XI. August. was about to land, in Mondego Bay. Arriving off the Tagus on CHAP. the 19th, he was informed by Sir Charles Cotton, that Sir Arthur was proceeding along the coast. It was not Sir Hew's wish to 1808. supersede that General in a detached command for which he had been particularly chosen, especially when he was now completely engaged in an enterprise from which it was impossible to recede, and which required all his ability to accomplish. Under these feelings, therefore, the Commander-in-Chief resolved to proceed to Mondego Bay, and there join the expected reinforcements when they should land, leaving Sir Arthur meantime to pursue and complete his own plan. Seeing, however, on the way a number of ships under the land, and receiving a vague account of the action at Roliça from a sloop of war, he sent an aide-decamp on shore for intelligence, ordering him to inform Sir Arthur, if he chanced to see him, that he was proceeding to fall in with Sir Harry Burrard and the main body, and that though he wished to be informed of his proceedings, he did not mean to interfere with his command. This was on the evening of the 21st; about midnight the boat returned, bringing intelligence of the battle, and that Sir Harry Burrard was in command. There was now no room for that delicacy toward Sir Arthur, as honourable as it was judicious, which he had resolved to observe. His determination was immediately taken, and in the morning the frigate stood in for the shore. the army to Aug. 22. None of the official accounts which Sir Arthur had addressed He orders to him had been received; he landed therefore with no other advance. information than what had been thus gathered upon the way, and entirely unacquainted with the actual state of the French army. When he reached the beach they were embarking the wounded for Porto: during the whole night the sailors had been thus employed, wading nearly up to the middle in the sea, and displaying as much humanity as skill. Arriving at Vimeiro, he XI. August. CHAP. found the army on the ground which it had occupied the day before, the dead lying on the field, and the carts still busy in 1808. removing the wounded. That ground had not been chosen as a military position, but merely as a halting-place, and it was now necessary to remove from it, because of the late action. Sir Hew therefore gave orders for marching the next morning at daybreak toward Lisbon by way of Mafra. Like his predecessor, he thought that Sir Arthur had entered upon a hazardous operation, which, unless it obtained complete success, must end in complete ruin, the British having no prospect of support, nor any thing upon which to fall back in case of disaster, so that on their part the battle would be fought for existence, while the enemy, in case of defeat, would lose only what were killed or taken. But he differed from Sir Harry Burrard in this, that he deemed it imprudent to wait for Sir John Moore's division, the arrival of which was extremely uncertain, and that he saw the necessity of pursuing active measures. The French, he knew, must either give him battle, for the sake of defending Lisbon, (a chance which he was willing to take, though they were superior in cavalry, and, as he thought, in numbers, and though they would have the great advantage of choosing their ground;) or they would cross the Tagus. Kellermann arrives to armistice. Soon after mid-day an alarm was given that the enemy propose an were advancing to renew the attack; the position was taken as on the preceding morning. It proved to be a body of cavalry with a flag of truce; and General Kellermann alighting at head-quarters, proposed an armistice, for the purpose of concluding a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. Sir Hew immediately called for his two predecessors. He himself had no means of knowing, but from them, what the consequences of yesterday's battle really had been; the responsibility was his, but for the information upon which the agreement XI. was to be founded, he trusted to them, and more especially to CHAP. Sir Arthur. That General's plans had been completely defeated by the refusal to follow up the victory, and by the change which 1808. Sir Harry Burrard, before he landed, had made in the intended August. destination of Sir John Moore's corps. Considering, therefore, that in consequence of these errors the enemy had been allowed leisure to resume a formidable position between the British army and Lisbon, and could not now by any increase of the British numbers be prevented from crossing the Tagus, and occupying in strength the strong place of Elvas, with its stronger fort La Lippe, and Almeida; that the Tagus would not for some time longer be open to the fleet, the army meantime depending upon the ships for supplies, and that its communication with them by the coast must at that season be most precarious: considering also how important it was that the troops should not be delayed by regular sieges in Portugal, but march as soon as possible into Spain, he thought it expedient that the French should be allowed to evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, and that every facility for this purpose should be afforded them. They occupied at that time, in a military point of view, he thought, the whole of Portugal, having every strong hold in their hands their present situation enabled them still to avail themselves of those