The reviewer will perceive that Dr. B. has looked at this most offensive passage, and shown that it does not teach that infants are damned.

2. The next evidence from Turrettin, as at first quoted, is his interpretation of Romans v. 14. Death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.' By the persons here referred to, he understands infants; and by the death that reigned over them, eternal death; and therefore the reviewer infers that he taught, in the passage, actual infant damnation. But does he not know that death, eternal death, reigning over men, was a common phrase for expressing universal liableness to punishment-the condition of guilt and condemnation into which the fall brought the race—and that it was applied to all adults, and to all infants, and could not have been meant to teach the actual damnation of those to whom it was applied, because, assuredly, Turrettin did not hold that all adults and all infants were, through death, from Adam to Moses, actually sent to hell.

Not a particle of evidence, therefore, did the reviewer produce from Turrettin in favor of infant damnation.

The passage at first quoted and relied on from Edwards to prove infant damnation, is as follows:

"But this to me appears plainly a giving up that grand point of the imputation of Adam's sin, both in whole and in part. For it supposes it to be not right for God to bring any evil on a child of Adam, which is innocent as to personal sin, without paying for it, or balancing it with good; so that still the state of the child shall be as good as could be demanded in justice, in case of mere innocence. Which plainly supposes that the child is not exposed to any proper punishment at all, or is not at all in debt to divine justice, on the account of Adam's sin." vol. vi. p. 462.

This passage the reviewer admits does not teach the doctrine expressly; but insists, that, in its connexion, it shows that he believed it. His argument is, that Edwards opposed some more tender-hearted Calvinists, who held to a partial imputation, and a mitigated punishment of infants, and therefore he must have held to a full imputation, and full punishment. But the fact is not so. Edwards does not oppose these more tender-hearted divines, in respect to the actual condition of infants, but objects to the arguments by which they opposed a full, and contended for a limited imputation.

1. Original sin, by a full imputation, is the subject of his controversy with Taylor; and his words are not needlessly to be carried beyond the exigence of his argument.

2. It is a full imputation, and complete liability to punishment on the part of infants, for which Edwards contends, and concerning which he says, that the opposite view “relieves nothing ;" -i. e. if full imputation and full punishment be unjust, partial

imputation and mitigated punishment is unjust-the only difference being the degree of injustice. That infants are, on either supposition, actually punished, his argument does not require him to say, and he does not say.

But, says the reviewer, that very circumstance proves that he believed it; for Watts was distressed on the subject, and Edwards had a fine opportunity to relieve him; and why did he not do it?' Suppose we could not tell why? does it follow, therefore, that he believed in infant damnation? Perhaps he had not time, aside from his main argument, to speak as fully on so difficult a subject as he wished to do, if he spoke at all. Perhaps he had nothing to say, believing, with many others, that some infants certainly are saved, and concerning the rest, as he knew nothing, he said nothing, but left them in the hands of a merciful God. And possibly he may have chosen to write to Dr. Watts a private letter, saying that he agreed with his friend Dickinson, “that all those who die in infancy may, for aught we know, belong to the election of grace." Such is the reviewer's evidence that Edwards believed in infant damnation. He did not deny it, where his argument required no denial; therefore he believed that infants are damned.

To corroborate past deficiency, the reviewer gives the following quotation :

"It seems to me pretty manifest that none can, in good consistence with themselves, own a real imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin to his posterity, without owning that they are justly viewed and treated as sinners, truly guilty and children of wrath on that account: nor unless they allow a just imputation of the whole of the evil of that transgression: at least all that pertains to the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the covenant which God had established; even as much as if each one of mankind had the like covenant established with him singly, and had by the like direct and full act of rebellion, violated it for himself." vol. vi. pp. 462, 463.

The only thing in this extract which even appears to teach anything but full desert, is the phrase, infants" are justly viewed and treated as sinners." But Edwards is here speaking, not of their actual eternal doom; for he speaks of all infants, and all men, as affected by original sin. Did he believe then, and teach that all men are damned? Besides, the phrase, "viewed and treated," has reference, in this passage, to their being viewed and treated as sinners in what happens to them in the present life, and not to their treatment in the future state.

