resentment even of an odious perfon, when he is injured by those to whom he has given no provocation. Our difapprobation of his ordinary character and conduct does not in this cafe altogether prevent our fellow-feeling with his natural indignation; though with those who are not either extremely candid, or who have not been accustomed to correct and regulate their natural fentiments by general rules, it is very apt to damp it. Upon fome occafions, indeed, we both punish and approve of punishment, merely from a view to the general interest of society, which, we imagine, cannot otherwise be secured. Of this kind are all the punishments inflicted for breaches of what is called either civil police, or military dif cipline. Such crimes do not immediately or directely hurt any particular person; but their remote confequences, it is fuppofed, do produce, or might produce, either a confiderable inconveniency, or a great diforder in the fociety. A centinel, for example, who falls afleep upon his watch, suffers death by the laws of war, because fuch carelessness might endanger the whole army. This feverity may, upon many occafions, appear neceffary, and, for that reason, juft and proper. When the preservation of an individual is inconsistent with the safety of a multitude, nothing can be more juft than that the many should be preferred to the one. Yet this punishment, how neceffary foever, always appears to be exceffively fevere. The natural atrocity of the crime feems to be fo little, and the punishment fo great, that it is with great

difficulty that our heart can reconcile itself to it. Though fuch carelefinefs appears very blamable, yet the thought of this crime does not naturally excite any fuch refentment, as would prompt us to take fuch dreadful revenge. A man of humanity muft recollect himfelf, muft make an effort, and exert his whole firmnefs and refolution, before he can bring himfelf either to inflict it, or to go along with it when it is inflicted by others. It> is not, however, in this manner, that he looks upon the juft punishment of an ungrateful murderer or parricide. His heart, in this cafe, applauds with ardor, and even with tranfport, the just retaliation which feems due to fuch deteftable crimes, and which, if, by any accident, they fhould happen to escape, he would be highly enraged and difappointed. The very different fentiments with which the fpectator views thofe different punishments, is a proof that his approbation of the one is far from being founded upon the fame principles with that of the other. He looks upon the centinel as an unfortunate victim, who, indeed, muft, and ought to be, devoted to the fafety of numbers, but whom ftill, in his heart, he would be glad to fave; and he is only forry, that the interest of the many should oppose it. But if the murderer fhould efcape from punishment, it would excite his highest indignation, and he would call upon God to avenge, in another world, that crime which the mjuftice of mankind had neglected to aftife upon earth..

For it well deferves to be taken notice of, that

we are so far from imagining that injustice ought to be punished in this life, merely on account of the order of fociety, which cannot otherwise be maintained, that Nature teaches us to hope, and religion, we fuppofe, authorizes us to expect, that it will be punished, even in a life to come. Our sense of its ill defert pursues it, if I may fay fo, even beyond the grave, though the example of its punishment there cannot ferve to deter the reft of mankind, who see it not, who know it not, from being guilty of the like practices here. The juftice of God, however, we think, ftill requires, that he fhould hereafter avenge the injuries of the widow and the fatherlefs, who are here fo often infulted with impunity. In every religion, and in every fuperftition that the world has ever beheld, accordingly, there has been a Tartarus as well as an Elifium; a place provided for the punishment of the wicked, as well as one for the reward of the just.

SECTION III.

OF the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions.

INTRODUCTION.

WHATEVER praise or blame can be

due to any action, must belong either first, to the intention or affection of the heart, from which it proceeds; or, fecondly, to the external action or movement of the body, which this affection gives occafion to; or, laftly to the good or bad confequences, which actually, and in fact, proceed from it. These three different things conftitute the whole nature and circumstances of the action, and must be the foundation of whatever quality can belong to it.

That the two laft of these three circumftances cannot be that foundation of any praise or blame, is abundantly evident; nor has the contrary ever been afferted by any body. The external action or movement of the body is often the same in the moft innocent and in the most blamable actions. He who shoots a bird, and he who fhoots a man, both of them perform the same external movement: each of them draws the trigger of a gun. The confequences which actually, and in fact, happen

to proceed from any action, are, if poffible, ftill more indifferent either to praise or blame, than even the external movement of the body. As they depend, not upon the agent, but upon fortune, they cannot be the proper foundation for any fentiment, of which his character and conduct are the objects.

The only confequences for which he can be anfwerable, or by which he can deferve either approbation or disapprobation of any kind, are those which were fomeway or other intended, or those which, at leaft, fhow fome agreeable or difagreeable quality in the intention of the heart, from which he acted. To the intention or affection of the heart, therefore, to the propriety or impropriety, to the beneficence or hurtfulness of the defign, all praise or blame, all approbation or disapprobation, of any kind, which can juftly be beftowed upon any action, must ultimately belong.

When this maxim is thus propofed, in abstract and general terms, there is nobody who does not agree to it. Its self-evident justice is acknowledged by all the world, and there is not a diffenting voice among all mankind. Every body allows, that how different foever the accidental, the unintended and unforeseen confequences of different actions, yet, if the intentions or affections from which they arofe were, on the one hand, equally proper and equally beneficent, or, on the other, equally improper and equally malevolent, the merit or demerit of the actions is ftill the fame, and