partner in the house of Moline, who traded in Spanish horsehides, and the latter having become bankrupt, Mr. Dyster claimed a debt of nearly 20,000l. which was resisted by the assignees, as illegal. Mr. Dyster then presented a petition to the Lord Chancellor, praying to be allowed to prove his debt, and the facts alleged in support of this application formed the subject of the present argument.

On the part of the assignees it was contended, by Mr. Hart, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Montague, that the petitioner was not entitled to prove; first, because as a broker he could not act at all as a merchant; and, 2dly, on the ground of the immorality of the transaction. To establish the first point, the learned Counsel insisted on the construction of an expired statute of King William, which was renewed by a statute of Queen Anne, whereby it was enacted, that no person should act as a broker in the city of London, unless specially authorised by the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, and subject to such rules and regulations for good behaviour as they should think fit and reasonable. By virtue of this statute, the Lord Mayor and Aldermen were stated to have made a certain bye-law, and to have imposed on every person who applied to be admitted a broker, the necessity of executing a bond, with certain conditions, and of taking an oath for the faithful discharge of his duty. The bye-law, it was argued, contained the regulations to which the broker was to be subject, namely, that he should

not deal as a merchant in the same transaction; and this byelaw being authorised by the statute, had all the force of a positive enactment. In support of the second position, it was contended, that the bond and oath restrained the petitioner from acting contrary to the beforementioned rules and regulations, and, consequently, that the transaction in question was immoral, and as such was prohibited by the principles of the common law.

On the part of the petitioner, Sir S. Romilly, Mr. Cooke, and Mr. Roupell, contended, that the gentlemen on the other side had argued upon supposition of a bye law, which had all the effect of a statute law, whereas the statute in question, which was purely a local statute, gave no power whatever to the city of London to make bye laws, but only to prescribe regulations as to the conditions on which a person should be allowed to act as a broker. It was, indeed, a most gratuitous assumption that there existed any bye-law, and if such bye-law had actually been made, it seemed extraordinary that the bond should take no notice of it. All that the Mayor and Aldermen had power to do was, that as soon as they found a man acting contrary to the conditions of the bond, they could enforce the penalty against him. But it had been said there was an oath, and that the Court would not assist the petitioner to recover his demand, in violation of that solenn engagement. This was much the most serious part of the case, not only to the individual concerned in this question,

but

mitted, that if a man acted as broker and principal, and took a larger price than he would have taken in any other character, he had violated this oath; but it was material to state with precision what brokers engaged to do, and in what instances they were perjured, if they did otherwise. They undertook; first, to keep a book, or register, and to enter every contract within three days, with the names of the principals; and, on demand, to produce such entries, in order to prove the truth of the contracts. Secondly, they were to produce a silver medal, to shew that they were authorised to act in the character of brokers. Thirdly, they were not to deal for themselves, or for their own or any other broker's benefit, or advantage, and were not to employ a deputy. The question, therefore, came to this: whether the petitioner had done any thing to render his transactions with the bankrupt illegal, so as to prevent him from recovering his debt, on principles of public policy. The learned Counsel asked what the law was that he had violated, which made those transactions illegal! It had been said, that a

man must not carry on trade, holding out false colours, in other words, making false representations to the world. But what was the case here? One might as well say, that a man could not recover who writes up, as many persons do, "This is the cheapest shop in London," The fact was, the learned gentlemen had argued the case of persons acting as brokers and merchants in the same transaction; but here, a considerable part of the debt arose out of other transactions. No less a sum than 8,000l. was for loans of money, in which there was no mercantile transaction whatever. Upon the whole, the arguments on the other side were not warranted by the facts of the case, or the principles of equity, and the petitioner was clearly entitled to recover.

The Lord Chancellor said, that this was, indeed, a most important question to the mercantile world. His Lordship had already ordered a question on the statute of James, as to dormant partners, to be made the subject of a case for the opinion of the Court of King's Bench, and he hoped, that when that question came to be argued, it would be considered that the Court of Chancery was not merely a court of equity in matters of bankruptey, but was bound to enforce the provisions of the several statutes. In point of fact, that question had greatly distressed his Lordship's predecessors, and was justly thought a most difficult question. The present, he repeated, was a most important case, and he was quite satisfied, that he did not know enough of the facts to decide it.

He

He did not know, indeed, that he should be satisfied with his own" decision. If there were no more' in the case than the bond, he should think that would be no objection to the petitioner's recovering, because he would be liable for the penalty of the bond. But the Act of Queen Anne had been cited, and by that Act, no man was to act as a broker unless authorized by the Mayor and Aldermen, and under such regulations as they should think fit and reasonable. His Lordship apprehended, therefore, that the ques tion was, whether any regulations had been made, and what those regulations were. It was material to ascertain, whether the bond and oath were to enforce certain regulations, or whether such bond and oath were to be considered as stating what the regulations were: He was disposed to think that the Mayor and Aldermen had made regulations, and sought to secure them by this bond and oath. The next point was, whether those regulations were such as they were empowered to make, according tổ the true intent and meaning of the statute. If they were such as the statute authorized, then the question might be brought to this-that brokers, being prohibited from this species of trading by those regulations, they were also prohibited by the statute. His lordship, therefore, wished to know what those regu lations were, de facto.

Sir Samuel Romilly observed, that the word regulations did not occur in the statute: The words of the statute were: "With such limitations and restrictions as the

Lord Mayor and Aldermen should' think fit and reasonable.”

The Lord Chancellor:-" Undoubtedly those words' may re quire further consideration. We have argued the case all along aš if the word regulation had been employed in the statute. I should' wish to know, therefore, what' restrictions and limitations have been established."

