Their only liberties might not be summarily suppressed. bulwark, the power of the purse, was in danger of being wellnigh levelled by the royal claim to impose taxes upon merchandise -a claim which both now and afterwards Bacon maintained to be strictly legal. Common patriotism might have protested at leaving the liberties of the English nation thus unprotected and at the mercy of the Sovereign; common honesty might have revolted at this violation of the Spirit of Magna Charta, under pretext of isolated and exceptional precedents mostly derived from troubled times, or from the period of national lassitude consequent on the Wars of the Roses; common sense, without any claim to prophetic foresight, might have anticipated that the straining of the Royal Prerogative, in times of freer thought and growing demand for liberty, must necessarily end in bringing King and people into a fatal collision. But with Francis Bacon none of these three considerations had sufficient weight to prevent him from advocating a course which could not but ultimately lead to conflict and revolution, but which had the immediate effect of strongly recommending him to the King and facilitating his own advancement. § 20 BACON'S REMEDY AGAINST THE COMING REVOLUTION Bacon's remedies against the coming Revolution, so far as we can judge from the Commentarius Solutus, appear to have been three: 1st, the suppression of the lawyers and the exaltation of the King's "summary justice," by which means the Sovereign was to conciliate his subjects, and especially the poor, administering justice more cheaply, speedily, and impartially than at present; 2nd, the acquisition of a permanent royal revenue by means similar to those proposed by Salisbury in the Great Contract; 3rd, the distraction of the popular attention from political and debatable questions by the excitements of foreign war. All Bacon's remarks on laws, lawyers, and judges in the Commentarius Solutus tend to the same object, the subordination of the lawyers as a political power; and they show the peculiar and responsible position then occupied by the legal profession. In the existing relations between the King and his subjects there was then a debatable ground wherein the Prerogative of the former conflicted with the liberties of the latter; and in this field it was scarcely possible for a Judge to decide a special case without modifying and defining for posterity those previously indefinite relations, and to some extent trenching on the functions of a Statesman. Thus in 1606 the well-known decision of "Bates's case" had sanctioned the royal claim to levy Impositions on exports and imports, and the claim sustained by this single decision was maintained for thirty-five years. In our days Parliament can at once rectify, by a new Act, an injury arising from a judicial interpretation of statutes or from the over-riding of statutes by Common Law: but no such power existed then. This unsettled condition of things commended itself to Coke, as being providentially calculated to erect the Judges into a great constitutional Tribunal, whose duty it was to mediate impartially between the King and the people Bacon, on the other side, believing that true statesmanship consisted in the magnifying of the Prerogative, felt that no amount of knowledge of the Common Law of England would ever constitute such a Statesman as he deemed worthy of the name. Against the lawyers therefore, it is part of his policy to be always on his guard, and especially against lawyers of the type of Coke, whom he stigmatizes as "mere lawyers."1 "Mere lawyers" are to be "disprized;" they are to be kept "in awe," that is, in dread that they may miss promotion, by "not calling Sergeants till Parliament has met:" Bacon proposes to make use of the Archbishop of Canterbury's opposition to the lawyers, in order to bring on a project of reforming the Laws. Elsewhere he mentions his intention of submitting to the King his project for revising the Laws, and apparently (though the language is not quite clear) with some special reference to the royal Prerogative: "for equalling laws, to proceed with my Method, and to shew the King title of Prerogative, as it is done."2 No doubt, in any reform, Bacon could have removed much that was irregular and inequitable; but there is as little doubt that his reformation would have commended itself rather to the Archbishop and the King than 1 See Gardiner, History, iii, 23-4. Spedding, Life, iv. p. 94. 2 L to the lawyers themselves, or to the party which, through the lawyers, was aiming at the defining and strengthening of the liberties of the people. As for the financial part of Bacon's policy, the Commentarius contains no indication that its author did not sincerely believe (in July 1608, at all events) that Salisbury's financial projects were the best that could be devised: "Note amongst the pores of gain thought of by my L(ord) of Salisb(ury.) He wanteth Divites et Orbi tanquam indagine capi," apparently referring to some project of fishing out orphans and rich people to make a profit of wardships and exceptionally large incomes-" and mutter of marchanding, which, mixed with power of estate, I conceive may do wonders.... To correspond "-i.e.conform--" to Salisbury) in the invent(ion) of suits and levies of money and to resp(ect) poll. è gem. for emp(ty) coffers and alien(ation) of the peop(le.)" 1 We seek in vain throughout the Commentarius for some definite scheme of internal policy beyond the suppression of the lawyers, and the increase of the King's permanent revenue. And yet, if Bacon had such a scheme, he must certainly have made mention of it. For in the section which he entitles "Poll." and reserves for political notes, he states, briefly but methodically, first, all the great dangers of the day, then other minor perils, and then the means of remedying them; and in this sketch he could hardly have omitted any original scheme of his own, if he had been prepared with one. The 1 "For empty coffers," i.e. "to cure empty coffers." I can find in the Comm. Solutus no trace