"ble of managing our own affairs, and answerable for our "conduct to others. This is called common sense, because "it is common to all men with whom we can transact busi"ness."

"The same degree of understanding (he afterwards observes) "which makes a man capable of acting with common pru"dence in life, makes him capable of discerning what is true "and what is false, in matters that are self-evident, and which "he distinctly apprehends." In a subsequent paragraph, he gives his sanction to a passage from Dr Bentley, in which common sense is expressly used as synonymous with natural light and reason*.

It is to be regretted, as a circumstance unfavourable to the reception of Dr Beattie's valuable essay among accurate rea

* Pages 522, 524, 4to edit. In the following verses of Prior, the word reason is employed in an acceptation exactly coincident with the idea which is, on most occasions, annexed by Dr Reid to the phrase common sense :

"Note here, Lucretius dares to teach
"(As all our youth may learn from CREECH,)
“That eyes were made, but could not view,
"Nor hands embrace, nor feet pursue,
"But heedless Nature did produce

"The members first, and then the use;

"What each must act was yet unknown,

"Till all was moved by Chance alone.

"Blest for his sake be HUMAN REASON,

"Which came at last, tho' late, in season."- -Alma, Canto I.

soners, that, in the outset of his discussions, he did not confine himself to some such general explanation of this phrase as is given in the foregoing extracts from Buffier and Reid, without affecting a tone of logical precision in his definitions and distinctions, which, so far from being necessary to his intended argument, were evidently out of place, in a work designed as a popular antidote against the illusions of metaphysical scep ticism. The very idea, indeed, of appealing to common sense, virtually implies that these words are to be understood in their ordinary acceptation, unrestricted and unmodified by any technical refinements and comments. This part of his essay, accordingly, which is by far the most vulnerable part of it, has been attacked with advantage, not only by the translator of Buffier, but by Sir James Steuart, in a very acute letter published in the last edition of his works*.

While I thus endeavour, however, to distinguish Dr Reid's definition of common sense from that of Dr Beattie, I am far from considering even the language of the former on this subject, as in every instance unexceptionable; nor do I think it has been a fortunate circumstance (notwithstanding the very high authorities which may be quoted in his vindication), that he attempted to incorporate so vague and ambiguous a phrase with the appropriate terms of logic. My chief reasons for this opinion I have stated at some length, in

*To the honour of Dr Beattie it must be remarked, that his reply to this letter, (which may be found in Sir James Steuart's works) is written in a strain of forbearance and of good humour, which few authors would have been able to maintain, after being handled so roughly.

an account published a few years ago of Dr Reid's Life and Writings*.

One very unlucky consequence has unquestionably resulted from the coincidence of so many writers connected with this northern part of the island, in adopting, about the same period, the same phrase, as a sort of philosophical watch-word ;— that, although their views differ widely in various respects, they have in general been classed together as partizans of a new sect, and as mutually responsible for the doctrines of each other. It is easy to perceive the use likely to be made of this accident by an uncandid antagonist.

All of these writers have, in my opinion, been occasionally

* In consequence of the ambiguous meaning of this phrase, Dr Reid sometimes falls into a sort of play on words, which I have often regretted. "If this be philosophy "(says he, on one occasion) I renounce her guidance. Let my soul dwell with common "sense." (Inquiry into the Human Mind, Chap. i. Sect. 3. See also Sect. 4. of the same chapter.) And in another passage, after quoting the noted saying of Hobbes, that "when reason is against a man, a man will be against reason;" he adds: "This is equally applicable to common sense." (Essays on the Intellectual Powers, p. 530, 4to edition.) In both of these instances, and indeed in the general strain of argument which runs through his works, he understands common sense in its ordinary acceptation, as synonymous, or very nearly synonymous, with the word reason, as it is now most frequently employed. In a few cases, however, he seems to have annexed to the same phrase a technical meaning of his own, and has even spoken of this meaning as a thing not generally understood. Thus, after illustrating the different classes of natural signs, he adds the following sentence: "It may be observed, that as the first class of natural signs I have mentioned is the foundation of true philoso❝phy, and the second of the fine arts or of taste, so the last is the foundation of common sense; a part of human nature which hath never been explained."—Inquiry, Chap.

v. sect. 3.

See Note (D).

M

misled in their speculations, by a want of attention to the distinction between first principles, properly so called, and the fundamental laws of human belief. Buffier himself has fallen into the same error; nor do I know of any one logician, from the time of Aristotle downwards, who has entirely avoided it.

The foregoing critical remarks will, I hope, have their use in keeping this distinction more steadily in the view of future inquirers; and in preventing some of the readers of the publications to which they relate, from conceiving a prejudice, in consequence of the looseness of that phraseology which has been accidentally adopted by their authors, against the just and important conclusions which they contain.

CHAPTER SECOND.

OF REASONING AND OF DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE.

SECTION I.

Doubts with respect to Locke's Distinction between the Powers of Intuition and of Reasoning.

ALTHOUGH, in treating of this branch of the Philosophy of the Mind, I have followed the example of preceding writers, so far as to speak of intuition and reasoning as two different faculties of the understanding, I am by no means satisfied that there exists between them that radical distinction which is commonly apprehended. Dr Beattie, in his Essay on Truth, has attempted to show, that, how closely soever they may in general be connected, yet that this connection is not necessary; insomuch, that a being may be conceived endued with the one, and at the same time destitute of the other*. Something of

Beattie's Essay, p. 41, 2d edit.