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duct, the grofs infolence and injuftice which it feems to involve in it, often fhock and exafperate us more than all the mischief which we have fuffered. To bring him back to a more just sense of what is due to other people, to make him sensible of what he owes us, and of the wrong that he has done to us, is frequently the principal end propofed in our revenge, which is always imperfect when it cannot accomplish this. When our enemy appears to have done us no injury, when we are fenfible that he acted quite properly, that, in his fituation, we should have done the fame thing, and that we deferved from him all the mischief we met with; in that cafe, if we have the least spark either of candor or justice, we can entertain no fort of refentment.

Before any thing, therefore, can be the complete and proper object, either of gratitude or resentment, it must poffefs three different qualifications. First, it must be the cause of pleasure in the one cafe, and of pain in the other. Secondly, it must be capable of feeling those sensations. And, thirdly, it muft not only have produced those sensations, but it must have produced them from defign, and from a defign that is approved of in the one cafe, and difapproved of in the other. It is by the first qualification, that any object is capable of exciting those paffions: it is by thẹ fecond, that it is in any refpect capable of gratifying them the third qualification is not only neceffary for their complete fatisfaction, but as it gives a pleasure or pain that is both exquifite and

peculiar, it is likewise an additional exciting cause of those paffions.

As what gives pleasure or pain, therefore, either in one way or another, is the fole exciting cause of gratitude and refentment; though the intentions of any person should be ever fo proper and beneficent, on the one hand, or ever fo improper and malevolent on the other; yet, if he has failed in producing either the good or the evil which he intended, as one of the exciting causes is wanting in both cafes, lefs gratitude feems due to him in the one, and less resentment in the other. And, on the contrary, though in the intentions of any perfon, there was either no laudable degree of benevolence on the one hand, or no blamable degree of malice on the other; yet, if his actions fhould produce either great good or great evil, as one of the exciting caufes takes place upon both these occafions, fome gratitude is apt to arise towards him in the one, and some resentment in the other. A shadow of merit seems to fall upon him in the first, a fhadow of demerit in the second. And, as the confequences of actions are altogether under the empire of Fortune, hence arifes her influence upon the fentiments of mankind with regard to merit and demerit.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune. THE effect of this influence of fortune is, firft,

to diminish our fenfe of the merit or demerit of thofe actions which arofe from the most laudable or blamable intentions, when they fail of producing their propofed effects: and, fecondly, to increase our sense of the merit or demerit of actions, beyond what is due to the motives or affections from which they proceed, when they accidentally give occafion either to extraordinary pleasure or pain.

1. First, I fay, though the intentions of any perfon fhould be ever so proper and beneficent, on the one hand, or ever fo improper and malevolent, on the other, yet, if they fail in producing their effects, his merit seems imperfect in the one case, and his demerit incomplete in the other. Nor is this irregularity of fentiment felt only by thofe who are immediately affected by the confequences of any action. It is felt, in fome measure even by the impartial spectator. The man who folicits an office for another, without obtaining it, is regarded as his friend, and feems to deferve his love and affection. But the man who not only folicits, but procures it, is more peculiarly confidered as his patron and benefactor, and is entitled to his refpect and gratitude. The perfon obliged, we are apt to think, may, with fome juftice, imagine himfelf on a level with the firft: but we cannot enter VOL. I. M

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into his fentiments, if he does not feel himself inferior to the second. It is common indeed to say that we are equally obliged to the man who has endeavoured to serve us, as to him who actually did fo. It is the speech which we conftantly make upon every unsuccessful attempt of this kind; but which, like all other fine speeches, must be understood with a grain of allowance. The fentiments which a man of generosity entertains for the friend who fails, may often indeed be nearly the fame with those which he conceives for him who fucceeds: and the more generous he is, the more nearly will those sentiments approach to an exact level. With the truly generous, to be beloved, to be esteemed by those whom they themselves think worthy of esteem, gives more pleasure, and thereby excites more gratitude, than all the advantages which they can ever expect from those sentiments. When they lose those advantages therefore, they seem to lose but a trifle, which is fcarce worth regarding. They still however lose something. Their pleasure therefore, and confequently their gratitude, is not perfectly complete and accordingly if, between the friend who fails and the friend who fucceeds, all other circumstances are equal, there will, even in the nobleft and the best mind, be fome little difference of affection in favor of him who fucceeds. Nay, fo unjuft are mankind in this refpect, that though the intended benefit should be procured yet if it is not procured by the means of a particular benefactor, they are apt to think that lets gratitude is due to the man, who with

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the best intentions in the world could do no more than help it a little forward. As their gratitude is in this cafe divided among the different persons who contributed to their pleasure, a smaller share of it seems due to any one. Such

a person, we hear men commonly fay, intended no doubt to serve us; and we really believe exerted himself to the utmoft of his abilities for that purpose. We are not, however, obliged to him for this benefit; fince, had it not been for the concurrence of others, all that he could have done would never have brought it about. This confideration, they imagine, fhould, even in the eyes of the impartial spectator, diminish the debt which they owe to him. The person himself who has unsuccessfully endeavoured to confer a benefit, has by no means the fame dependency upon the gratitude of the man whom he meant to oblige, nor the fame sense of his own merit towards him, which he would have had in the case of success.

Even the merit of talents and abilities which fome accident has hindered from producing their effects, feems in fome measure imperfect, even to those who are fully convinced of their capacity to produce them. The general who has been hindered by the envy of minifters from gaining fome great advantage over the enemies of his country, regrets the lofs of the opportunity for ever after. Nor is it only upon account of the public that he regrets it. He laments that he was hindered from performing an action which would have added a new luftre to his character in his own eyes, as