His Lordship then stated; that he had spoken to the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas this morning on the subject of this case, who observed, that he had known this objection taken to a broker's action at Nisi Prius, but it had been over-ruled. As to the statute, the Chief Justice declared, he had never heard that it' existed.

Gladstone and Co. v. the Trustees of the Liverpool Docks-ThisTM was a writ of error from the Common Pleas at Lancaster':' it was an action brought by the plaintiffs to recover 241. 8s. 9d. as an overcharge made upon the ship Richard, upon her arrival in the docks at Liverpool. The record stated, that before the passing of the 51 Geo: III. c. 143, för incorporating the Liverpool Dock Company, the plaintiffs were: owners of the ship Richard, built at Whitby; and registered at Liverpool; she had traded out-*

wards,

wards, and had paid the duty under the former acts. At the time the 51st of the King was passed, the Richard was absent from Liverpool, and returned, paying no duty, having been charged on her outward voyage. This exemption was provided for in the 51st Geo. III.; and after that statute had passed, the Richard proceeded on a voyage to St. Domingo, where she discharged her cargo, no duty being demanded on her clearance out from Liverpool. Having discharged her outward and taken in her homeward cargo, the Richard returned to London, where she was completely un laden, and after she had been again freighted for Liverpool with other goods, she sailed for that port: on her arrival the trustees demanded the payment of 341. 10s., the sum which they contended was due according to the rate of duties provided by the act of parliament after a voyage to St. Domingo. The plaintiffs resisted; but afterwards settling the whole claim under a protest, they brought an action to recover 241. 8s. 9d. being the difference between the amount of duty pay able by the act after a voyage to London or to St. Domingo. The question therefore was, whether, according to the terms of the 51st Geo: III. the trustees of the Liverpool Docks, after the voyage performed by the Richard, could enforce the payment of the duty on an adventure to St. Domingo, which is 2s. per ton, or could only claim the duty as for a voyage from London, at the rate of 7d. per ton.

Mr. Richardson, for the defen

dants (the plaintiffs in error), contended, that by the 6th section, as explained by the 7th section of the 51st Geo. III. the trustees could insist that the owners of the Richard should pay the rate of duty due for the most. distant port at which she had touched in the course of her voyage. Under the old aets, in the case of Gladstone v. Geldert (2 Taunt. 97, and 12 East 439), it had been decided, that a vessel' which cleared out from Liverpool with a cargo incurred only one duty, though she might have traded to intermediate ports, and carried more than one cargo during her absence'; but the express provisions of the 51 Geo. III. were decisive upon the point, that if a ship, as in this case, cleared out for St. Doningo, performed her voyage, discharged her cargo at London, and took in another, which she conveyed to Liverpool, she was liable to pay the dock duty as for a voyage to St. Domingo, being the most distant port to which she had traded during her absence. The reasons for the augmented duties for distant adventures seemed to be, that after it the vessel would require additional accommoda tion, and would probably make a longer stay in the docks, and that the owner was supposed to be better able, from the profits of his speculation, to sustain a hea vier burden; it might also be said, that ships making short trips would not be long absent from the docks, and would consequently: pay a smaller duty more frequently. The learned Counsel admitted that the 6th clause was somewhat ambiguous,

but

but that all doubt was removed by the terms of the 7th, which declared that ships clearing out from Liverpool should be charged, on their return, according to the rate of duty payable from the most distant port from which they shall so trade to the port of Liverpool."

Lord Ellenborough.-Can it be said, that in this case there was any trading from St. Domingo to Liverpool? The Richard unloaded the cargo she brought from St. Domingo at London, and there took a new cargo, which she carried to Liverpool: on this new voyage she had as little to do with the St. Domingo cargo, as if she had delivered it ten years before.

Mr. Richardson submitted that the words of the 7th sect. which were most explicit, controlled and explained the doubtful terms of the 6th section. If the Court should decide against his argument, that determination might lead to many evasions of the act; for a vessel which had performed a long and prosperous voyage might then discharge her cargo at Bristol or Waterford, and afterwards entering the port of Liverpool, would only be liable to pay a duty of 5d. per ton. The word trading,' which had been constantly and cautiously used instead of voyage,' which had formerly occasioned much dispute, did not mean bringing the cargo which she had taken in at the most distant port to Liverpool, but re-entering after the completion of the adventure.

Mr. Joy, on the other side, contended, that the payment of the duty on the entrance of the

ship always cleared her on her outward voyage, and consequently that if the defendants insisted that the voyage was to St. Domingo, nothing was due for that voyage. It would be attended with great hardship if it were decided that duty was payable for the most distant port on the return of the ship to Liverpool without the cargo, which she had discharged at another port of the United Kingdom; since in that case the owner would be twice liable to tonnage once at the port where the cargo was actually delivered (in this case London), and again at the port to which the ship belonged (in this case Liverpool). The language of the 6th clause was quite clear, and the only doubt that could be raised was upon a few words in the 7th sect. which, in fact, had no bearing upon the real question, and had been intruded into the act. The onus of explaining away the decided intention of the legislature lay upon the Trustees of the Liverpool docks, and reference to the 10th and 12th sections further confirmed the construction for which the plaintiffs argued. The contrary had never been suggested until two years after the passing of the 51st Geo. III. and the 53d Geo. III. c. 156, showed that the framers of the former act never intended to give to the company that for which they now contended.

:

Lord Ellenborough. The word most in the act, where it speaks of the most distant port, is a comparative term, and refers to some other ports. Now, in this case, the ship sails from London with an entirely new cargo: there

her