Many such causes of this vice there be; but pride and ignorance are the proper parents of it, whatever else be the nurse or friend.

CHAP. XX.

Objections Answered.

I EASILY foresee, that besides the aforesaid impediments, all these following Objections will hinder the cure of false pretended knowledge, and self-conceitedness, and false belief, if they be not answered.

Object. 1. You move men to an impossibility: to see without light; and for an erring man to believe that he erreth. He that hath not light to see the truth, hath not light to see his ignorance of it. This is no more, than to persuade all men to be wise, and not to err; which you may do long enough to little purpose.'

Answ. It is impossible indeed for an erring man, while such, to know that he erreth: but it is not impossible 1. For an ignorant man to know that he is ignorant; (nor for a man without light or sight, to know that he seeth not; though he cannot see that he seeth not). For though nescience be nothing; and nothing is not properly and directly an object of our knowledge, no more than of our sight: yet as we see the limited quantity of substances, and so know little from big, by concluding that it hath no more quantity than we see; so we know our own knowledge, both as to object and act, and we know the degree of it, and to what it doth extend: and so can conclude, I know no more. And though nescience be nothing, yet this proposition, I know no more,' is not nothing. And so nothing is usually said to be known reductively; but indeed it is not properly known at all; but this proposition, de nihilo, is known, which is something. (I will not here meddle with the question, whether God know nonentities.)

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2. To think, and to know, are not all one: for I may think that I may know; that is, I study to know. Now I can know that I study, or think; and I can perceive, that my studies reach not what I desire to reach, but fall short of satisfaction: and so as in the body, though emptiness be

nothing, and therefore not felt as nothing; yet a hungry man feeleth it in the consequents, by accident; that is, feeleth that by which he knoweth that he is empty and so it is with a student as to knowledge.

3. And a man that hath so much experience, as we all have of the stated darkness of our understandings, and frequent errors; may well know, that this understanding is to be suspected, and so blind a guide not over-confidently and rashly to be trusted.

4. And a man that knoweth the danger of error, may know that it is a thing that it should fear and fear should make him cautelous.

5. And though an erring man, while such, cannot know that he erreth; yet, by the aforesaid means, he may cease to err, and know that he hath erred.

6. And lastly, It is a shame for a man to be unacquainted with himself, and especially with his understanding, and not to know the measure of his knowledge itself.

Object. II. You talk like a Cartesian, that must have all that would know, suppose first that they know nothing, no not that he feeleth and liveth.'

Answ. No such matter. Some things we know necessarily, and cannot choose but know: for the intellect is not free of itself, but only as 'quoad exercitium actus,' it is 'sub imperio voluntatis.' And it is vain to bid men not to know what they cannot choose but know. And it is as vain to tell them that they must suppose, (falsely,) that they know not what they know, as a means to know: for ignorance is no means to knowledge, but knowledge is. One act of knowledge being necessary to more, and therefore not to be denied. I have told you before what certainties are, which must be known, and never forsaken.

Object. III. But your discourse plainly tendeth to draw men to scepticism, and to doubt of all things.'

Answ. 1. I tell you, I describe to you many certainties not to be doubted of. 2. And it is indeed your prefidence that tendeth to scepticism, as is shewed: for men that believe hastily and falsely, find themselves so often deceived, that at last they begin to doubt of all things: it is scepticism which I prevent. 3. But I confess to you, that I am less afraid of scepticism in the world, than ever I was; as

finding corrupt nature so universally disposed the contrary way. As when I first saw the books of Jacob Behmen, and some such others, I adventured to prognosticate, that the Church would never be much endangered by that sect, or any other which a man cannot understand and join in, without great study and acuteness; because few men will be at so much labour; even so I say of scepticism; here and there a hard, impatient, half-knowing student, may turn sceptic; but never any great number. For pride and ignorance, and other causes of self-conceitedness are born in all men; and every man that apprehendeth any thing, is naturally apt to be too confident of his apprehensions; and few will have the humility to suspect themselves, or the patience and diligence to find out difficulties. I must say in my experience, that except the congregation which I long instructed, and some few such, I meet with few women, boys, or unlearned men, when they are past eighteen or twenty years old, but they are in conceit wiser than I, and are still in the right, and I am in the wrong, in things natural, civil, religious, or almost any thing we talk of, if I say not as they say; and it is so hard to abate their confidence, or convince them, that I have half ceased to endeavour it, but let every one believe and say what he will, so it be not to the dishonour of God, the wrong of others, and the hazard of his salvation: for I take it for granted beforehand, that contradiction more often causeth strife than instruction; and when they take not themselves for scholars, they seldom learn much of any but themselves: and their own thoughts and experience must teach them that in many years which from an experienced man they might have more cheaply learned in a few days.

