212 BLAKE SUCCEEDS TO THE COMMAND, CHAP. VI. the cause for which Aloys had fought-the cause of freedom. 1809. April. May. On the death of Reding, the Marquis de Coupigny succeeded to the temporary command of the Catalan army. He was superseded by Blake, whose powers were more extensive than those of his predecessors, being appointed Commanderin-chief in Catalonia, Valencia, and Arragon. The loss of nearly all the fortresses, and the dispersion of the armies, compelled him for a time to limit his views to the re-organization of the troops, and the encouragement of that species of harassing warfare for which the character of the country afforded such peculiar facilities. A Having succeeded in collecting a considerable force, the views of Blake became more extended. His first operations were fortunate. French detachment, of about one thousand men, were cut off in an attempt to regain the fortress of Monzon. Blake then resolved to attempt the recovery of the city of Alcaniz, a position of considerable importance, as it intercepted the communication between Mequimenza and Tortosa, and commanded the high road to Valencia. May 28. In this, Blake was again successful. The town AND IS DEFEATED AT BELCHITE. 213 was taken; and the enemy, commanded by Su- CHAP. VI. chet, were repulsed in their most powerful ef forts to regain it. After four attacks, the French army were compelled to retreat with great loss. 1809. June. The next object of Blake was the recovery of Zaragoza. With the united armies of Arragon Jun. 15. and Valencia, he attacked the enemy under Suchet, who were strongly posted in front of the town. Here his good fortune failed. His troops were repulsed with considerable loss; and, harassed in his retreat by the French army, he took up a position on the heights of Sta. Maria, above Belchite, and resolved to stand the issue of a battle. This too was unfortunate. The raw Valen- Jun. 18. cian troops gave way with little resistance. The panic spread, and the whole army soon fled in confusion, leaving their arms, artillery, and ammunition on the field. To this disgraceful conduct of the troops, a single regiment alone afforded an exception. They rallied at a short distance from the field, but were speedily cut to pieces. Suchet rapidly followed up the advantage he had thus easily acquired. He entered Alcaniz, 214 1809. June. ORIGIN OF THE GUERILLAS. CHAP. VI. Calanda, and Carpe, making many prisoners, and dispersing everything opposed to him. In Arragon resistance was no longer attempted, and Blake retired into Catalonia, where he endeavoured to re-organize his scattered army. It was at this period that the system of Guerilla warfare, which had spontaneously sprung up in different parts of the Peninsula, became so widely extended as to exercise an important influence on the character of the contest. When the French first attempted the subjugation of Spain, so pervading was the hostility of the natives, that it was found necessary to divide their armies into small bodies, in order to procure subsistence, and maintain subjection in the towns and villages. Inferior officers were thus raised into commanders; and, restrained by no feeling of responsibility, plunder, cruelty, and oppression, on the one hand, were followed by hatred and desire of vengeance, on the other. Thus strife, of the most deadly and inveterate character, was daily waged between the invaders and the native population. Many of the latter, rendered desperate by the destruction of their property, fled to the mountains, where they remained, unless when compelled ORIGIN OF THE GUERILLAS. 215 1809. by necessity to descend to the neighbouring vil- CHAP. VI. lages in search of provisions. When at these times they chanced to encounter a small party of the enemy, an irregular fight ensued. No quarter was given on either side, and the bloody character of these contests tended still further to increase the feelings of animosity on both sides. The French, indignant at the slaughter of their countrymen, by men whom they at once feared and despised, continued to wreak their vengeance on the defenceless inhabitants. These were driven in greater numbers to join the desperate and lawless bands in the mountains; and thus arose that general and extended system of warfare, which carried with it results far greater and more important to the cause of Spain, than the greatest successes which her armies had been able to achieve. The augmented atrocities of the invaders, tended only to deepen the hatred of the nation, and to impress more indelibly the necessity of resistance. Unity of sentiment and purpose brought with it a certain unity of action in the undirected efforts of the people; and to regular warfare succeeded a system of war in detail,species of organized disorder,-of petty but fe 8 216 GUERILLA WARFARE BECOMES PREVALENT. 1809. CHAP. VI. rocious contests, at once suited to the circumstances of the country, and the fierce and untamed spirit of its population. These bands, in their character and objects at once predatory and patriotic, were joined by active and enterprizing men of all classes. Intelligence of their successes, exaggerated by frequent repetition, spread like wildfire through the country, stimulating the hopes, and increasing the confidence of the people; and the French soon found themselves assailed by an instrument of tremendous power, to which no efficacious resistance could be offered. The Guerillas were without uniform and without pay. Having a perfect knowledge of the country, they assembled or dispersed at pleasure; and thus while they were always prepared to co-operate for the destruction of such bodies of the enemy as approached their district, they in a moment became intangible to any superior force detached in pursuit. In the different provinces, leaders of distinguished talent and enterprize occasionally arose, who gave to this desultory warfare additional vigour and effect. The names of men, who contributed so powerfully to the liberation of their |