possessions, and to strengthen them as they might think proper; and he was of opinion that an army which had its retreat open, and possessed such advantages, had a fair claim to be allowed such terms. He wished, however, to limit the suspension of arms to eight-and-forty hours. Sir Hew preferred that it should be unlimited, as it had been proposed; in this he had a view to the disembarkation of Sir John Moore's corps, which was not forbidden by the agreement. Terms of An armistice accordingly for the purpose of negotiating a the armi stice. VOL. I. 4 D CHAP. definitive convention was concluded upon * these terms: That XI. the river Sisandre should be the line of demarcation between the 1808. two armies, and that neither of them should occupy Torres Vedras; that the English general should bind himself to com August. * It is asserted by General Thiebault, that General Kellermann was sent to feel his ground, under pretext of a conference relating to the prisoners and wounded. Upon that General's return he says, "On conçoit de quel interét étoient les nouvelles qu'il rapportoit, et combien elles parurent heureuses quand on sut à quel point il avoit réalisé tout ce qu'on avoit pu esperer. Il avoit été reçu avec la plus grande distinction; il avoit eu le talent de faire prendre aux Anglais l'initiative des propositions qu'il avoit à leur faire; sachant parfaitement l' Anglais, il avoit suivi la partie la plus mysterieuse de leurs conversations; il s'étoit fortifié de la certitude que, malgré l'énormité de leurs avantages, les Anglais, incertains de l'epoque de l'arrivée des renforts, qu'ils attendoient, n'étoient pas tranquilles sur leur position: il étoit parvenu à traiter pour la flotte Russe en même temps que pour l'armée Française, et cela en faisant pressenter que les Russes alloient se joindre à nous: il étoit arrivé de cette manière à demander même que nous émmenassions la flotte Portuguese, non pour l'obtenir, mais afin d'avoir quelque chose à céder, dans le cas où des articles d'une haute importance seroient trop contestés; et c'est ainsi, que par autant d'habilité que de fermeté et d'adresse, il parvint à conclure et à signer un traité provisoire. This statement is sent into the world with General Kellermann's sanction, Baron Thiebault's Relation having, as the preface states, been read to him. General Kellermann was so successful in this negotiation, that he can derive no additional credit from these additions to the plain facts. With regard to the initiative, he came declaredly to treat for an armistice preparatory to a convention for evacuating Portugal, and he produced a paper containing the wishes of the French Commander-inchief; the deliberations upon his proposal, which he is said to have overheard, were not carried on in his presence, but in an inner room. (Proceedings upon the Inquiry, p. 57.) As to the demand that the French might carry away the Portugueze fleet, the French are certainly bold askers; and in this negotiation, as in many others, they proved that Fortune favours the bold; .. but he must have been more than bold, who could have made such a proposal. What was afterwards asked upon that score will appear hereafter. + Voici quelques-unes des phrases qu'il recueillit: Notre position est delicate-Le corps de Sir John Moore n'est pas encore arrivé à Figuieres-La bonne intelligence des Russes et des Français doit nous donner des inquietudes, &c. prehend the armed Portugueze in the truce, and that their line CHAP. of demarcation should be from Leiria to Thomar: that it was XI. agreed that the French army should in no case be considered 1808. as prisoners of war; that all the individuals of it should be August. transported to France with their arms and baggage and private property, and that they should be deprived of no part of it whatsoever that no individual, whether Portugueze, Frenchman, or of a nation allied to France, should be molested for his political conduct, but be protected, both in person and property, and have liberty to retire from Portugal within a limited time, with all his effects: that the neutrality of the port of Lisbon should be acknowledged for the Russian fleet; that is to say, that, when the English army and fleet should be in possession of the city and port, the Russian fleet should neither be disturbed during its stay, nor stopped when it might choose to depart, nor pursued when it had sailed, till after the time fixed, in such cases, by maritime law: that all the French artillery, and all their cavalry horses, should be transported to France. A demur was, with good reason, made concerning the baggage and private property which the French were to carry off with them; and Kellermann explained, that the words were only to bear their strict grammatical meaning. The article regarding the Russians underwent more discussion. Sir Hew insisted, that this was a point referable to the Admiral, and that if he did not agree to it, it must be struck out; with this understanding on the part of the French negotiator that article was framed. turns to While Kellermann was thus employed in the British camp, Junot reJunot occupied the positions of the Cabeça de Montechique Lisbon. and Mafra, and hastened himself to Lisbon. On the 20th official intelligence had been published in that city that Laborde had sustained an action with the English army, and though he had only 2000 men, had kept his ground against it; in the |