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telligent and argumentative a writer, in what he deems an excurfion of fo much moment.

After mentioning the weak, unwarlike, and difunited state of many of the large provinces of Indoftan, he urges the danger. that may arife to our liberties from the exercife of this prerogative, in the following manner:

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ENGLISH MAN.

We have feen that the rich provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa, in that great peninfula, have already, in effect, been reduced to a ftate of obedience to the Eat-India company, though they continue, nominally, to be governed by one of their own natives, who is permitted to call himself their nabob, or fovereign. The public revenue collected in these three provinces is generally allowed to be three millions fix hundred thousand pounds fterling. This revenue was collected there in the time of the independent nabobs, or fovereigns, of thofe provinces: and therefore, I prefume, the taxes, or rents, out of which it arifes, were impofed upon the inhabitants of them by what was then confidered as the legal authority by which those provinces were governed. This revenue has, for thefe eight, or nine, years paft, been received by the Eaft-India company; who have been invefted with the office of Dewan, or public treasurer, of thofe provinces: and they allow a fmall portion of it (two, or three, hundred thousand pounds a year,) to the nominal, or dependent, Nabob, whom they have permitted, or, rather, appointed, to govern thofe provinces under their protection; and they employ another part of it in the maintenance of their own armies, and forts, and other establishments, civil and military, in that country; and then they divide the remainder of it (over and above what is neceffary for thefe purposes,) amongst themselves, that is, amongst the feveral proprietors of Eaft-India stock. Now let us fuppofe that another fuch conqueft fhould be made in that country by the crown instead of the East-India Company; as for example, a conqueft of the province of Arcot (of which we have lately heard a great deal,) or of the province of Decan: and that the public revenues regularly collected in the country fo conquered fhould amount to three, or four, millions of pounds sterling per annum. Of this large revenue it is probable that, with good management, one or two millions might be fufficient to defray the expences of the civil and military establishments that would be found neceffary for the maintenance of the king's authority and the administration of government in the faid country; and confequently that two millions of pounds fterling might be remitted every year to England, to be difpofed of as the king fhould pleafe. There is nothing in this fuppofition that is at all improbable; nor would the making fuch a new conqueft, and the acquifition of fuch a new revenue, by the Crown be at all inconfiftent with the rights of the Eaft-India Company, or their enjoyment of the acquifitions they have already made of the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa. Now, with fuch an annual increase of the royal revenue, the Crown might either govern the British nation without the affiftance of parliament, (as king Charles the Firit did during the space of eleven years, till the people had almost for

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got what a parliament was) or, (which would be a milder and fafer way of proceeding,) it might fo influence the elections of members of the House of Commons as to cause a great majority of them to be chofen out of fuch perfons as the ministers of ftate should have recommended for that purpofe; or, if those members had been chofen freely, it might influence them, when chofen, to pafs fuch bills, and give their fanction to fuch meafures, (whatever their tendency might be,) as the Crown fhould think fit to adopt. In either of these three ways it is evident the freedom and excellence of the British conftitution would be greatly impaired, and, in the first way, totally extinguished. You now fee the danger that may arife from this other prerogative of the Crown," to difpofe of the revenues already legally exifting in conquered and ceded countries in fuch manner as it thall think fit," which is much more generally allowed to belong to the Crown than the former prerogative of impofing laws and taxes on the inhabitants of fuch countries.

FRENCHMAN.

'You have made it very plain to me, that this prerogative may become exceeding dangerous to Great-Britain; and therefore I join with you most heartily in wishing it were put under fome regulation, or restraint, that would remove this danger. But, pray, in what manner would you propofe to regulate this dangerous prerogative? For I do not think it would be eafy fo to regulate it as entirely to remove the danger you have been defcribing.

ENGLISHMAN.

