292 NATURE OF THE COUNTRY 1809. CHAP. VIL cable for artillery. The long chain of mountains, which take their rise towards the sources of the Tagus, follow that river in its course to where it enters the frontier of Portugal, and form an immense and almost impassable barrier from Segovia to Placentia. Between these mountains and the river lies what is called the valley of the Tagus, at some places only a few miles wide, at others enlarging in latitude according to the inflections of the river. Along this valley runs the principal road from Placentia to Madrid. A country, which is bounded on one flank by a deep river, and on the other by a range of lofty mountains, must naturally be supposed to afford strong stations of defence. It does so at Oropesa, at Maqueda, and at Santa Cruz; and by defending these positions, the French would have been enabled to oppose very powerful obstacles to the advance of the allies. The northern road to the capital, leading by the Douro, was defended by the army under Soult, consisting of his own corps, and those of Ney and Mortier, which could be concentrated by a few marches. Victor's force occupied the road leading by the valley of the Tagus. These BETWEEN THE DOURO AND THE TAGUS. 223 1809. June. armies communicated across the intervening CHAP. VII. mountains, by the roads in the neighbourhood of Segovia, while by that leading from Salamanca to Placentia, either Victor or Soult would be enabled to act offensively against the rear of an enemy who should advance against the other. The immediate object of both leaders was to cover the capital, the possession of which, in every point of view, was of the greatest consequence to the invaders. On the twenty-seventh of June, the British army broke up from its cantonments on the Tagus, and, in two columns, directed its march on Placentia. Of these, one, consisting of three divisions of infantry, and the whole of the cavalry, advanced by way of Coria; the other column proceeded by a different route, and the whole army were concentrated at Placentia about the tenth of July. The Lusitanian legion, Jul. 10. under Sir Robert Wilson, with several Spanish battalions of light infantry, were stationed on the Tietar, in order to act independently on the flank or rear of the enemy, as circumstances might direct. From Placentia the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley might, with equal facility, be directed 224 BRITISH ARMY REACHES PLACENTIA: 1809. July. CHAP. VII. against either Soult or Victor; and, while the British army remained in that neighbourhood, no decided indication had been given of the intention of its leader. But the moment it commenced its march from Placentia, the object of the allies could no longer remain concealed; and one of the French armies would, from that moment, find itself at liberty to engage in operations in support of that threatened with attack, either by effecting a junction by the passes of the Guadarama, or by moving towards Placentia, and thus placing itself in rear of the allied armies. While the army remained at Placentia, Sir Arthur Wellesley went to the Spanish headquarters, and held an interview with Cuesta. He found that leader decidedly averse from the project of dividing his army, and anxious that the passes of Perales and Banos should be occupied by the British, in order that his own force might enjoy the chief honour of defeating Victor in the contemplated engagement. On these points, however, he was at length overruled, but the force eventually detached was altogether inadequate to the object. The plan of operations failed, too, in another particular. The orders IT ADVANCES FROM PLACENTIA. 225 1809. July. sent to Vanegas were countermanded by the CHAP.VII. Junta; and thus did the corps under that General remain inoperative, at the moment when its services were most necessary to the success of the campaign. In the meanwhile, the most confident promises were made by Cuesta, that no difficulty would be found in provisioning the armies in the country they were about to enter; and on the return of Sir Arthur Wellesley, rapid preparations were made for continuing the advance on Madrid. On the eighteenth, the army broke up from Jul. 18. Placentia, and halted at Majadas; thus clearly indicating that the corps of Victor was about to become the immediate object of hostile operation. On the twentieth, the British headquarters were at Oropesa, where a junction was effected with Cuesta's army. On the twenty- Jul. 22. second, the advance was continued; and the enemy were driven from the town of Talavera de la Reyna, across the Alberche, where Victor placed his army in position. Sir Arthur Wellesley was anxious to attack the enemy on the morning of the twentythird, but to this measure Cuesta refused his 226 1809. July. CUESTA REFUSES TO ATTACK VICTOR. . CHAP.VII. assent. In vain did the British General urge the inevitable dangers of delay in the precarious position of the armies, and entreat that time so precious should not be wasted in inaction. Cuesta could neither be swayed by argument nor influenced by entreaty. He was obstinate and lethargic; fell asleep during the conference; and Sir Arthur Wellesley felt the full extent of his misfortune, in being thus dependant on a man, who, however honest in principle, was evidently wanting in all the qualities of a General. In the meanwhile, Sir Robert Wilson quitted his position on the Tietar on the fifteenth, and on the twenty-third reached Escalona, a town about eight leagues distant from Madrid, and in rear of Victor's army. In consequence of this movement, the French army fell back during the night in the direction of Toledo. Other circumstances likewise contributed to thwart the views of Sir Arthur Wellesley. The promise that his army during its advance would be furnished with the necessary supplies by the authorities of the country, had not been fulfilled. The troops had suffered considerably from want of provisions; and Sir Arthur, thus circumstanced, |