CHAP. XI. July. The Mon dego the only place where a landing could be effected. General Spencer represented Junot's force as exceeding 20,000 men: the admiral, according to the reports of the Por1808. tugueze, estimated them at less: Sir Arthur concluded that they were from 16,000 to 18,000, of whom about 12,000 were at Lisbon, and in its vicinity, and 2400 at Alcobaça. Any attempt at landing in the Tagus was considered impracticable: it would be equally so at Cascaes: it was at all times difficult to land an army in the small bays near the rock, and would be now especially dangerous because of the neighbourhood of the enemy: Peniche was garrisoned by the French. There was therefore no choice but to disembark in the Mondego. Thither Sir Arthur returned. He rejoined the fleet there on the 30th, and there he found intelligence of the defeat of Dupont, and advice from his own government, that he would be reinforced immediately with 5000 men, under Brigadier-General Acland, and afterwards with 10,000 who had been under Sir John Moore in Sweden, the command being vested in Sir Hew Dalrymple; but he was directed to carry into execution without delay the instructions which he had received, if he thought himself sufficiently strong. He also received accounts that Loison had been detached from Lisbon, to open the communication with Elvas, the patriots in Alem-Tejo having been joined by about a thousand men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and being now formidable. Troops landed in dego. This latter account made him conclude that there was no the Mon- danger of being attacked by superior numbers before his reinforcements reached him; and he determined to land, both for the sake of the troops, and because he knew that the Portugueze, who were much discouraged at seeing the men remain so long on board after their arrival in Mondego Bay, would suspect either the inclination of the English to contend with the French, or their ability, if the landing were still deferred. It was now XI. August. found that the Coimbra students had performed a service of real CHAP. importance in winning Figueira from the enemy; the landing in the Mondego being so difficult, that with all the zeal and 1808. ability of the navy, it would have been impossible to effect it without the cordial assistance of the Portugueze. They began to disembark on the first of August. The weather was so little favourable, and the surf so high, that the whole of the troops were not landed till the 5th, and on that day General Spencer arrived, his corps following him the next. He had embarked immediately upon learning the surrender of Dupont, not waiting for instructions. This corps was disembarked on the 7th and 8th, on which night the whole army were in readiness to advance; the march of the main body was, however, delayed till the 10th, at the desire of the Portugueze general officers. Sir Arthur conferred with them at Montemor o Velho, and arranged the plan of operations: he armed and inspected their troops, recommended and superintended their organization, and offered as large a sum as his military funds could afford, to defray the expenses of their equipment: this, however, was declined by their officers. While the troops were landing, a party of the police cavalry arrived at Coimbra, having effected their escape from Lisbon. This hazardous attempt was planned and conducted by Eliziario de Carvalho. A serjeant, by name Gamboa, as soon as their flight was discovered, was dispatched to the French commander at Santarem, with orders to intercept and make an example of them, according to the system of the French tyranny. Gamboa, however, with the party under his command, followed and joined his countrymen; and they accomplished their dangerous march in safety. vance to Sir Arthur determined to march along the road nearest the They adsea, for the sake of communicating with the store-ships; but as Leiria. this communication must needs be very precarious, both as de CHAP. pending upon the state of the surf, and also because the army XI. might find it expedient to strike more into the country, arrange1808. ments were made for taking with them sufficient stores to last August. till they should reach the Tagus. The advanced guard marched on the 9th, supported by the brigades under Generals Hill and Ferguson. Laborde and Thomieres had collected their corps, to the amount of from 5000 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood of Leiria; they threatened the magazines formed in that city for the Portugueze army; and Sir Arthur was urged to advance as speedily as possible, for the sake of preserving them. The main body followed on the 10th: on that day Sir Arthur received advices from Coruña, informing him that neither Blake nor Cuesta was in a condition to act offensively against Bessieres, nor to follow him, if he should enter Portugal. But at the same time news arrived of the flight of the Intruder from Madrid; and Sir Arthur perceived that Bessieres would be more solicitous to cover his retreat towards the French