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for that particular perfon, yet as we either have conceived, or may be disposed to conceive, paffions of the fame kind, we readily enter into those high hopes of happiness which are propofed from its gratification, as well as into that exquifite diftrefs which is feared from its difappointment. It interefts us not as a paffion, but as a fituation that gives occafion to other paffions which intereft us; to hope, to fear, and to diftrefs of every kind: in the fame manner as in a defcription of a feavoyage, it is not the hunger which interests us, but the distress which that hunger occafions. Though we do not properly enter into the attachment of the lover, we readily go along with thofe expectations of romantic happiness which he derives from it. We feel how natural it is for the mind, in a certain fituation, relaxed with indolence, and fatigued with the violence of defire, to long for ferenity and quiet, to hope to find them in the gratification of the paffion which distracts it, and to frame to itself the idea of that life of pastoral tranquillity and retirement which the elegant, the tender, and the paffionate Tibullus takes fo much pleasure in defcribing; a life like what the poets describe in the Fortunate Islands, a life of friendship, liberty, and repose; free from labor, and from care, and from all the turbulent passions which attend them. Even fcenes of this kind interest us most, when they are painted rather as what is hoped, than as what is enjoyed. The groffness of that paffion, which mixes with, and is, perhaps, the foundation of love, disappears

when its gratification is far off and at a distance; but renders the whole offenfive, when defcribed as what is immediately poffeffed. The happy paffion, upon this account, interefts us much lefs than the fearful and the melancholy. We tremble for whatever can disappoint fuch natural and agreeable hopes: and thus enter into all the anxiety, and concern, and diftrefs of the lover.

Hence it is, that, in fome modern tragedies and romances, this paffion appears fo wonderfully interesting. It is not fo much the love of Caftalio and Monimia which attaches us in the Orphan, as the diftrefs which that love occafions. The author who fhould introduce two lovers, in a scene of perfect fecurity, expreffing their mutual fondnefs for one another, would excite laughter, and not fympathy. If a scene of this kind is ever admitted into a tragedy, it is always, in fome meafure, improper, and is endured, not from any sympathy with the paffion that is expressed in it, but from concern for the dangers and difficulties with which the audience foresee that its gratification is likely to be attended.

The referve which the laws of fociety impose upon the fair fex, with regard to this weakness, renders it more peculiarly distressful in them, and, upon that very account, more deeply interefting. We are charmed with the love of Phædra, as it is expressed in the French tragedy of that name, notwithstanding all the extravagance and guilt which attend it. That very extravagance and guilt may be faid, in fome measure, to recommend it to us,

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Her fear, her fhame, her remorse, her horror, her defpair, become thereby more natural and interefting. All the fecondary paffions, if I may be allowed to call them fo, which arife from the fituation of love, become neceffarily more furious and violent; and it is with thefe fecondary paffions only that we can properly be faid to sympathize.

Of all the paffions, however, which are so extravagantly disproportioned to the value of their objects, love is the only one that appears, even to the weakest minds, to have any thing in it that is either graceful or agreeable. In itself, first of all, though it may be ridiculous, it is not naturally odious; and though its confequences are often fatal and dreadful, its intentions are seldom mifchievous. And then, though there is little propriety in the paffion itself, there is a good deal in fome of thofe which always accompany it. There is in love a ftrong mixture of humanity, generosity, kindness, friendship, esteem; paffions with which, of all others, for reafons which fhall be explained immediately, we have the greatest propensity to sympathize, even notwithstanding we are sensible that they are, in fome measure, exceffive. The fympathy which we feel with them, renders the pasfion which they accompany lefs difagreeable, and fupports it in our imagination, notwithstanding all the vices which commonly go along with it; though in the one sex it neceffarily leads to the laft ruin and infamy; and though in the other, where it is apprehended to be least fatal, it is almost always attended with an incapacity for labor, a neglect of

duty, a contempt of fame, and even of common reputation. Notwithstanding all this, the degree of fenfibility and generosity with which it is fuppofed to be accompanied, renders it to many the object of vanity, and they are fond of appearing capable of feeling what would do them no honor if they had really felt it.

It is for a reafon of the fame kind, that a certain referve is neceffary when we talk of our own friends, our own ftudies, our own profeffions. All these are objects which we cannot expect should intereft our companions in the fame degree in which they intereft us. And it is for want of this reserve, that the one half of mankind make bad company to the other. A philofopher is company to a philosopher only; the member of a club, to his own little knot of companions.

CHAP. III.

Of the unfocial Paffions.

THERE is another fet of paffions, which, though

derived from the imagination, yet before we can enter into them, or regard them as graceful or becoming, must always be brought down to a pitch much lower than that to which undifciplined nature would raise them. These are, hatred and refentment, with all their different modifications. With regard to all fuch paffions, our fympathy is divided between the person who feels them, and

the person who is the object of them. The interests of these two are directly oppofite. What our fympathy with the person who feels them would prompt us to wifh for, our fellow-feeling with the other would lead us to fear. As they are both men, we are concerned for both, and our fear for what the one may fuffer, damps our refentment for what the other has fuffered. Our fympathy, therefore, with the man who has received the provocation, neceffarily falls fhort of the paffion which naturally animates him, not only upon account of those general causes which render all sympathetic paflions inferior to the original ones, but upon account of that particular caufe which is peculiar to itself, our opposite sympathy with another perfon. Before refentment, therefore, can become graceful and agreeable, it must be more humbled and brought down below that pitch to which it would naturally rise, than almost any other paffion.

Mankind, at the fame time, have a very strong fense of the injuries that are done to another. The villain, in a tragedy or romance, is as much the object of our indignation, as the hero is that of our fympathy and affection. We deteft Iago as much as we esteem Othello; and delight as much in the punishment of the one, as we are grieved at the distress of the other. But though mankind have so strong a fellow-feeling with the injuries that are done to their brethren, they do not always refent them the more that the fufferer appears to resent them. Upon moft occafions, the greater his patience, his mildness, his humanity, provided

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