Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic LifeProfessor Emeritus of Economics University of Massachusetts and Adjunct Professor Department of Politics Herbert Gintis, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Professor Faculty of Economics Samuel Bowles, Robert T. Boyd, Ernst Fehr, Professor of Economics and Director of the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Ernst Fehr MIT Press, 2005 - 404 páginas Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised self-interest but from the presence of "strong reciprocators" in a social group. Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology, social psychology, and sociology, the book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of this explanation for cooperation. Chapter authors in the remaining parts of the book discuss the behavioral ecology of cooperation in humans and nonhuman primates, modeling and testing strong reciprocity in economic scenarios, and reciprocity and social policy. The evidence for strong reciprocity in the book includes experiments using the famous Ultimatum Game (in which two players must agree on how to split a certain amount of money or they both get nothing.) |
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Contenido
Moral Sentiments and Material Interests Origins Evidence and Consequences | 3 |
The Behavioral Ecology of Cooperation | 41 |
The Evolution of Cooperation in Primate Groups | 43 |
The Natural History of Human Food Sharing and Cooperation A Review and a New MultiIndividual Approach to the Negotiation of Norms | 75 |
Costly Signaling and Cooperative Behavior | 115 |
Modeling and Testing Strong Reciprocity | 149 |
The Economics of Strong Reciprocity | 151 |
Modeling Strong Reciprocity | 193 |
Reciprocity and Social Policy | 251 |
Policies That Crowd out Reciprocity and Collective Action | 253 |
Reciprocity and the Welfare State | 277 |
Fairness Reciprocity and Wage Rigidity | 303 |
The Logic of Reciprocity Trust Collective Action and Law | 339 |
Social Capital Moral Sentiments and Community Governance | 379 |
Contributors | 399 |
401 | |
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment | 215 |
Norm Compliance and Strong Reciprocity | 229 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in ... Herbert Gintis,Samuel Bowles,Robert T. Boyd Sin vista previa disponible - 2006 |
Términos y frases comunes
altruistic associated average Behav behavior believe benefits Bowles chapter choose collective action competition contract contribute cooperation cost costly cultural cuts distribution Economic effect effort employees enforcement evidence evolution evolutionary example expected experimental experiments explain fact fairness families Fehr females Figure firms give given governance grooming higher human hunting important incentives income increase individuals inequity institutions interactions interest Journal kind less male managers means measures monkeys morale motives norms observed offer opportunists organization payoff percent period person player points political population positive predicts preferences Press primates problem production proposer punishment question rates reason receive reduce relative responders rules sanctions selection self-interest sharing signaling situation social societies strong reciprocity studies subjects suggest term theory tion types University wage welfare workers
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