I agree with you that it cannot easily be regulated so as to avoid thofe dangerous confequences we have been fpeaking of. Nay more, I believe it cannot potibly be fo regulated. And therefore (as we now are speculating upon this fubject, and inquiring, not what is most likely to happen, but what is best,) I do not wish it to be regu lated, but to be wholly given up by the crown, and vested, by act of parliament, in the king and parliament conjointly, "fo that, for the future, the public revenues of all fuch countries as fhall be conquered by the British arms and ceded to the crown of Great-Britain, which fhall be found to be legally existing in the faid countries at the time of the conqueft and ceffion of them, fhould be difpofed of by act of parliament only;" like the overplus of the taxes granted by parlia ment in Great-Britain itfelf, above the fums neceffary to defray the expences of the fervices for which they are granted, which overplus, I am affured, is always referved, by fpecial claufes in the acts by which those taxes are granted, for the future difpofal of parliament. FRENCHMAN.

This would undoubtedly be a moft defirable method of preventing the dangers we have been fpeaking of. But, as it would fo greatly diminish his Majesty's perfonal emoluments from all future acquifitions of his crown, it feems hardly reasonable to expect that he should confent to it: and without fuch confent, I prefume it cannot be taken.

ENGLISH MAN.

It certainly cannot. But there is reafon to think that, if his Majefty were to be folicited by his parliament to give his affent to a bill of this kind, or even if he were to be strongly advised by his

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minifters of state to declare to his parliament before-hand his difpofition to affent to fuch a bill, (which would be a more decent and proper way of conducting the bufinefs than the other (he would graciously condefcend to facrifice his own perfonal intereft to the fafety and fatisfaction of his people. For he has already vouchfafed to do a fimilar act of noble generofity towards his fubjects, in giving up to the public revenue of Great-Britain the fum of feven hundred thousand pounds fterling, which was the produce of the fales of the French fhips which had been taken by the late king's ships of war in the years 1755 and 1756, in the beginning of the hoftilities of the late war against France, and before the war had been declared in form, and the ufual act of parliament had been paffed for vefting the property of the fhips and goods, that fhould be taken at fea in the courfe of the war, in the officers and failors of the veffels by which they fhould be taken. After fuch an act of generofitý one can hardly doubt of his Majesty's willingness to confent to fuch an act of parliament as I have mentioned, if he were to be advised to such a meafure by his parliament, or by the minifters of ftate whom he honours with his confidence.

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FRENCHMAN.

• The inftance you have mentioned of his Majefty's generofity to his fubjects in giving up to them the faid fum of feven hundred thoufand pounds sterling, is indeed a very noble one, and warrants you in the opinion you entertain that he would not refuse his royal affent to an act of parliament of the kind you have fuggefted, if it were properly recommended to him. The probability therefore of fuch an act's being paffed will depend upon the difpofition of the parliament to requeft, or of his Majesty's minifters of ftate, to advise his Majesty to agree to fuch a meafure. How far they are likely to folicit or recommend fuch a meafure, I know not: but to me it appears to be a matter of fo much importance, that I fhould think it a good bargain for the British nation to purchase his Majesty's refignation of this prerogative at the expence of half a million, or even a million, of pounds fterling, which (as the emoluments which his Majefty might derive from this prerogative are diftant and uncertain,) might, I fhould imagine, be thought no contemptible compenfation for the lofs of it. And thus both the king and his fubje&s would reap benefit from fuch a measure.

ENGLISH MAN.

• I have no objection to purchasing fo great a fecurity for the national liberties for what the lawyers call a valuable confideration; more especially as it would give the refignation of this prerogative on the part of the Crown the greater appearance of freedom and perfect approbation, and would thereby contribute to make it more binding and permanent. Nor do I think the greater of the fums you have mentioned too great a price for fo important an advantage.But now, if you please, we will go back to the fubject we were before confidering, when this inquiry concerning the danger arifing from the king's right to the legally-exifting revenues of conquered countries, called us away; that is, to the right of making new laws for, and impofing new taxes on, the inhabitants of fuch countries; which right Lord Mansfield has declared to be vefted, by the English conflitution,

conftitution, in the king alone, without the concurrence of his parliament."