Object. IV. 'You speak against taking things on trust, and so would keep children from believing and learning of their parents and masters, and from growing wise.'

Answ. I often tell you that human faith is a necessary help to divine faith; but it must not be mistaken for divine faith. Men are to be believed as fallible men; but in some things with diffidence, and in some things with confidence, and in some things, (where it is not the speaker's credit that we rely on but a concurrence of testimonies, which make up a natural certainty,) belief and knowledge go together, and the thing is sure. But man is not God.

Object. V. May not a man more safely and confidently believe by the Church's faith, than his own? That is, take that for more certain which all men believe, than that which I think I see a divine word for myself?"

Answ. This is a Popish objection thus confusedly and fallaciously often made. 1. Properly, no man can believe by any faith but his own, any more than understand with any understanding but his own. But the meaning being, that we may better trust to the Church's judgment, that this or that is God's word, than to our own persuasion that it is God's word, from the evidence of the revelation. I further answer. 2. That the Church's judgment is one part of our subordinate motive; and therefore not to be put in competition with that divine evidence which it is always put in conjunction with. And the Church's teaching, is the means of my coming to know the true evidences of Divinity in the Word. And the Church's real holiness caused by that Word, is one of the evidences themselves, and not the least. Now to put the question, whether I must know the Scripture to be God's Word because I discern the evidences of its divinity, or rather because the Church teacheth me that it is God's Word, or because the Church saith it is God's Word, or because the Church is sanctified by it, are all vain questions; setting things conjunct and co-ordinate as opposite. 1. By the Church's judgment or belief, I am moved to a high reverence of God's Word, by a very high human faith, supposing it credible that it may be God's Word indeed. 2. Next by the Church's (or minister's) teaching, the evidences of its divinity are made known to me. 3. The. effect of it, in the Church's holiness, is one of these evidences. 4. And by that and all other evidences I know that it is God's Word. 5. And therefore I believe it to be true. This is the true order and resolution of our faith.

3. But because the Popish method is, barely to believe the Scripture to be God's Word, because a Pope and his Council judgeth so, I add, 1. That we have even of that human sort of testimony far more than such. For theirs is the testimony of a self-exalting sect of Christians, about the third part of the Christian world: but we have also the testimony of them and of all other Christians; and in most or much of the matter of fact, (that the Scriptures were deli

vered down from the apostles) the testimony of some heathens and abundance of heretics. 2. And with these we have the evidences of its divinity themselves. 3. But if we had their Church's (or Pope and Council's) decrees for it alone, we should take it but for a human, fallible testimony.

For, 1. They cannot plead God's word here as the proof of their infallibility: for it is the supposed question, what is God's word, which (they say) cannot be known but by their infallible judgment. 2. And they cannot plead number; for, 1. The Mahometans are more than the Christians in the world: Brierwood reckoneth that they are six parts of thirty, and we but five. And yet not therefore infallible nor credible. 2. And the heathens are more than the Mahometans and Christians (being four-sixth parts of the world), and yet not infallible. But of this I have the last week wrote a book of the "Certainty of Christianity without Popery;" and heretofore my " Safe Religion," and others.

Object. VI. At least this way of believing and knowing things by proper evidences of truth, will loosen the common sort of Christians, (even the godly) from their faith and religion for whereas now they go quietly on without doubting, as receiving the Scriptures from the Church or their teachers as the Word of God, when they fall on searching after proofs, they will be in danger of being overcome by difficulties, and filled with doubts, if not apostatizing to infidelity, or turning Papists.'

Answ. Either these persons have already the knowledge of certain evidence of the divinity of the Scripture, or Christianity, or they have none. If they have any, the way of studying it more will not take it from them, but increase it: else you dishonour Christianity to think that he that knoweth it to be of God, will think otherwise if he do but better try it. Upon search he will not know less, but more.

But if he have no such certainty already, 2. I further answer, that I take away from him none of that human belief which he had before: if the belief of his parents, teachers, or the Church only, did satisfy him before, which was but a strong probability, I leave with him the same help and probability, and only persuade him to add more and surer arguments. And therefore that should not weaken but confirm his faith.