occasion of a world of guilt to those revolted spirits. Had not Christ come, satan could never have had an opportunity to have sinned in the manner he has, in tempting him, instigating his murderers, and all along opposing the spread of his kingdom. But would it be right therefore for satan, in behalf of himself and his associates, to plead in this manner at the great assize?" Why were we not confined to the deep? Seeing no mercy was designed for us, where was the justice of suffering us to range in the world, where it was certain we should only increase our guilt, and so be punished the more severely? Surely our first revolt was enough for us, without being suffered to go any farther."'

If the reasoning of P. on this subject, particularly in p. 57, prove any thing, it will prove not merely that sinners ought not to be punished more severely; but that, if it were not for grace provided for them, they ought not to be punished at all. In that case, one should think the greatest grace would have been to have let them alone, and left them under the ruins of the fall; then had they been blameless, and harmless, without rebuke, and consequently unexposed to misery, either here or hereafter.

After all, I question if ́P. really means any thing more by his notion of grace, than we do by natural ability. We allow that men can come to Christ, and do things spiritually good if they will. He is not satisfied, it seems, with this; they must have something of grace given, or offered, or otherwise they cannot be accountable beings.-Well, what does it

all amount to? Does he mean that they must have something of real good, and holy inclination in them? I question if he will affirm this. Does he mean that this supposed grace does any thing effectual towards making them willing? no such thing. What then does he mean? Nothing that I can comprehend more than this, that men may come to Christ if they will. His whole scheme of grace, therefore, amounts to no more than our natural ability. We admit that men in general are possessed of this ability; but then we have no notion of calling it grace. If we must be accountable beings, we apprehend this to be no more than an exercise of justice. And in fact our opponents; whatever terms they use, think the same; for though they call it grace, and so would seem to mean that it is something for which we had no claim, yet the constant drift of their writings proves that they mean no such thing: for they all along plead that it would be unjust and cruel in God to with-hold it, and yet to treat them as accountable beings. P. does not scruple to compare it to the conduct of an Egyptian task-master, who required brick without straw. What end, therefore, they can have in calling this power by the name of grace it is difficult to say, unless it be to avoid the odium of seeming to ascribe to divine grace nothing at all.

For my part, I apprehend whatever grace is provided for, or bestowed upon men, they are altogether inexcusable without any consideration of that nature whatever-Some of the principal reasons for which are as follow. 1. The term grace, implies that the

subject is totally unworthy. altogether inexcusable, and destitute of every claim; and all this previous to, and independent of, its bestowment; otherwise grace is no more grace. 2. The heathen in their ignorance

For

of God are said to be without excuse; and that not from the consideration of grace bestowed upon them, unless by grace is meant simply the means of knowledge by the works of creation, answering to the testimony of conscience within them. That which may be known of God, says the apostle, is manifest in them, for God hath shewed it unto them. the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; even his eternal power and Godhead-so that they are without_excuse.* 3. The manner in which the godly have prayed for grace to fulfil their duty, and preserve them from sin, shews that they considered themselves as obliged to duty, and as liable to sin, antecedent to its bestowment. "Thou hast commanded us that we should keep thy precepts diligently; O, that my ways were directed to keep thy statutes! We know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit itself helpeth our infirmities. Hold up my goings in thy paths, that my footsteps slip not. O, that thou wouldest keep me from evil, that it may not grieve me! Keep back thy servant from presumptuous sins-then shall I be in

* Rom. i. 19, 20.

nocent from the great transgression.* 4. Fallen angels are under a moral inability to love God, or do any thing that is really good; and no grace is provided for them, yet they are without excuse.

P. informs us of some unsuccessful conferences which he has frequently had with unconverted sinners, in endeavouring to fix blame upon their consciences upon Calvanistic principles. (60.) If I had had the pleasure of being a stander-by in one or more of those conferences, I imagine I should have seen a very easy conquest; and no wonder, people seldom manage those principles which they do not believe, to the best advantage. We see this exemplified too often where a controversy is written in the form of a dialogue.

I do not apprehend P. intended to plead the cause of the infernal legions in their continued enmity to, and rebellion against, the Most High; but if I am not greatly mistaken, the purport of his reasoning is fully of that tendency. There is only one particular wanting, viz. deriving their depravity from a predecessor, to render all their iniquities, according to his reasoning, entirely excusable. They cannot now find in their hearts to do aught but evil; and no grace being bestowed upon them to deliver them, wherein can consist their blame? 'Tis true each of them brought his depravity upon himself, without deriving it from another; and this may prove them to have been to

* Psal. cxix. 4. 5. Rom. viii. 26. Psal. xvii. 5. 1 Chron. iv. 10. Psal. xix. 13.

blame in that their first revolt, but not in any thing that follows. They sinned to be sure at the beginning; but if the reasoning of P. be just, I do not see how they can have sinned from it. He insists upon it in these cases there is no difference between a natural and moral inability, "for what we cannot do, we cannot do." (60.) Now in all cases of natural inability, the party is excusable, even though he may by his own fault have brought that inability upon himself. If a man, by debauchery or excess, bring upon himself the loss of his limbs to such a degree as utterly to disable him from all future employment; it is not then his duty to do the same business which it was before. His inability is really an excuse. 'Tis true it does not excuse his former intemperance; for that he was to blame: but it excuses his present cessation from business; for that he is not to blame, nor can any person blame him. This will hold good in all cases of natural inability whatever; and if there is no difference between that and what is of a moral nature, the same reasoning will apply to the fallen angels. They were certainly to blame for their first revolt, by which they contracted their inability; but how can they be to blame for continuing what they are? Their propensity to evil is now become invincible; and no grace is bestowed upon them to deliver them from it: how then can they be to blame? And if truth is of a like force in all places and at all times, why should not the plough-boy's argument, as it is called, "what we cannot do, we cannot do," be as