whatever of any dissent from Salisbury's financial schemes, and no indication that they even needed improvement, unless the following rather obscure passage implies that Bacon objected to some of the impositions laid on by Salisbury: "My L. of Salisbury is to be remembered of the great expectation wherewith he enters; as, that he will make the King's payments certain... ; that he will moderate new Impositions," (Spedding, iv. 46). This is written in July 1608. Salisbury "entered" on the office of Treasurer in April 1608, and, while lessening a few existing impositions, had laid on new ones to the amount of £60,000 a year in June 1608. Bacon's meaning is therefore (as Mr. Spedding has pointed out) not quite clear. But I have placed the passage before the reader, as the only one of the kind. It may possibly mean that people believed (in July) that Salisbury had laid on the "new Impositions" in June with the view of "moderating," or removing them in exchange for some contribution from the Commons. But could an expectation in July be described as "an expectation wherewith S. enters?" Possibly this entry may have been written in April and "transferred" (see note on p. 130, above) to the Comm. Sol. in July, and it may have referred to some recent Impositions that might be called "new in April; but why transfer an entry, unchanged, that has become inapplicable? I hope some critic may find a solution of the difficulty pointed out by Mr. Spedding. danger that comes first in his list is "The bringing the King low by poverty) and empt(y) coffers)." After this, he passes before his mind other possible perils: danger from Scotland; danger from some too powerful subject, e.g. Salisbury; from the Privy Council; from the Lower House in Parliament; the office of Lieutenant Constable is then mentioned in connection with the possible absence of the Prince (Henry) in wars, if he should come to the Crown. Then follow remedies. There is to be confederacy and more straight amity with the Low Countries." Jurisdictions are to be limited and made more regular; and he asks himself what, if any, use could be made of the Presbytery or nobility of Scotland. It would appear, but it is by no means certain, that he has in mind the possibility of persuading the King to abate something of the pretensions of the Prerogative; for the next entry mentions "books in commendation of Mon (archy) mixed or Aristoc(racy);" and the next is, “persuade the King in glory, Aurea condet saecula." But this last sentence may refer merely to the following entry: "new laws to be compounded and collected; lawgiver perpetuus princeps;" and Bacon's meaning may be that he will persuade the King to support his favourite project of reforming the Laws by reminding him of the glory that attends a Lawgiver.1 After a suggestion as to the Church-" restore the Church to the true limits of authority since Henry VIII.'s confusion-" he notes "choice of persons act(ive) and in their nat(ure) stir(ring) and assure them," apparently meaning that the King is to select, for the struggle with his people, ambitious men whose loyalty must be insured.2 Possibly he himself might become chief Minister and wield the whole power of the State, diverting the King from domestic politics by "glory;" and hence the following entry :-" succ(eed) Salisb(ury) and amuse the K(ing) and Prince) with pasti(me) and glory." In order to diffuse his views on politics he contemplates "finishing my treat(ise) of 1 In Essay lv. 33 "the true marshalling of the degrees of sovereign honour" assigns the second place (above liberators and increasers of empire) to "lawgivers, which are also called second founders, or perpetui principes, because they govern by their ordinances after they are gone." 2 Ambition maketh men active . . and stirring."-Essays, xxxvi. 2. "Good commanders in the wars must be taken, be they never so ambitious. there is also great use of ambitious men in being screens to princes in matters of danger and envy."-Ib. 21-25. the great(ness) of Br(itain) with aspect ad pol(iticam)." Then he mentions the names of several members of the House of Commons, probably as being popular, who might be useful if conciliated: "Chem. (?) pop(ular) Neville, Sandys, Herbert, Crofts, Berkly." Thus having touched on possible dangers and possible remedies, without hitherto giving an opinion as to the most suitable remedy-jotting thoughts down on paper in order to see, as it were, how they looked-he now concludes by mentioning the one remedy that seems to him most efficacious; and this is simply an energetic foreign policy calculated to distract the people from internal politics. All questions that may arise concerning domestic policy are to be turned aside by reference to the "ampliation of a Monarchy in the Royalty." "The fairest, without dis(order) or per(il), is the gener(al) persuad(ing) to K(ing) and peop(le) and cours(e) of infusing everywhere the foundat(ion) in this Isle of a Monarchy in the West, as an apt seat, state, people, for it ; so civilising Ireland; further colonising the wild of Scotl(and), annexing the Low Countries. "If anything be questio(ned) touch (ing) Pol(icy), to be turned upon the Ampliation of a Mon(archy) in the Royalty." Annexing the Low Countries," meant war with Spain; and this was the policy that Bacon had distinctly advocated in his speech on Naturalization.1. This advice is somewhat similar to that which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Henry IV., exhorting his son to distract the attention of the people from his unsound title by foreign wars: "Therefore, my Harry, Be it thy course to busy giddy minds With foreign quarrels ; that action, hence borne out, An able and warlike King, following Bacon's advice, might perhaps have united his people in an aggressive foreign policy of "glory" and so have deferred for many years the struggle between Crown and Commonwealth. The story of the Spanish Armada and the exuberance of the national loyalty consequent on the Gunpowder Plot showed how much of internal discord. 1 See above, pp. 115, 116. |