The next corroboration in his second attempt is the following passage:

"We may well argue from these things, that infants are not looked upon by God as sinless, but that they are by nature children of wrath, seeing this terrible evil comes so heavily on mankind in infancy. But besides these things, which are observable concerning the mortality of infants in general, there are some particular cases of the death of infants, which the Scriptures set before us, that are attended with circumstances in a peculiar manner giving evidence of the sinfulness of such, and their just exposedness to divine wrath As particularly,

"The destroying of the infants of Sodom, and the neighboring cities; which cities, destroyed in so extraordinary, miraculous and awful a manner, are set forth, as a signal example of God's dreadful vengeance for sin to the world in all generations; agreeable to that of the apostle Jude, verse 7. To say here, that God could make it up to those infants in another world, must be an insufficient reply. For so he could as easily have made it up to Lot, or to ten or fifty righteous, if they had been destroyed in the same fire: Nevertheless it is plainly signified, that this would not have been agreeable to the wise and holy proceedings of the Judge of all the earth.” vol. vi. pp. 262, 453, 254.

But this passage teaches nothing to the purpose, except in the reference to Jude, verse 7; and that proves nothing, unless the reviewer means to admit that Jude teaches infaut damnation. Besides, it is the temporal death of infants, of which, in this passage, Edwards is speaking, and not their eternal death; for the point of debate between him and Taylor was, not whether infants are damned in consequence of imputation and desert, but whether they are sinners by imputation, and deserving of punishment at all, of any kind or degree. And the argument he urges is, that temporal death is a punishment for sin-that therefore the death of infants proves guilt, which, as it cannot be actual, must be original by imputation; and the apostle Jude is quoted as giving an instance of the death of children, in which it is supposed to be inflicted as a punishment. But the text itself excepts infants from the vengeance of eternal fire; for it is said expressly that those who were set forth as an example of suffering, were those who gave themselves to fornication, and went after strange flesh."

The objection, too, that God might make it up to infants, shows that the sufferings to be made up were the sufferings of temporal death; for how could God make up to them the sufferings of eternal death?

The following is the last passage adduced in the second attempt to sustain the charge that Edwards believed in the damnation of infants.

"Merely persons' being born in covenant, is no more evidence of their having moral sincerity, than saving grace. Yea, there is more reason to suppose the latter, than the former without it, in the infant children of believing parents. For the Scripture gives us ground to think, that some infants have the habit of saving grace, and that they have a new nature given them; but no reason at all to think, that ever God works any mere moral change in them, or infuses any habits of moral virtue, without saving grace: And we know they cannot come by moral habits in infancy, any other way than by immediate infusion: They cannot obtain them by human instruction, nor contract them by use and custom. And especially there is no reason to think that the children of such as are visible saints, according to Mr. Williams' scheme, have any goodness infused into them by God, of any kind. For in his scheme, all that are morally sincere may lawfully receive the privileges of visible saints; But we have no Scripture grounds to suppose that God will bless the children of such parents as have nothing more than moral sincerity, with either common or saving grace. There are no promises of the covenant of grace made to such parents, either concerning themselves or their children." vol. i. pp. 497, 498.

But here, the question at issue between Edwards and Williams is, not whether infants will be saved or lost, but what are the

requisite qualifications for communion in adults? Williams relied on moral sincerity and a blameless life, and on the actual membership and right to communion of all who had been baptized. Edwards undertakes to show him that his argument is a felo de se -that if moral sincerity is indispensable, there is no evidence that infants possess it—that "merely persons' being born in covenant is no more evidence of moral sincerity than it is of saving grace" -nay, that there is more reason to suppose that infants have saving grace, than that they have moral sincerity; because we have some instances of sanctification from the womb, but none of moral sincerity being communicated without regeneration; and as they cannot obtain moral sincerity by instruction, and only by infusion, he concludes we have no reason to think, i. e. have no evidence, that God does communicate to the children of unrenewed men, either moral sincerity or holiness, as a qualification for subsequent sacramental communion.

Now then for the reviewer's syllogism.

"1. Without God's saving grace no one can be saved.

"2. Edwards says that the infants of mere morally sincere men cannot have saving grace. Therefore,

"3. Edwards believed that no such infants can be saved." But Edwards does not say they cannot have saving grace-he merely says that we have no positive evidence that it is communicated. And he says this only with reference to such as live, and not at all with reference to such as may die in infancy, for the state of such was no part of the subject in debate.

