CHAP. that he could not consent without an express order from the III. court. Where there was prudence enough to prompt this answer, 1808. a certain degree of precaution might have been looked for, which February nevertheless was wanting. The French soldiers were permitted every day to enter the citadel and receive their rations there, and this with such perfect confidence on the part of the garrison, that even the forms of discipline were not observed at such times. One night, during the darkness, D'Armagnac secretly introduced three hundred grenadiers into the house he occupied, which was opposite the principal gate of the citadel. Some of the ablest and most resolute men were selected to go as usual for the rations, but with arms under their cloaks. The ground happened to be covered with snow, and some of the French, the better to divert the attention of the Spaniards, pelted each other with snow-balls; and some running, and others pursuing, as if in sport, a sufficient number got upon the drawbridge to hinder it from being raised; the signal was then given, some of the party who had entered seized the arms of the Spaniards, which were not, as they ought to have been, in the hands of the guard; others produced their own concealed weapons to support their comrades; the grenadiers from the general's house hastened and took possession of the gate, the rest of the division was ready to follow them, and the first news which the inhabitants of Pamplona heard that morning was, that the French, whom they had received and entertained as friends and allies, had seized the citadel. When all was done, D'Armagnac addressed a letter to the magistrates, informing them, that, as he understood he was to remain some time in Pamplona, he felt himself obliged to insure its safety in a military manner; and he had therefore ordered a battalion to the citadel, in order to garrison it, and do duty with the Spanish troops: "I beseech you," he added, "to consider this as only a trifling change, incapable of disturb ing the harmony which ought to subsist between two faithful CHAP. allies." III. The Spanish court had by its own folly and its treachery 1808. towards Portugal, reduced itself to so pitiable a state of helpless February. embarrassment, that it dared not resent this act of unequivocal insult and aggression. Not to perceive that some hostile purpose was intended, was impossible; but Charles and his minister were afraid to remonstrate, or to express any feeling of displeasure, or to prepare for resistance, or even to take any measures for guarding against a like act of treason on the part of their formidable ally in the other strong holds, upon the security of which so much depended. This wretched court contented itself with repeating instructions to the commanders and captains-general, on no account to offend the French, but to act in perfect accord with them, and by all means preserve that good understanding which so happily subsisted between the two governments! And when representations were repeatedly made of the suspicions which were entertained, and the danger which all the measures of the French gave so much reason for apprehending, the answers of the court were written in vague and empty official language, from which nothing could be understood, except that the government was determined to let the whole responsibility fall upon its officers, and to be answerable itself for nothing! While D'Armagnac secured Pamplona, General Duhesme had been instructed in like manner to get possession of Barcelona, where he was quartered. Immediately on Seizure of his arrival he requested that his troops might do duty in the city jointly with the Spaniards, and occupy with them the principal posts, assigning candidly as a reason for this suspicious request, his own personal security in the disturbed state of public feeling which was then apparent; and as a farther reason, the probability that such a proof of perfect amity and confidence would Barcelona. CHAP. more than any other measure tend to satisfy and tranquillize the III. people. The Conde de Espeleta, captain-general of Catalonia, 1808. was so strictly charged in his instructions to offer no displeasure February to the French, that he could not refuse his assent to this insidious proposal. If there had been any doubt of the intention which it covered, that doubt was speedily removed; the usual guard at the principal gate of the citadel was twenty men, but Duhesme stationed a whole company of chasseurs there. A people so intelligent, so active, and so high-minded, as the Catalans, were neither to be deceived nor intimidated; and if the inhabitants had not been restrained by obedience to their own government, Barcelona might certainly have been preserved. Duhesme felt himself in danger, and the Spanish troops, as well as the inhabitants, sometimes expressed an impatience, which at any moment might have produced a perilous conflict. The French reported that their passports from Madrid were arrived, and that they were to march for Cadiz as speedily as possible; on the morrow they were to be reviewed preparatory to their march. This welcome news completely deceived the inhabitants, and no surprise was excited by the beat of drum and the movement of battalions at the time appointed. Some regiments were drawn up upon the esplanade which separates the citadel from the town, and a battalion of Italian light troops were stationed upon the road leading from the custom-house to the principal gate of the citadel. At two in the afternoon, an hour when the people, satisfied with the spectacle, had mostly left the streets and returned to their dinner and their siesta, General Lechi came to review this body of Italians, and passed on, followed by his aidesde-camp and his staff, into the citadel. The French who were on duty received him under arms, according to military etiquette, and the Spaniards did the same. Under pretence of giving some orders to the officer of the guard, Lechi and his suite halted III. on the drawbridge, and occupying it by that manœuvre, covered CHAP. the approach of the infantry. The Italians defiled under cover of the ravelin which defended the gate, and knocked down the 1808. first Spanish centinel, whose voice when he would have given February. the alarm was drowned by the beating of the French drums under the archway. Lechi then advanced; the Spanish part of the guard could make no resistance, their French comrades being ready to act against them in the first moment when the treason was discovered; and immediately afterwards overpowering numbers were upon them. Four battalions followed the first, and the invaders were completely masters of the place. The Spanish governor, Brigadier Santilly, indignant at a treachery against which he should have taken some precautions, presented himself to Lechi as a prisoner of war: he was received however with perfect courtesy, and all protestations of friendship and alliance, which General Lechi, with an effrontery worthy of his master and his cause, made no scruple of repeating in the very act of breaking them. Upon the alarm of this aggression the Spanish and Walloon guards who belonged to the garrison hastened to their post; they were not permitted to enter the citadel till night, by which time the French had secured themselves in possession of the place. Having been admitted, they ranged themselves in arms opposite the French, and in that menacing position the night was passed, and the following morning, till orders came to quarter themselves in the town; and the French were then left sole masters of the place. Monjuic. While one division of these treacherous allies surprised the Seizure of citadel, another advanced upon Monjuic, a fort upon a hill which commands the town. An Italian colonel, by name Floresti, commanded this latter division. Monjuic is one of the strongest fortresses in Spain: it had a sufficient garrison, and the commander, D. Mariano Alvarez, was a man of the highest and most heroic CHAP. patriotism. When he was summoned to open the gate, he deIII. murred, saying he must receive instructions from his govern1808. ment. Floresti insisted that his orders were peremptory and must February. be executed. He and his men were standing upon ground which Seizure of March 3. was undermined, and Alvarez was strongly inclined, instead of admitting them, to fire the train. Could he have foreseen what a spirit was about to display itself in the Peninsula, this he would undoubtedly have done; but the spirit of Spain was still overlaid by its old wretched government; and the responsibility at such a time of involving his country in direct hostilities with France was more than even the bravest man would- venture to take upon himself. At St. Sebastian's General Thouvenot requested leave to place his hospital in the fort and in the Castle of S. Cruz, and to deposit there the baggage of the cavalry corps which was in his charge. Both the Spanish commanders did their duty by returning a refusal, and transmitting an account of their conduct to the court;.. the court returned for answer, that there was no inconvenience in acceding to the wishes of the French general; and this fortress was thus, by the imbecility of Charles and his ministers, delivered up to the French. There still remained the strong and important fortress of Figuieras. Colonel Pie had been left in the town with 800 men, and with instructions to get possession of the fort. He attempted to win it by the same stratagem which had been practised at Barcelona; but the Spaniards also knew and remembered that example, and raised the drawbridge in time. Here however the governor seems to have acted with more facility than had been shown elsewhere; two days after the treacherous attempt had been frustrated, he consented to let Pie introduce two hundred conscripts, whom he pretended he wished to secure ; . . two hundred chosen men March 18. marched in under this pretext; the rest followed them, and the |