66

We see from these passages why the study of simple natures is so important—namely because they are comparatively speaking few in number, and because, notwithstanding this, a knowledge of their essence would enable us, at least in theory, to solve every problem which the universe can present to us. As an illustration of the doctrine of simple natures, we may take a passage which occurs in the Silva Silvarum. Gold," it is there said, "has these natures: greatness of weight, closeness of parts, fixation, pliantness or softness, immunity from rust, colour or tincture of yellow. Therefore the sure way, though most about, to make gold, is to know the causes of the several natures before rehearsed, and the axioms concerning the same. For if a man can make a metal that hath all these properties, let men dispute whether it be gold or no." 1

Of these simple natures Bacon has given a list in the third book of the De Augmentis. They are divided into two classes: schematisms of matter, and simple motions. To the former belong the abstract qualities, dense, rare, heavy, light, &c., of which thirty-nine are enumerated, the list being concluded with a remark that it need not be carried farther, "neque ultra rem extendimus." The simple motions and it will be observed that the word "motion" is used in a wide and vague sense are the motus antitypiæ, which secures the impenetrability of matter; the motus nexûs, commonly called the motus ex fugâ vacui, &c.; and of these motions fourteen are mentioned. This list however does not profess to be complete, and accordingly in the Novum Organum (ii. 48.) another list of sim

1 Compare Nov. Org. ii. 5.

ple motions is given, in which nineteen species are recognised.

The view of which we have now been speaking — namely, that it is possible to reduce all the phenomena of the universe to combinations of a limited number of simple elements is the central point of Bacon's whole system. It serves, as we shall see, to explain the peculiarities of the method which he proposed.

(8.) In what sense did Bacon use the word "Form?" This is the next question which, in considering the account which he has given of the nature of science, it is necessary to examine. I am, for reasons which will be hereafter mentioned, much disposed to believe that the doctrine of Forms is in some sort

an extraneous part of Bacon's system. His peculiar
method may be stated independently of this doctrine,
and he has himself so stated it in one of his earlier
tracts, namely the Valerius Terminus.
It is at any
rate certain, that in using the word "Form" he did
not intend to adopt the scholastic mode of employing
it. He was much in the habit of giving to words
already in use a new signification. "To me," he re-
marks in the Advancement of Learning, "it seemeth
best to keep way with antiquity usque ad aras, and
therefore to retain the ancient terms, though I some-
times alter the uses and definitions." And thus though
he has spoken of the scholastic forms as figments of the
human mind, he was nevertheless willing to employ
the word "Form" in a modified sense, "præsertim
quum hoc vocabulum invaluerit, et familiariter oc-
currat.' He has however distinctly stated that in
speaking of Forms, he is not to be understood to speak

9 2

1 Nov. Org. i. 51.

2 Nov. Org. ii. 2.

of the Forms "quibus hominum contemplationes et cogitationes hactenus assueverunt." 1

As Bacon uses the word in his own sense, we must endeavour to interpret the passages in which it occurs by means of what he has himself said of it; and this may I think be satisfactorily accomplished.

We may begin by remarking that in Bacon's system, as in those of many others, the relation of substance and attribute is virtually the same as the relation of cause and effect. The substance is conceived of as the causa immanens of its attributes,2 or in other words it is the formal cause of the qualities which are referred to it. As there is a difference between the properties of different substances, there must be a corresponding difference between the substances themselves. But in the first state of the views of which we are speaking this latter difference is altogether unimaginable: "distincte quidem intelligi potest, sed non explicari imaginabiliter." 3 It belongs not to natural philosophy, but to metaphysics.

These views however admit of an essential modification. If we divide the qualities of bodies into two classes, and ascribe those of the former class to substance as its essential attributes, while we look on those of the latter as connected with substance by the relation of cause and effect- that is, if we recognise the distinction of primary and secondary qualities — the state of the question is changed. It now becomes possible to give a definite answer to the question, Wherein

1 Nov. Org. ii. 17.

2 See Zimmerman's Essay on the Monadology of Leibnitz, p. 86. (Vienna, 1807).

8 Leibnitz, De ipsâ Naturâ.

does the difference between different substances, corresponding to the difference between their sensible qualities, consist?

The answer to this question of course involves a reference to the qualities which have been recognised as primary; and we are thus led to the principle that in the sciences which relate to the secondary qualities of bodies the primary ones are to be regarded as the causes of the secondary.1

This division of the qualities of bodies into two classes is the point of transition from the metaphysical view from which we set out to that of ordinary physical science. And this transition Bacon had made, though not perhaps with a perfect consciousness of having done so. Thus he has repeatedly denied the truth of the scholastic doctrine that Forms are incognoscible because supra-sensible; 2 and the reason of this is clearly that his conception of the nature of Forms relates merely to the primary qualities of bodies. For instance, the Form of heat is a kind of local motion of the particles of which bodies are composed,3 and that of whiteness a mode of arrangement among those particles. This peculiar motion or arrangement corresponds to and engenders heat or whiteness, and this in every case in which those qualities exist. The statement of the distinguishing character of the motion or arrangement, or of whatever else may be the Form of a given phenomenon, takes the shape of a law; it is the law in fulfilling which any substance determines the existence of the quality in question. It is for this

1 Whewell, Phil. Ind. Science, [book iv. ch. i.]

2 See Scaliger, Exercit. in Cardan.

3 [Nov. Org. ii. 20.]

4 [Valerius Terminus, ii. 1.]

reason that Bacon sometimes calls the Form a law; he has done this particularly in a passage which will be mentioned a little farther on.

With the view which has now been stated, we shall I think be able to understand every passage in which Bacon speaks of Forms; - remembering however that as he has not traced a boundary line between primary and secondary qualities, we can only say in general terms that his doctrine of Forms is founded upon the theory that certain qualities of bodies are merely subjective and phenomenal, and are to be regarded as necessarily resulting from others which belong to substance as its essential attributes. In the passage from which we set out, the Form is spoken of as vera differentia, the true or essential difference, naturans and as the fons emanationis. these expressions refers to the theory of definition by genus and difference. The difference is that which gives the thing defined its specific character. If it be founded on an accidental circumstance, the definition, though not incorrect if the accident be an inseparable one, will nevertheless not express the true and essential character of its subject; contrariwise, if it involve a statement of the formal cause of the thing defined.

as natura The first of

The second of these phrases is now scarcely used, except in connexion with the philosophy of Spinoza. It had however been employed by some of the scholastic writers. It is always antithetical to natura naturata, and in the passage before us serves not inaptly to ex

1 [Nov. Org. ii. 1.]

2 See Vossius, De Vitiis Serm. in voce Naturare; and Castanæus, Distinctiones in voc. Natura.