The reafons affigned by Lord Mansfield in fupport of his opinion, of the legislative power of the Crown over conquered countries, were chiefly thefe three. First, The King's acknowledged right of making war and peace, which he supposed to include in it the power of making laws and impofing taxes on the conquered people; fecondly, The practice which has taken place, with refpect to the countries which have from time to time been conquered by the Crown of England, such as Ireland, Wales, Berwick upon Tweed, and Calais, and more especially, the little territories of Gibraltar, and the Ifland of Minorca, which have been conquered from the Crown of Spain, and ceded to, and enjoyed by, the Crown of Great Britain, ever fince the peace of Utrecht. Thirdly, The opinions of former judges and eminent lawyers on this fubject, teftified by occafional and collateral declarations of the judges concerning it, or by the answers given by lawyers out of court, to questions of law upon which they were confulted; there having been no exprefs decifion upon the point before that in the cafe of Campbell and Hall. Our Author is of opinion, that none of these reasons are fatisfactory or conclufive. We fhall endeavour to digeft, methodically, the principal arguments which he has employed to fhew their infufficiency, and to put our readers in poffeffion of the thread of his argument, difentangled from the tedious forms of dialogue-writing.

It is not very evident what connection fubfifts between the right of making war and peace, which is vefted in the King, as the executive magiftrate, and as wielding the fword of the ftate, and a permanent legislative authority that is to operate when the fword is returned to the fcabbard. Perhaps it will not be more evident, when we have heard his Lordship's reafoning upon the subject. The intermediate links by which powers, fo wide of each other, are connected, must be found (if they are to be found any where) in the following words:

"The King (fays his Lordship) has a power to grant or refufe a capitulation to the conquered enemy. If he refufes it, and puts the inhabitants of the country to the fword, or extirpates them, as he obtains the country by conqueft, the lands of it are his, and he may grant them to whom he pleafes and if he plants a colony upon them, the new fettlers will hold the fhares of the faid lands which fhall have been allotted them, fubject to the prerogative of the Conqueror. If, on the other hand, he does not put to the fword, or extirpate the old inhabitants, but receives them into his obedience, and grants them a continuance of their property in their own lands, he has power to impose a tax upon them. He is intrufted with terms of .. REV. Sept. 1779. making

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making peace at his difcretion; and he may retain the conqueft, or yield it up, on fuch conditions as he fhall think fit to agree to. This is not a matter of difputed right. It has hitherto been uncontroverted, that the King may change a part, or all, of the political government over a conquered dominion."

We agree with our Author, that there is in this paffage a degree of obfcurity and confufion, which we should not have expected from a perfon fo much celebrated for clearness of reafoning and accuracy of diftinction. Affertions and arguments are curiously blended together in one mafs, that we may yield to their joint impreffion a conviction which would not have refulted from their separate force. No line is drawn, nor is any diftinction marked out, between the temporary (or rather mil.tary) powers, intrufted to the King in time of war, as the general of his fubjects, and a regular and peaceable authority to levy taxes and make laws. Yet thefe powers are so distinct and feparate in their natures, that the first can hardly be faid to involve the laft. It is true, the King may, in the moment of conqueft, grant or refuse a capitulation to the vanquished. He may put them to the fword, and feize their property, or grant them their lives, and deprive them of their property, or, in fhort, impose what terms he pleases; but who does not fee, that this power over the perfons and property of the conquered is founded on neceffity, in order to enable the conqueror to fecure the advantages he has gained in the war, and to compel the enemy to accept of a reasonable peace? It appears abfurd to contend, that this power fhould fubfift any longer than the neceffity from which it took its birth fubfifts; that is, any longer than the war continues: For, as our Author very cogently argues, the rights of war being founded on neceffity, the power, or prerogative of exercising thofe rights, that is, the prerogative of managing the war, is vefted, by the laws of England, in the king alone for almoft the fame reafon, namely, on account of the high expediency, amounting to a kind of neceffity, of entrusting this matter to the direction of one man, arifing from the extreme difficulty of carrying on the operations of the war, and of making the fudden and temporary regulations fit to be observed in conquered countries immediately upon their firft fubmiffion, by a numerous body of men, and who are not at all times affembled together, fuch as the parliament of Great Britain. This I conceive to be the reason why the power of making these regulations is vefted in the king alone immediately upon the conqueft of a country and during the remainder of the war; during all which time the inhabitants of fuch a country, though no longer in arms against their conqueror, muft fill be fuppofed to be fecretly his enemies, and to be inclined to take the first opportunity of throwing off his authority and returning to their former matters, and are, in truth, neither more nor lefs than prifoners of war, who are permitted to be at large upon their parole of honour. While this violent ftate of things continues, the King continues

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