The following are quotations from Bellamy to prove infant damnation :

No. 1. It is plain and evident, from facts, that Adam was considered and dealt with under the capacity of a public head, and that death natural, spiritual, and eternal, were included in the threatening; for all his posterity are evidently dealt with just as if that had been the case. They are born spiritually dead, as has been proved in the former discourse. They are evidently liable to natural death, as soon as they are born. And if they die and go into eternity with their native temper, they must necessarily be miserable in being what they are, unlike to God, and incapable of the enjoyment of him, and contrary to him. And God must necessarily look upon them with everlasting abhorrence. vol. i. p. 312. No. 2. So that, to a demonstration, God's thoughts of mercy towards a guilty, undone world, did not, in any measure, take its rise from any notion that mankind had been hardly dealt with, or that it would be anything like cruelty or unmercifulness to damn the whole world for Adam's first sin. vol. i. p. 321.

No. 3. Mankind were, by their fall, brought into a state of being infinitely worse than not to be. The damned in hell, no doubt, are in such a state, else their punishment would not be infinite; as justice requires it should be. But mankind, by the fall, were brought into a state, for substance, as bad as that which the damned are in. For the damned undergo nothing in hell, but what, by the constitution with Adam, and the law of nature, all mankind were, and would have been, for substance, exposed unto, if mere grace had not prevented.” vol. i. p. 333.

To the objection, how can men have a heart to propagate their kind, if they are born children of wrath, in a state of being worse than not to be, Bellamy answers thus :—

No. 4. As to godly parents, they have such a spirit of love to God, and resignation to his will, and such an approbation of his dispensations towards mankind, and such a liking to his whole scheme of government, that they are content that God should govern the world as he does; and that he should have subjects to govern; and that themselves and their posterity should be under him, and at his disposal. Nor are they without hopes of mercy for their children, from sovereign grace through Christ, while they do, through him, devote and give them up to God, and bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. And thus they quiet themselves as to their souls. vol. i. p. 336.

:

No. 5. It was at God's sovereign election, to determine, whether to grant any relief, or not and what relief to grant and when, and to whom. To give his Son to die with a view to save all mankind, or only a part; to send the news of the Gospel to all nations, or only to some; to give every child of Adam, born in a Christian land, opportunity, by living, to hear the glad tidings, or only to grant this to some, while others die in infancy, and never hear. Those who die in infancy, may as justly be held under law in the next world, as those that live may in this. God is under no more obligations to save those that die, than he is to save those that live; to grant the regenerating influences of his Spirit to them than he is to these. vol. ii. pp. 369, 370.

No. 6. As to carnal men, since they are enemies to God and his holy law, it is no wonder they are at enmity against his whole scheme of conduct as Governor of the world. Did they understand how God governs the world, and firmly believe it, I doubt not it would make all their native enmity ferment to perfection. They would wish themselves to be from under God's government, and hate that he should ever have anything of their's to govern. As soon as ever they enter into the eternal world, and see how things really are, this will, no doubt, actually be their case. vol. i. p. 336.

The reviewer adduced, No. 2. chiefly "because it is so striking." What it strikes, or what he thought it struck, I cannot tell; as all it teaches is, that all mankind might have been punished justly for Adam's sin. But what has this to do to prove that infants are damned?

Nos. 1 and 3 were adduced to prove, "just what Dr. B. admits them to prove, and no more," viz. infant depravity, and, if they die in infancy, the necessity of renovation, to exempt them from misery, and prepare them for heaven.

It is from Nos. 4, 5, and 6, that the reviewer infers that Bellamy believed in the actual damnation of infants. He admits that Bellamy does not say that there is no hope for the children of unbelievers, dying in infancy, or that they are sent to hell; and it is his rot saying that there is hope, in his circumstances, which brings to the reviewer's mind the "irresistible evidence," that it was his opinion that the infants of unbelievers are lost.

But suppose that Bellamy, like the Reformed, and moderate Calvinists, and Dickinson, (as the Scriptures had decided nothing,) could not tell what became of the infants of unbelievers, and could only answer the objection in respect to minds who have implicit confidence in God, and some revealed hope for their children; does it follow, because he did not answer an objection which he could not for want of information, that therefore, without information or evidence, he believed that infants are damned? The whole evidence, so irresistible to the mind of the reviewer, amounts to this, that Bellamy said nothing, where the greatest number of