have been done to him; and we are as ready to despise him for the defect, as to hate him for the excess of this paffion.

The infpired writers would not furely have talked fo frequently or fo ftrongly of the wrath and anger of God, if they had regarded every degree of thofe paffions as vicious and evil, even in fo weak and imperfect a creature

as man.

Let it be confidered too, that the prefent inquiry is not concerning a matter of right, if I may say so, but concerning a matter of fact. We are not at prefent

examining upon what principles a perfect being would approve of the punishment of bad actions; but upon what principles fo wek and imperfect a creature as man actually and in fact approves of it. The principles which I have just now mentioned, it is evident, have a very great effect upon his fentiments; and it seems wifely ordered that it fhould be fo. The very existence of fociety requires that unmerited and unprovoked malice fhould be reftrained by proper punishments; and confquently, that to inflict thofe punifhments should be regarded as a proper and laudable action. Though man, therefore, be naturally endowed with a defire of the welfare and pref.rvation of fociety, yet the Author of nature has not intrusted it to his reafon to find out that a certain application of punishments is the proper means of attaining this end; but has endowed him with an immediate and inftinctive approbation of that very application which is moft proper to attain it. The economy of nature is in this refpect of a piece with what it is upon many other occafions. With regard to all those ends which, upon account of their peculiar importance, may be regarded, if fuch an expreffion is allowable, as the favorite ends of nature, fhe has conftantly in this manner not only endowed mankind with an appetite for the end which the prope fes, but likewife with an appetite for the means by which alone this end can be brought about, for their own fakes, and independent of their

tendency to produce it. Thus felf-prefervation, and the propagation of the fpecies, are the great ends which Nature feems to have proposed in the formation of all animals. Mankind are endowed with a defire of thofe ends, and an averfion to the contrary; with a love of life, and a dread of diffolution; with a defire of the continuance and perpetuity of the fpecies, and with an averfion to the thoughts of its entire extinction. But though we are in this manner endowed with a very ftrong defice of thofe ends, it has not been intrusted to the flow and uncertain determinations of our reafon, to find out the proper means of bringing them about. Nature has directed us to the greater part of thefe by original and immediate inftincts. Hunger, thirst, the paffion which unites the two fexes, the love of pleasure, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply thofe means for their own fakes, and without any confideration of their tendency to thofe beneficent ends which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them.

Before I conclude this note, I must take notice of a difference between the approbation of propriety and that of merit or beneficence. Before we approve of the fentiments of any perfon as proper and suitable to their objects, we must not only be affected in the fame manner as he is, but we must perceive this harmony and correspondence of fentiments between him and ourselves. Thus, though

upon hearing of a misfortune that had befallen my friend, I fhould conceive precifely that degree of concern which he gives way to; yet till I am informed of the manner in which he behaves, till I perceive the harmony between his emotions and mine, I cannot be faid to approve of the fentiments which influence his behaviour. The approbation of propriety therefore requires, not only that we should entirely fympathize with the perfon who acts, but that we should perceive this perfect concord between his fentiments and our own. On the contrary, when I hear of a benefit that has been bestowed upon another person, let him who has received it be affected in what manner he pleases, if, by bringing his cafe home to myself, I feel

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gratitude arife in my own breaft, I neceffarily approve of the conduct of his benefactor, and regard it as meritorious, and the proper object of reward. Whether the perfon who has received the benefit conceives gratitude or not, cannot, it is evident, in any degree alter our sentiments with regard to the merit of him who has bestowed it. No actual correfpondence of fentiments, therefore, is here required. It is fufficient that if he was grateful, they would correfpond; and our fenfe of merit is often founded upon one of thofe illufive fympathies, by which, when we bring home to ourselves the cafe of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the perfon principally concerned is incapable of being affected. There is a fimilar difference between our disapprobation of demerit, and tha of impropriety.

SECTION

I I.

Of Juftice and Beneficence.

CHA P. 1.

Comparison of thofe two virtues.

ACTIONS of a beneficent tendency, which proceed from proper motives, feem alone to require reward; because fuch alone are the approved objects of gratitude, or excite the sympathetic gratitude of the fpectator.

Actions of a hurtful tendency, which proceed from improper motives, feem alone to deserve punishment; because such alone are the approved objects of refentment, or excite the sympathetic refentment of the spectator.

Beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment; because the mere want of beneficence tends to do no real pofitive evil. It may disappoint of the good which might reasonably have been expected, and upon that account it inay juftly excite diflike and difapprobation: it cannot, however, provoke any refentment which mankind will go along with. The man who does not recompense his benefactor, when he has it in his power, and when his benefactor needs his affiftance, is, no doubt, guilty of the blackest ingratitude. The heart of every impartial spectator rejects all fellow-feeling with the

felfishness of his motives, and he is the proper object of the highest disapprobation. But ftill he does no pofitive hurt to any body. He only does not do that good which in propriety he ought to have done. He is the object of hatred, a paffion which is naturally excited by impropriety of fentiment and behaviour; not of refentment, a paffion which is never properly called forth but by actions which tend to do real and pofitive hurt to some particular perfons. His want of gratitude, therefore, cannot be punished. To oblige him by force to perform what in gratitude he ought to perform, and what every impartial spectator would approve of him for performing, would, if poffible, be ftill more improper than his neglecting to perform it. His benefactor would difhonor himself if he attempted by violence to conftrain him to gratitude, and it would be impertinent for any third person, who was not the fuperior of either, to intermeddle. But of all the duties of beneficence, those which gratitude recommends to us approach nearest to what is called a perfect and complete obligation. What friendship, what generofity, what charity, would prompt us to do with univerfal approbation, is ftill more free, and can ftill lefs be extorted by force than the duties of gratitude. We talk of the debt of gratitude, not of charity, or generofity, nor even of friendship, when friendship is mere efteem, and has not been enhanced and complicated with gratitude for good offices. Refentment seems to have been given us by nature for defence, and for defence only. It is the fafeguard