frontier, than to attempt a diversion in favour of Junot. At all events, there was time enough for his operations against the latter before Bessieres could arrive; and it was to be expected that General Acland, or Sir John Moore, would land before he could come up. These advices, therefore, only determined him to follow up with the utmost celerity the plan which he had concerted. On the 11th the main body joined the advanced guard at Leiria, and the next day the Portugueze force, consisting of 6000 men, including 600 cavalry, arrived, the whole force being now collected there. When the English advanced guard entered that city, they found in one of the convents the dead bodies of several monks who had Early Cam- been murdered by the French; the murderers had amused themthe Duke of selves with dipping their hands in the blood of these victims, and printing the red mark upon the wall. paigns of Wellington, p. 8. The arrival of the British troops in Portugal had the imme XI. August. Portugueze 67. 170. diate effect of putting an end to that anarchy which had already CHAP. produced so much evil in the northern provinces. Meantime the wildest reports were afloat at Lisbon. The miserable people 1808. from looking every where for deliverance, believed that an army Morocco was coming to their aid. The trick of the egg was Joy of the repeated, not as before, with mysterious initials, referring to in Lisbon. King Sebastian, but with a distinct annunciation that the French Neves, v. were speedily to be destroyed. The egg thus inscribed was found upon the high altars of the Patriarchal Church: but the former instance had led the French to discover the easy process by which an inscription in relief may be produced, and on the following morning eggs with a counter prophecy, in the same fashion, were to be seen upon the high altar in every church in Lisbon at the same time a paper was fixed up, explaining the Thiebault, trick. This was fair matter of mirth for the day; but Junot and his officers well knew that the hostile prediction was not made now without a reasonable and near prospect of its fulfilment; and very soon intelligence came that the only foe of which he stood in fear had actually disembarked. The Portugueze commanders Neves, v. at Coimbra and Pombal used their utmost endeavours that no information of the British movements might reach the enemy, and in this they were assisted by the disposition of the people. But entire concealment was not possible; . . the news came to Lisbon at the same time from General Thomieres, from the agents of the police, by private letters, and by public report; and if Junot could have doubted the accuracy of his dispatches, all doubt would have been removed by the altered appearance of Thiebault, the Lisbonians, who now knew that of a truth their deliverance was at hand. 62, 65. 172. the French. Loison was immediately recalled from Alem-Tejo, and La- Measures of borde, who was supposed to be the ablest of the French generals, was sent with the two brigades of Generals Brenier and Tho 175. CHAP. mieres to manœuvre and delay the enemy till Loison could XI. arrive, Travot being appointed to the command at Lisbon in 1808. Laborde's stead; . . this general was chosen because having August. demeaned himself as a man of honour and humanity, he had Thiebault, deserved and obtained the respect and good opinion of the Portugueze. The castle at Lisbon, which had now been strongly fortified, was supplied with more ammunition and stores. The fowling-pieces and other weapons, which had been delivered up in obedience to a former edict, were broken, or rendered useless, ..the bars of silver into which the church plate had been cast, and the other portable plunder, packed for removal, and deposited on board one of the Portugueze ships of war. Whole piles of rich hangings and vestments, the spoils of palaces and churches, were burnt in a building erected for the purpose near head-quarters, and in the sight of the people, for the sake of the gold and silver wherewith they were embroidered. In order to counteract the excitement of hope in the citizens, it was confidently asserted that 20,000 French had entered Portugal on the side of Braganza; and for the chance, vain as it was, of provoking their bigotry, they were reproached as having brought a stain upon their country by inviting heretics and Mahometans to fight against the French, who, like themselves, professed the true religion. It was indeed actually believed by the Portugueze that the British had brought with them a Moorish force: the Portugueze Consul in Barbary had in fact obtained from the Emperor of Morocco a promise of 200,000 cruzados for the service of Portugal; and this may have given occasion to a belief which was confirmed by the appearance of the High Portuguez, Observador landers:.. their dress was immediately pronounced not to be Christian, and for a time no doubt was entertained but that these were the Moorish auxiliaries. 402. Neves, v. 65, 118. The French apprehended that Sir Arthur would move upon |