never possessed the right of convoking the Cortes,.. why then should they give it that authority? Was it because it had lent the whole weight of its influence to the usurpation? Because it had acted in opposition to those fundamental laws which it was established to preserve and defend? Because it had afforded the enemy every facility to usurp the sovereignty of Spain, to destroy the hereditary succession of the crown, and the dynasty legally in possession? Because it had recognized and seated on the throne a foreigner, destitute even of the shadow of a title to it? What confidence could the Spanish nation place in a government convoked by an authority incompetent, illegal, and guilty of acts which might justly be ranked with the most atrocious crimes against their country? But the Council of Castille being thus excluded from all consideration, who was to convoke the Cortes? It was the peculiar and exclusive prerogative of the King to summon them; the provinces would not submit to any other authority; they would not unite thus, therefore, there would be no Cortes, or, if a few deputies were to assemble, that very circumstance would occasion divisions, the very evil which all were anxious to avoid. The kingdom found itself suddenly without a king and without a government,.. a situation unknown in its history, and to its laws. XII. The people legally resumed the power of appointing a govern- CHAP. ment. They created Juntas without any regard to the cities which had votes in the Cortes. The legitimate power was there- 1808. fore deposited with the Juntas: in virtue of that power they had governed, and still were governing, and had been, and still were, universally acknowledged and obeyed. Their situation had not changed; the danger still existed; no new authority had supervened: the lawful authority resided entire in the Juntas to which the people had confided it. It was therefore incontestable that the sole and exclusive right of electing those who were to compose the supreme government was vested in the supreme Juntas. And whom should they elect? Most certainly individuals of their own body; for they alone derived their power from the people, and in them the nation had reposed entire confidence. Hence, if there were any province in which the military power subsisted alone, it was absolutely necessary that a supreme Junta should be constituted there, by which the people might act; this being indispensable, in order to concentrate the legitimate power of the people; for, under present circumstances, the government could not be legitimate, unless it originated in their free consent. The Junta of Seville was therefore of opinion that the Juntas, meeting on the same day, should each elect, from its own members, two deputies; and the persons so elected, from that moment, be acknowledged as governors-general of the kingdom. The supreme Juntas ought nevertheless to be continued till the termination of the present state of things, being invested with the internal management of their respective provinces, but under due subordination to the general government. They ought to give instructions to their deputies constituting that government, and it would be the duty of those deputies to observe them, and to represent and support the claims of their provinces, as far as was consistent with the public weal. If there were one supreme CHAP. of the Royal Family capable of presiding in the supreme goXII. vernment, he, and no other, ought to be appointed to that 1808. office; but if there were no person of the royal blood, then it must elect a president from its own body; and, to obviate all danger, the presidency should be only for such limited time as might seem best. The Juntas would appoint a place for the seat of government, which the government might afterwards change, if it should see cause. It ought to be at a distance from the dangers of war, and to possess other local advantages. Seville possessed those advantages, but had no anxiety to be selected, and willingly sacrificed her claims. The Junta of that city would, however, frankly state, that, in their opinion, La Mancha was most convenient for the seat of government, and, especially, either the city of Ciudad-Real, or Almagro. But this point was to be decided by the free choice of the supreme Juntas. The paper concluded with a brief and dignified recapitulation of what the Junta of Seville had done for their country, disclaiming, on their part, any affectation or desire of superiority, and declaring, that whatever they had done was no more than their indispensable duty. The Provincial sent to it. The general opinion was undoubtedly in favour of the plan Juntas as of government thus recommended; and it is no light proof of its fitness, that schemes the same in principle and effect should have been suggested by persons who had no communication with each other, and whose views were in other respects so different. There were many in England who thought it would have been better to have at once convoked the Cortes, in the supposition that there was more resemblance between the Cortes and the English parliament than had ever really existed, and in the generous but mistaken hope that vigorous measures might be expected from a free legislative assembly. The best and wisest of the Spaniards wished also for a Cortes, and looked to it for such XII. judicious reforms as were conformable to the constitutional prin- CHAP. ciples of the monarchy, and suited to the habits and feelings of the nation. But they saw that many points must be determined 1808. before the manner of assembling the Cortes could be adjusted, and that the necessity of forming a central government was immediate and urgent. The plan therefore which the Junta of Seville proposed was assented to without opposition. Still it was a great object with many of the provincial Juntas to retain their power. That of Valencia drew up secret rules for its deputies, declaring that they were to follow the direction of their constituents, remain subject and obedient to them, communicate regularly with them, and in no instance depart from their instructions; and they reserved to themselves the power of displacing their deputies at pleasure. This paper was made public; and it was known that other Juntas, that of Seville in particular, had pursued the same mischievous course. The Junta of Seville, however, did worse than this. In electing its deputies it chose two persons so notoriously unworthy of such a trust, that the only motives which could be assigned for the choice were a desire of being rid of them, or an opinion that they would submit to any terms for the sake of the appointment. D. Vicente Hore was the one; he had been a creature of Godoy's, and was so sensible of the estimation in which he was held, that he declined the charge, knowing his life would be in danger if he appeared in Madrid, where it was of course expected that the Central Junta would assemble. D. Juan de Vera y Delgado, titular Archbishop of Laodicea, and coadjutor of Seville, was then chosen in his place; and this was an unexceptionable choice. It was hoped and expected that Tilly, the other member, would follow Hore's example, in declining an appointment for which he was equally disqualified; but Tilly was of a bolder stamp. A blasted character had not prevented him from obtaining great popularity at Seville; and being utterly regardless Unworthy choice of the Junta of Seville. |