mon fenfe into that of mere chance. If fuch were the nature of man, no one could rely on another: a promise or an oath would be a rope of fand: the utmost cordiality between two friends would be no fecurity to either against the other: the firft weapon that comes in the way might be lethal. Would any man wish to have been formed according to fuch a model? He would probably wish to have been formed according to the model first mentioned: but that is denied him, virtuous mótives fometimes prevailing, fometimes vitious; and from the wisdom of Providence we have reafon to believe, that this law is of all the best fitted for man in his present ftate.

To conclude this branch of the fubject: In none of the works of Providence, as far as we can penetrate, is there display'd a deeper reach of art and wisdom, than in the laws of action peculiar to man as a thinking and rational being. Were he left loose to act in contradiction to motives, there would be no place for prudence, forefight, nor for adjufting means to an end: It could not be foreseen by others what a man would do the next hour;

hour; nay it could not be forefeen even by himself. Man would not be capable of rewards and punishments: he would not be fitted, either for divine or for human government: he would be a creature that has no refemblance to the human race. But man is not left loose; for tho' he is at liberty to act according to his own will, yet his will is regulated by defire, and defire by what pleases and displeases. This connection preferves uniformity of conduct, and confines human actions within great chain of caufes and effects. By this admirable fyftem, liberty and neceffity, feemingly incompatible, are made perfectly concordant, fitting us for fociety, and for government both human and divine.

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Having explained the laws that govern human actions; we proceed to what is chiefly intended in the present section, which is, to examine how far the moral fentiments handled in the foregoing fections are confiftent with thefe laws. Let it be kept in view, that the perception of a right and a wrong in actions, is founded entirely upon the moral fenfe. And that upon the fame fenfe are founded the fentiO 2

ments

ments of approbation and praise when a man does right, and of disapprobation and blame when he does wrong. Were we deftitute of the moral fenfe, right and wrong, praise and blame, would be as little understood as colours are by one born blind *.

The formidable argument urged to prove that our moral fentiments are inconfiftent with the fuppofed neceffary influence of motives, is what follows. "If "motives have a neceffary influence on

our actions, there can be no good rea"fon to praise a man for doing right, nor to blame him for doing wrong. What

* In an intricate fubject like the prefent, great' care fhould be taken to avoid ambiguities. The term praife has two different fignifications: in one, fense it is opposed to blame; in another, to difpraife. In the former sense it expreffes a moral fentiment in the latter, it expreffes only the approving any object that pleafes me. I praife one man for his candour, and blame another for being a doubledealer. Thefe, both of them, imply will and intention. I praise a man for being acute; but for be, ing dull, I only difpraife him. I praise a woman for beauty; but blame not any for uglinefs, I only difpraife them. None of thefe particulars imply will or intention.

"foundation

"foundation can there be either for praise

"

or blame, when it was not in a man's power to have acted otherwife. A man "commits murder, inftigated by a fud"den fit of revenge: why should he be "punished, if he acted neceffarily, and "could not refift the violence of the paf"fion?" Here it is fuppofed, that a power of refiftance is effential to praise and blame. But upon examination it will be found, that this fuppofition has not any fupport in the moral fenfe, nor in reason, nor in the common sense of mankind.

With respect to the first, the moral fense, as we have seen above, places innocence and guilt and confequently praise and blame, entirely upon will and intention. The connection between the motive and the action, fo far from diminishing, enhances the praife or blame. The greater influence a virtuous motive has, the greater is the virtue of the actor, and the more warm our praise. On the other hand, the greater influence a vitious motive has, the greater is the vice of the actor, and the more violently do we blame him. As this is the cardinal point, I wish to have it confidered in a general view.

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It is effential both to human and divine government, that the influence of motives fhould be neceffary. It is equally effential, that that neceffary influence fhould not have the effect to leffen guilt in the eftimation of men. To fulfil both ends, guilt is placed by the moral sense entirely upon will and intention: a man accordingly blames himself for doing mischief willingly and intentionally, without once confidering whether he acted neceffarily or not. And his fentiments are adopted by all the world: they pronounce the fame fentence of condemnation that he himself does. A man put to the torture, yields to the pain, and with bitter reluctance reveals the fecrets of his party: another does the fame, yielding to a tempting bribe. The latter only is blamed as guilty of a crime; and yet the bribe perhaps operated as ftrongly on the latter, as torture did on the former. But the one was compelled reluctantly to reveal the fecrets of his party; and therefore is innocent: the other acted willingly, in order to procure a great fum of money; and therefore is guilty.

With refpect to reafon, I obferve, that

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