venture, seeing how great a reward success would bring.

And here (115), Bacon says, concludes the pullingdown part, pars destruens, of the Instauration. It consists of three confutations; namely, of the natural working of the mind, of received methods of demonstration, and of received theories or philosophies. In this division we perceive the influence of the first form of the doctrine of Idols. As the Novum Organum now stands, the pars destruens cannot be divided into three portions, each containing one of the confutations just mentioned. Thus, for instance, the doctrine of Idols, which undoubtedly forms a distinct section of the whole work, relates to all three. Errors natural to the mind, errors of demonstration, errors of theory, are all therein treated of; and Bacon then goes on to another part of the subject, in which, though from a different point of view, they are all again considered. The sort of cross division here introduced is explained by a passage in the Partis secundæ Delineatio, in which the doctrine of Idols is introduced by the remark, "Pars destruens triplex est secundum triplicem naturam idolorum quæ mentem obsident." And then, after dividing idols into the three classes already mentioned, he proceeds thus: — "Itaque pars ista quam destruentem appellamus tribus redargutionibus absolvitur, redargutione philosophiarum, redargutione demonstrationum, et redargutione rationis humanæ nativæ." When the doctrine of Idols was thrown into its present form it ceased to afford a convenient basis for the pars destruens; and accordingly the substance of the three redargutiones is in the Novum Organum less systematically set forth

than Bacon purposed that it should be when he wrote the Partis secundæ Delineatio.1 It is to be remarked that Redargutio Philosophiarum is the title of one of the chapters in the third and last of the tracts published by Gruter with the title Temporis Partus Masculus, and that it is also the title of a tract published [by Stephens in 1734, and reprinted] by Mallet [in 17603], and evidently of a later date than the other of the same name.

From (116) to (128) Bacon endeavours to obviate objections and unfavourable opinions of his design. In the first place he plainly declares that he is no founder of a sect or school,—therein differing from the ancient Greeks, and from certain new men, namely Telesius, Patricius, and Severinus. Abstract opinions

1 I think this apparent discrepancy may be better explained. It appears to me that the number of idols was originally three, - the Tribe, the Cave, and the Market-place; all belonging to the ratio humana nativa; fallacies innate or inherent in the human understanding, - -to be guarded against, but not to be got rid of; and that a fourth was added afterwards, but of quite a different kind; consisting of fallacies which have no natural affinity to the understanding, but come from without and may be turned out again; impressions derived from the systems which men have been taught to accept as true, or from the methods of demonstration which they have been taught to rely upon as conclusive. These are the Idols of the Theatre, and the sole objects of the two Redargutiones which stand first in the Delineatio, and last in the Novum Organum. If this be true, the Redargutio rationis humanæ nativæ (or I should rather say, the part of the Novum Organum which belongs to it) extends from the 40th to the 60th aphorism; and the Redargutio Philosophiarum and Demonstrationum from the 61st to the 115th. For a fuller explanation and justification of this view, see Note C.-J. S.

mus."

2 Say rather, "is the title prefixed by M. Bouillet to the second chapter of the fragment printed by Gruter with the heading Tradendi modus legitiI cannot find that M. Bouillet had any authority for giving it this title, more than the tenor of the chapter itself, which shows that it fits. J. S.

3 A small portion of it was printed by Gruter at the end of the Partis secundæ Delineatio [and it seems to have been the beginning of the Pars secunda itself].

on nature and first principles are in his judgment of no great moment. Nor again does he promise to mankind the power of accomplishing any particular or special works for with him works are not derived from works nor experiments from experiments, but causes and axioms are derived from both, and from these new works and experiments are ultimately deduced; and at present the natural history of which he is in possession is not sufficient for the purposes of legitimate interpretation, that is, for the establishment of axioms. Again, that his Natural History and Tables of Invention are not free from errors, which at first they cannot be, is not a matter of much importance. These errors, if not too numerous, will readily be corrected when causes and axioms have been discovered, just as errors in a manuscript or printed book are easily corrected by the meaning of the passage in which they occur. Again, it may be said that the Natural History contains many commonplace things; also many things mean and sordid; and lastly many things too subtle to be of any use. To this a threefold answer is to be given. In the first place, rare and notable things cannot be understood, much less new things brought to light, unless the causes of common things and their causes' causes be duly examined and searched out. Secondly, whatever is worthy of existence is also worthy to be known; for knowledge represents and is the image of existence. Lastly, things apparently useless are in truth of the greatest use. No one will deny that light is useful, though it is not tangible or material. And the accurate knowledge of simple natures is as light, and gives access to all the secrets on which

works depend, though in itself it is of no great

use..

Again it may be thought a hard saying that all sciences and authors are at once to be set aside together. But in reality this is both a more modest censure and one that carries with it a greater show of reason than any partial condemnation. It implies only that the errors hitherto committed are fundamental, and that they have not been corrected because as yet they have not been sufficiently examined. It is no presumption if any man asserts that he can draw a circle more truly with a pair of compasses than another can without; and the new method puts men's understandings nearly on the same level, because everything is to be done by definite rules and demonstrations. Bacon anticipates also another objection, that he has not assigned to the sciences their true and highest aim; which is the contemplation of truth, not works, however great or useful. He affirms that he values works more inasmuch as they are signs and evidences of truth than for their practical utility. It may also, he continues, be alleged that the method of the ancients was in reality the same as ours, only that after they had constructed the edifice of the sciences they took away the scaffolding. But this is refuted both by what they themselves say of their method,1 and by what is seen of it in their writings. Again he affirms that he does not inculcate, as some might suppose, a2 [final suspension of judgment, as if the

1 I have adopted here the correction introduced into the text of the present edition.

2 Mr. Ellis had written thus far when the fever seized him. The remaining pages which complete the analysis of the first book, are mine.-J. S.

mind were incapable of knowing anything; that if he enjoins caution and suspense it is not as doubting the competency of the senses and understanding, but for their better information and guidance; that the method of induction which he proposes is applicable not only to what is called natural philosophy, as distinguished from logic, ethics, and politics, but to every department of knowledge; the aim being to obtain an insight into the nature of things by processes varied according to the conditions of the subject; and that in declaring that no great progress can be expected either in knowledge of truth or in power of operation by the methods of inquiry hitherto employed, he means no disrespect to the received arts and sciences, but fully recognises them as excellent in their proper place and use, and would have them honoured and cultivated accordingly.

These explanations, together with some remarks (129), by way of encouragement to followers and fellow-labourers, on the dignity, importance, and grandeur of the end in view, - bring the preliminary considerations to a close, and clear the way for the exposition of the art of interpretation itself; which is commenced, but not completed, in the second book. What this art was, has been fully discussed in the general preface, and it is not necessary therefore to follow the subject further here. Only it is important to remark that whatever value Bacon may have attached to it, he certainly did not at this time profess to consider it either as a thing absolutely necessary, or even as the thing most necessary, for any real progress in science. In the concluding aphorism of the first book he distinctly warns the reader that the precepts which he is about